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 1
1 Introduction 
1.1 The state of financial globalization 
Since the end of World War II, the explicit barriers to international investment activity have 
been sharply knocked down and the financial markets of most countries are not closed to cross-
border trade in financial assets. Over the past decades, financial markets have increasingly 
extended beyond national borders. The reduction of formal barriers to trade in financial assets 
is often called “financial globalization” (see Stulz 2005b). 
“Friedman (2005) makes the case that globalization leads to a flat world. By that, he means 
that it removes obstacles that, in the past, would have prevented firms and individuals from 
competing with each other across the world. Such competition improves welfare not only by 
insuring that goods are produced at the lowest cost but also by making sure that consumers get 
access to new and better goods. ………the metaphor is helpful to understand the forces that 
shape our world. It is even more apt to describe the financial world than the world of trade in 
goods” (Stulz, 2005a, page 1). 
“In neoclassical models, financial globalization generates major economic benefits. In 
particular, it enables investors worldwide to share risks better1, it allows capital to flow where 
its productivity is the highest, and it provides countries with an opportunity to reap the benefits 
of their respective comparative advantages (see Stulz (1999a), for a review)” (Stulz, 2005b, 
pp.1595). It generates welfare gains by reducing the volatility of aggregate consumption and 
also by delinking national consumption and income (Kose et al, 2006). Welfare is maximized 
with complete financial globalization and perfect markets within countries. Kaminski and 
Schmuckler (2006) constructed a comprehensive chronology of financial liberalization in 28 
mature and emerging market economies since 1973 to examine the short- and long-run effects 
of financial liberalization on capital markets. Their results revealed that financial liberalization 
is followed by more pronounced boom-bust cycles in the short run. However, financial 
liberalization leads to more stable markets in the long run.  
Actually, international financial markets are an inherent feature of today’s economies: the 
transmission of savings across countries has been facilitated; the agents in different countries 
have been enabled to hedge macroeconomic and financial risks; and the agents have been 
allowed to diversify and optimize their international asset and liability portfolios. (see Stark 
2006). 
                                                     
1 See Sorensen et al. (2007), Artis and Hoffman (2006a, 2006b), Giannone and Reichlin (2006) and Kose et al. 
(2007) for a review. 
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The phenomenon of financial globalization cannot be captured with a single catchword, 
measure or index. It has various dimensions. It is visible in the increasing scale and volume of 
financial transactions, the growing amount of international financial transactions, the 
increasing speed with which transactions are decided, implemented and settled, and the 
widening geographical scope of financial markets to countries and regions that until some 
years ago were cut off from worldwide financial markets (see Stark 2006). 
1.2 Three puzzles in financial globalization 
Although the explicit barriers to international investment activity have been dramatically 
reduced over the last 60 years and the cross-border trade in financial assets has dramatically 
increased, the positive impact of financial globalization has been surprisingly limited. Recent 
studies reveal some evidence different from the predictions of the traditional theory: 
 
a) Direction of capital flows 
International capital flows have increased dramatically since the 1980s. During the 1990s 
gross capital flows between industrial countries rose by 300 percent, much of which is due to 
trade in equity and debt markets (Evans and Hnatkovska, 2006). According to the standard 
neoclassical theory, if production functions are the same across countries, the capital 
productivity must be very high in the developing countries, because the cost of labor is very 
low in these countries. Large capital flows from rich to poor countries might be expected until 
the return to investment is equal in all countries. Therefore, the savings of rich countries could 
finance much-needed investment in poor countries, which increases the rate of returns on 
savings of industrial countries and enhances the economic growth in developing countries (see 
Smaghi 2006).  
However, such flows do not take place. Lucas (1990) made a comparison between the U.S. 
and India in 1988 and the results showed that a massive capital flow from the U.S. to India 
should have been generated by a large return differential because the marginal product of 
capital in India is about 58 times higher than that of the U.S. However, the expected massive 
capital flow did not occur. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003, p.175) hold that “international 
investment in poor countries is at an all time low today”. In 2000, developed countries’ 
investment per capital was US$6,000, much greater than that of developing countries (only 
US$400) (Wolf, 2004, pp. 114-115). Schularick (2005) took a comparative look at capital 
flows to less-developed countries in two eras of financial globalization. He found that 
investment in developing countries was a central element of 19th central financial globalization, 
but plays only a minor role today. “In the year of 1914, 7 out of 12 most important recipients 
of foreign capital were less-developed economies: Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India, South Africa, 
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China and Spain. …… In the year 2001, only one less-developed economy can be found 
among 12 most important destinations for international investment flows – China comes out 
slightly ahead of small Switzerland. The most obvious difference between now and then is that 
the western European economies do not appear at all on the historical list, but belong to the 
most important recipients of foreign investment today” (Schularick, 2005, pp. 10). 
 
b) Home bias  
In spite of the trend towards international portfolio diversification, international investors 
continue to have strong preference for domestic financial assets (Lewis 1999; Karolyi and 
Stulz, 2003). According to data from 1997, the U.S. investors have roughly 91% of their stock 
investment in the U.S. stocks, but the U.S. stocks represent only 49% of the world market 
portfolio (Dahlquist et al, 2002). “Home bias has been - steadily but slowly - declining over 
recent years, especially in Euro area economies as these tend to be relatively highly integrated 
with each other. However, most economies in the world invest only around 10 percent of their 
portfolio wealth in foreign securities although simple benchmarks would suggest a much 
higher share of foreign investment to be optimal” (Stark, 2006, pp. 4). 
 
c) Concentration of corporate ownership  
In their book “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, attention was called by Berle 
and Means (1932) to the prevalence of widely held corporations in the United States, where 
ownership of the corporations was dispersed among small shareholders, but the control right 
was concentrated in the hands of managers. This image has been questioned. On the basis of 
data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, it is found out by 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) that except in countries with very good 
protection of shareholders, few of these firms are widely held. These firms are typically 
controlled by rich families or the state. Equity control by financial institutions is found to be 
uncommon.  
1.3 “Twin Agency Problems” proposed by Stulz to explain the puzzles 
Why is the financial world still full of obstacles in spite of the collapse of explicit barriers 
and capital does not flow to the country with the highest capital productivity? Why are the 
investors hindered from buying foreign financial assets, and the corporate ownership is not 
dispersed to small shareholders? To explain these problems, Stulz (2005b) outlined an 
alternative to the neoclassical model, which is called the “Twin Agency Problems”.1 
                                                     
1 Referring to  Stulz (2005b) for the review of Stulz’s theory and model introduced  in section 1.3. 
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Firstly, the corporate insiders who control the firm can use their power for their own benefit 
and divert from the firm at the expense of outside investors, which creates “the agency 
problem of corporate insider discretion”. But their expropriation is costly and the cost depends 
on the fraction they take away from the company and the quality of the protection of minority 
shareholders.  
Secondly, the state rulers who control the resources of the state can use their powers to 
expropriate the company and improve their welfare at the expense of all shareholders, which 
creates “the agency problem of state ruler discretion”. This expropriation is also costly and the 
cost depends on the fraction the state rulers divert from the company and the quality of 
protection of all investors, or constraints on the state rulers.  
These two problems are twin problems rather than two separate ones and they can feed on 
each other. Expropriation by the state rulers leads to greater consumption of private benefits by 
corporate insiders, because any money the insiders leave in the firm will be partially taken 
away by the state rulers. The corporate insiders “can best reduce the risks of state expropriation 
by taking actions that both increase their discretion and also make it harder for the state rulers 
to monitor their action” (Stulz, 2005b, pp 1597~1598). They can also be connected with state 
rulers and use the state to expropriate other investors. 
“These risks are country-specific because, subject to constraints and trade-offs that depend 
on country characteristics, such as history, laws, location, and economic development, those 
who control a country’s state can establish, enforce, and break rules that affect investor’s 
payoff within that country” (Stulz 2005b, page1597). Nenova (2000) measured corporate 
control benefits – the value that dominant vote-holders deprived from the company controlled 
by them to the detriment of minority shareholders, using data of 661 firms in 18 countries. He 
found that the benefits that controlling shareholders extract out of corporate control are 
significant in magnitude and vary widely across countries. Mexican controlling shareholders 
expropriate one half of the value of the company, sharing the remaining half with minority 
shareholders in proportion to share holdings. The private benefits in Scandinavian and English-
speaking countries are dwarfed in comparison. They are below 4% for Canada, Denmark, 
Hong Kong, Sweden, and the US, and below 10% for Finland, Norway, South Africa, and UK. 
Germanic countries such as Switzerland and Germany exhibit vote values of around 10-15%. 
Stulz (2005b) exploited a simple one-period model to explain the impact of the Twin 
Agency Problems on financial globalization1. In his model the firm exists only one period, 
which is set up at the beginning of the period with the fixed amount of capital, I. The 
controlling shareholders’ cash flow ownership in the company is f. At the end of the period, the 
                                                     
1 The symbols used here are different to the original in Stulz’s model but the essential meaning of the equations is 
the same. The symbols in Stulz’s models are changed to make the same symbols used in different chapters of this 
paper have the same meaning. 
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following sequence of events take place: the investment opportunity yields a cash flow of IR, 
insider expropriators appropriate private benefits equal to a fraction s of IR, the state rulers 
engages in expropriation equal to a fraction h of (1-s) IR, and finally the firm liquidates and 
pays out a liquidating dividend, (1-h) (1-s) IR.  
He assumes that corporate insiders can consume private benefits without cost up to a 
fraction, c of the firm’s cash flow. Any expropriation of cash flow in excess of the threshold 
level c is subject to a cost of 0.5q (Max[s-c, 0])2 IR, where q>0. Investor protection is an 
increasing function of q, which is a country-specific constant. With these assumptions, the 
payoff to the insiders at the end of the period is  
( )( ) [ ]( ) IRcsMaxqIRsfhsIRU 20,5.011 −−+−−=                (1.3-1) 
The insiders choose s to maximize equation 1.3-1. It is always optimal for insiders to 
expropriate at least a fraction c of the cash flow, since they incur no penalty for doing so and 
cannot credibly commit not to that. So the solution is  
( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−+=
q
hfcs 11*                                               (1.3-2) 
The cost burndened on the state rulers because of their expropriation is 0.5ph2 (1-s) IR. Here 
p is an exogenous index of constraints on the state. So the payoff to the state rulers at the end 
of the period is 
( ) ( )sIRphhsIRG −−−= 15.01 2                                     (1.3-3) 
The state rulers choose h to maximize equation 1.3-3 and the optimal h is given by 
p
h 1* =                                                         (1.3-4) 
Minority shareholders value the firm by discounting the firm’s cash flows net of 
expropriation by insiders and the state at their required expected return, i. From their 
perspective, firm value is  
( ) ( )
i
IRh
b
hfc
V +
−⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−+−
=
1
1111
0                           (1.3-5) 
With these models Stulz examined the relationship between ownership concentration and the 
extent of expropriation and he analyzes the influence of these problems on financial 
globalization. As the cost of appropriating private benefits is low and these agency problems 
worsen, diffuse ownership is inefficient and dominated by concentrated ownership, since co-
investment by corporate insiders aligns their incentives better with minority shareholders and, 
therefore, reduces the expropriation of these shareholders.  
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Because of the ownership concentration “the risk sharing benefit of financial globalization is 
inversely related to how much the controlling shareholders co-invest in the equilibrium 
because when corporate insiders co-invest, their portfolios are over weighted in the equity of 
their firm” (Stulz, 2005b, pp. 1598), which is one of the reasons of the home bias puzzle. It is 
shown by Dahlquist et al. (2003) that the phenomenon of home bias is intricately linked to 
corporate governance. When companies are controlled by large investors, portfolio investors 
are limited in the fraction of a firm they can hold. Portfolio investors cannot hold world market 
portfolio in a world with controlling shareholders. So the removal of barriers to international 
investment cannot make the home bias disappear. For the home bias to disappear, it is 
necessary that investor rights improve across countries where firms are mostly controlled by 
large shareholders so that it becomes optimal for firms to have atomistic shareholders in these 
countries.  
Although developing countries are expected to absorb capital inflows because of their high 
physical productivity of capital, the expropriation by corporate insiders and state rulers 
decreases the cash flows, investors can expect to receive from the firms they invest into and 
hence the value of their claims on the firms. When these problems are sufficiently serious, the 
firms cannot promise a high enough return to investors to raise capital and cannot exploit their 
investment opportunities in those countries so capital will inversely outflow from developing 
to developed countries. 
Ownership concentration caused by these Twin Agency Problems limits a country’s ability 
to benefit from financial globalization. “It leads to lower financial development, more 
consumption volatility, stronger correlation between savings and investment, less foreign 
investment, lower firm valuations, smaller firms, and lower economic growth” (Stulz 2005a, 
page 2). 
On the basis of these Twin Agency Problems, Stulz also made predictions about aspects of 
corporate finance. “In particular, countries in which the Twin Agency Problems are severe 
should be expected to have higher leverage and a higher proportion of short-term debt than 
countries in which these problems are more benign. Further, investment in corporate 
governance is less profitable in countries in which the agency problem of state ruler discretion 
is significant because many activities that entrench corporate insiders help reduce the risk of 
expropriation by the state” (Stulz, 2005b, pp. 1634). 
But Stulz’s models have some limitation: his models are one-period and focuses mostly on 
new firms but in reality firms may exist for more than one period; he considered only all-
equity public firms without debt; the cost-of-theft function is given as quadratic, which is too 
concrete and the reasonableness may be doubted.  
 7
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
1.4.1 Developing the model of Stulz’s theory and looking for theoretical 
solutions 
On the basis of Stulz’s theory, remaining the central role of the Twin Agency Problems in 
fostering ownership concentration, this paper makes some changes on Stulz’s model: 
Firstly, one-period model is developed into multi-periods. Stulz assumes that the firm exists 
only in one period and focuses mostly on new firms. But in the reality the firms may survive 
more than one period so that this multi-periods model makes this research more practical. 
Secondly, corporate value model is built under the multi-periods assumption. With the 
multi-periods assumption the participants do not only care about their cash gain at the moment, 
which is considered by Stulz’s model, but also care about the value of their stocks in the firm 
which depends on the cash flow created in the future, which is ignored by Stulz. So a corporate 
value model with the consideration of Twin Agency Problems is built to analyze the impact of 
these problems on corporate value. 
Thirdly, the quality of basic legal environment, under which the law will be well enforced, 
defined as factor k in this study, is added in the model. In Stulz’s model, the cost of 
expropriation paid by corporate insiders depends only on the quality of protection of outside 
shareholders, which means that when the outside shareholders are better protected the insiders 
will most probably be severely punished for their theft. Here, the cost is assumed to also 
depend on k, because in some developing countries legal sense is so weak among the people 
that many rules and laws are ignored as if they did not exist. The factor k influences both 
corporate insiders and state rulers. 
Fourthly, debt is considered in the model. Stulz considers only all-equity firms and analyses 
only portfolio equity flows. In this study i is defined as the average capital cost of the firm, 
which can be seen as WACC (Weighted Average Capital Cost) in the corporate value model, 
so the impact of debt on the expropriation can be considered in this model. 
Fifthly, the cost-of-theft function is more common. Stulz has given a quadratic function to 
define the cost of expropriation burdened by the expropriators. This study does not give a 
concrete cost function, but assume that the function satisfies a series of conditions. The results 
deduced from this function might be more common and convincing. 
On the basis of this improved model, theoretical solutions are supposed to be found to solve 
these Twin Agency Problems, concerning education, economic politic, laws and regulations, 
which should be considered by the government.  
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1.4.2 Researching the Chinese financial market and looking for empirical 
solutions  
Since 1990, the Chinese financial market has experienced a fast expansion. But compared to 
other global financial markets, its development is lagged and disproportional to the economic 
prosperity of China. Recognizing the problem in the development of Chinese financial market 
and finding a good way to make it go further is an urgent task of the economists and politicians.  
According to Stulz’s theory, the Twin Agency Problems cause ownership concentration and 
lead to a lower financial development. So another objective of this study is to investigate the 
situation of ownership concentration caused by Twin Agency Problems in China, examine the 
impact of these problems on Chinese financial market and find some solutions indicated by the 
empirical data. An overview of the development of Chinese financial market in last decades 
and its actual situation will be displayed. Then, on the basis of more than thousand listed 
companies’ financial data from annual report 2007, the actual situation of ownership 
concentration in China will be disclosed. The relationship between ownership concentration 
and other characters, such as capital scale, profitability, ownership structure and so on, will 
also be examined in the practical part. Furthermore, on the basis of empirical evidence, 
practical suggestions will be proposed to solve the Twin Agency Problems in China.  
1.5 The structure of the study 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 an improved model on the basis 
of Stulz’s theory is built, and according to this developed model, the behavior of the 
expropriators after establishing the firm is investigated. Firstly, the assumptions and 
description of the model is introduced, such as the participants, the environment of the firm, 
and the definition of the factors. Then a corporate value model with the consideration of Twin 
Agency Problems is built. With this corporate value model the optimal fraction of 
expropriation and the determinant factors of this fraction are researched for both insider 
expropriators and state rulers. After that the important factors influencing corporate value are 
examined. Then the implication of investor protection on expropriators’ benefit is studied. 
Lastly, the impact of future profitability and capital cost on corporate insiders’ benefit are 
examined. 
Chapter 3 concerns the decisions of expropriators and outside investors before the company 
is established. At first the corporate insiders’ financing and investment decision is investigated, 
including how the firm will be financed, the impact of investor protection, capital cost and 
expected rate of return on the entrepreneurs’ willingness to set up a firm. Then, the outside 
investors’ investment decision is researched, concentrating on the factors which affect the sum 
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that can be collected from outside investors. Lastly, the state rulers’ behavior before the 
establishment of the firm is studied. State rulers can decide to improve or not to improve the 
investor protection. This depends on whether this measure increases their own benefit. 
In Chapter 4 the results in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are combined to find measures proposed 
by the theoretical model to solve the Twin Agency Problems. Firstly, what should be done to 
weaken the Twin Agency Problems is investigated, such as improving investor protection, 
increasing expected rate of return, reducing capital cost and adopting ownership-concentrated 
capital structure. But not all these means could be successfully performed because some may 
come up against embarrassment. So what could be done is examined to find out better ways, 
which can avoid strong resistance. On the basis of the analysis above, strategies for the 
government are suggested. 
Chapter 5 is a practical investigation in China. At first it gives a review of the development 
of Chinese financial market in the last decades and a comparison of Chinese stock market to 
other main stock markets. Then, on the basis of data of more than thousand publicly traded 
Chinese firms, the situation of ownership concentration in China is disclosed. After that, a 
careful comparison of ownership concentration between companies listed abroad and those 
listed in the mainland is performed to see whether listing abroad is a good way to make 
companies more ownership dispersed. Next, the relationship between profitability and 
ownership concentration is examined to testify ownership concentrated companies are really 
more profitable than others. For there exist a few companies which are ownership-dispersed 
and also more profitable than other firms in the same industry, so next, this study focuses on 
the ownership-dispersed companies to research the measures taken by these firms to solve the 
Twin Agency Problems. Lastly, on the basis of the empirical evidence above, suggestions 
indicated by the empirical data are proposed to solve the Twin Agency Problems in China.  
Chapter 6 is a summary of the whole study. 
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2 Expropriators’ Decision on Expropriating the Existing 
Company 
2.1 Assumptions and description of the model 
On the basis of Stulz’s theory, remaining the central role of the Twin Agency Problems, this 
study relaxes some limitation of Stulz’s model and presents a more practical one to analyze the 
implications of these problems on corporate finance.  
In this simplified model, firms also produce one good and pay a liquid dividend at the end of 
each period. The gain of the company is shared by three kinds of participants: state rulers, 
controlling shareholders (also called inside expropriators) and outside investors. State rulers 
are the officials in the government, who control the resources of the country, issue licenses, or 
have other rights to make companies obey their commands. They use their power to 
expropriate the company and their behavior affects the benefit of all investors – controlling 
shareholders and outside investors. Controlling shareholders are also called corporate insiders, 
since they are sometimes managers and at other times controlling shareholders or ultimate 
owners of the companies. Inside expropriators have many chances and rights to steal from the 
company when corporate governance is not so good and their theft affects the outside investors. 
After the gain is expropriated by inside expropriators and state rulers, the outside investors 
share the remaining gain of the company with the inside shareholders, proportional to their 
shares in the company1. 
Different to Stulz’ one-period model, the firms in this model are assumed to survive for n 
periods. At period 0, entrepreneurs decide whether to set up a firm. If the entrepreneur has 
decided to start a firm, he has two sources to finance the company. First, from his own initial 
wealth (W0), he can invest IE in the firm, with a fraction (f) of the equity in the firm, and 
becomes controlling shareholder, on the condition that IE ≤ W0. The rest of the initial wealth he 
can invest in the market, as a portfolio investor. Secondly, he can raise IM from the capital 
market by selling a fraction (1-f) of the firms’ cash flow right. It is assumed that entrepreneur 
retains control of his firm regardless of the fraction of the cash flow right he sells. The 
entrepreneur can also choose to invest all his initial wealth W0 in the capital market if he thinks 
starting a firm is unprofitable. Portfolio investors can invest in any securities issued by all the 
firms but have no control over the firms.  
The capital cost of the firm, i, and the market rate of return of the portfolio, i’, are both 
determined by the supply and demand for funds. The demand for funds is generated by the 
                                                     
1 The assumption in this paragraph is the same with Stulz’s theory, referring to Stulz (2005b). 
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individual firm’s demand, and the supply of funds is generated by entrepreneurs and other 
portfolio investors. Here, it is assumed that i and i’ are risk adjusted, that means i is the market 
demanding rate of return of all investment opportunities, which are as risky as the investment 
in the firm, while i’ is the market rate of return of the portfolio of all the securities.  
A firm has the amount of cash I, equal to the sum of IE and IM, which is invested in a project 
with a net rate of return (Rt) in period (t), so the net profit is RtI. In this model it is assumed that 
the firm has no reinvestment, so all the cash flow realized at period (t) is to be distributed. But 
not all of the cash flow is distributed to shareholders on a pro rata basis. As a benefit of 
controlling the firm or the country, the entrepreneurs and the state rulers can divert part of the 
profit from the firm to themselves, before the rest is distributed as dividend, which is “the 
Twin Agency Problems”, called by Stulz. 
In this model the elements of Becker’s (1968) classic “crime and punishment” framework 
are incorporated into a corporate finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (1976). The 
firms are operated in an environment with limited legal protection of outside shareholders, and 
so the controlling shareholders have opportunity to divert some of the profits of the firms once 
they materialize (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lombardo and Pagano 2002; Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon 2002). These private benefits can take many different forms such as salary, transfer 
pricing, subsidized personal loans, non-arms-length asset transactions, excessive spending on 
corporate planes, and, in some cases, outright theft (Burkart et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2000). 
By committing such misdeeds the expropriators risk being sued and fined for breaking the 
law or agreement with shareholders. The most obvious costs of expropriation are fines, 
imprisonment, and the loss of reputation and position associated with illegal diversion. 
Another cost is bribery of employees, regulators, and politicians to facilitate and hide the 
illegal actions. These direct costs vary across countries because of different regulatory 
environment, with higher costs in countries with strong legal protection for the investors. Dyck 
and Zingales (2004) estimated private benefits of control in 39 countries and found that higher 
private benefits of control are associated with less developed capital markets, more 
concentrated ownership, and more privately negotiated privatization. They also found that 
media pressure and tax enforcement seem to be the dominant factors which restrain private 
benefits. In this study the costs are also assumed to vary across companies because better 
corporate governance can make the expropriation more difficult and expensive.  
In this model the cost burdened on the corporate insiders because of their expropriation 
depends on: 
• q, the quality of  protection of outside shareholders;  
• s, the fraction of  profit diverted by the corporate insiders (0≤s≤1); and 
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• k, the quality of basic legal environment under which the law will be well enforced, 
also called legal sense in this study.  
Factors q and s are also considered by other study (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002), but k is a 
newly added factor in this model. The cost is also assumed to depend on k because in some 
developing countries legal sense is not strong among the people and many rules and laws are 
ignored as if they did not exist. This factor k not only has impact on the expropriation of 
corporate insiders but also influences the behavior of state rulers. 
The expropriation by state rulers takes place after appropriation of private benefits by inside 
expropriators, so that these state rulers do not expropriate the private benefits of the insiders. 
Because most of these benefits are hidden, it is reasonable to believe that they are less subject 
to expropriation by state rulers than cash dividends. Similar to corporate insiders, expropriation 
is also costly to the state rulers. In a democracy, if rulers were to over reduce the payoffs of 
investors, they might not to be re-elected. In a dictatorship, consuming too many private 
benefits might lead rulers to be overthrown. Furthermore, excessive current consumption of 
private benefits by the rulers decreases the value of their future private benefits. Institutions 
and the distribution of political power determine the costs that rulers bear for consuming 
private benefits and these costs vary across countries.  
In this model the cost of the state rulers because of their expropriation depends on:  
• p, the constraint on state rulers or the quality of the protection of all investors;  
• h, the ratio of profit diverted by state rulers to the remaining profit after the 
expropriation by inside expropriators (0≤h≤1); and  
• k, the quality of basic legal environment under which the law will be well enforced, 
also called legal sense in this study. 
Section 2.2 displays a firm value model under the assumption of these expropriations and 
makes a primary research on the implication of these two kinds of expropriations on firm value. 
Section 2.3 focuses on how much the entrepreneur will divert from the firm. These include; 
what is the optimal fraction of profit expropriated by the corporate insiders, defined as s*, 
assuming the quality of investors protection q and k, fraction diverted by state rulers h, and the 
fraction of shares held by controlling shareholder f are given. Here s* is assumed to be 
influenced by h, the fraction diverted by state rulers, because the entrepreneurs know 
empirically how much will be expropriated by state rulers and adjust their fraction s according 
to state rulers’ behavior. And the impact of some important factors on s*, such as ownership 
concentration f, the quality of investor protection q, k and p, expected future profitability R, 
and the capital cost i, will also be examined in this section. In section 2.4, the optimal decision 
of the state rulers will be examined to get the optimal fraction taken by the state rulers, h*, and 
to see the impact of p and k on h*. Here this study assumes, h* cannot be influenced by s, 
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because state rulers do not know how much has been taken away by the insiders, but only 
know how much has been left by them. With the optimal decisions of both corporate insiders 
and state rulers above, the impact of q, k and p on firm value is explored in section 2.5. In 
section 2.6, the impact of investor protection, q, k and p, on the payoff to corporate insiders 
and state rulers is discussed respectively. Section 2.7 investigates the impact of future 
profitability and capital cost on corporate insiders’ interest. Section 2.8 is a summary of 
Chapter 2.  
2.2 Firm value and expropriation by corporate insiders and state rulers 
Stulz assumes that the firm exists only for one period and builds a simple one-period model 
to research these Twin Agency Problems. But in reality, the firms may survive much longer, so 
that the participants not only think about their cash gain at the moment, but also care about the 
value of their stocks in the firms which depends on the future cash flow created by the firms. 
To make this research more practical, in this study, the one-period model of Stulz is developed 
into a multi-period one to examine whether the same or some new conclusions can be made. 
In this section, the model of corporate value is built under the assumption of these 
expropriations to see the impact of Twin Agency Problems on corporate value. It is supposed 
that a firm has been set up at period 0 by the entrepreneur and outside investors with total 
initial investment (I). The firm survives n periods and the cash flow created by the firm at the 
end of period (t) is IRt, fraction s of which is taken away by inside expropriators and the rest is 
IRt (1-s), h of which is expropriated by state rulers, so the net cash flow that can be distributed 
as dividend is only IRt (1-s) (1-h). Minority investors evaluate the firm by discounting the 
firm’s net cash flow after expropriation with the rate of return (i), which is their required rate 
of return for all investment opportunities with the same risk. From their perspective, the 
corporate value at the end of period (t) after the distribution of dividend is 
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Here IRt+m (m=1, 2… n-t) are the cash flows created by the firm in periods from period (t+1) 
to period (n), respectively. 
The equation above indicates that the firm value is related to the fraction taken away by the 
insider expropriators (s) and state rulers (h). To investigate the influence of these two factors on 
firm value, derivation has to be made of Vt with respect to s and h. This mathematic method is 
used throughout this study to examine the relationship between the variables. 
Differentiating the firm value with respect to s and h, respectively, the following is obtained: 
( )
( )∑
−
=
+
+
−−=∂
∂ tn
m
m
mtt
i
hIR
s
V
1
0
1
1 p                                               (2.2-2) 
 14
( )
( )
( )
( )∑ ∑
−
=
−
=
++
∂
∂
+
−−+
−−=∂
∂ tn
m
tn
m
m
mt
m
mtt
h
s
i
hIR
i
sIR
h
V
1 1
0
1
1
1
1 p 1                         (2.2-3) 
These expressions can be obtained because: I, R and i are independent of the fraction 
expropriated by the insiders (s) and state rulers (h); the state rulers do not know how much has 
been taken away by the insiders so that the fraction taken away by them (h), is not impacted by 
the fraction expropriated by the insiders (s); and empirically the insiders know how much will 
be taken away by the state rulers so their behavior is influenced by the state rulers, namely s is 
variable to h. So the first result of this study is as the following:  
Result 2.2-1: The more the corporate insiders and the state rulers expropriate, the less the 
firm value is. 
Doidge et al. (2004) compared the value of foreign firms listed in the U.S. to the value of 
foreign firms that are not listed in the U.S. They found that firms listed in the U.S. have a 
Tobin’s Q ratio that exceeds the Q ratio of firms from the same country that are not listed in the 
U.S. by 16.5% average. They explain this valuation difference with the expropriation by 
corporate insiders. They believe that controlling shareholders of firms listed in the U.S. cannot 
extracts as many private benefits from control compared to controlling shareholders of firms 
not listed in the U.S., but that their firms are better able to take advantage of growth 
opportunities. The growth opportunities of cross-listed firms will be more highly valued than 
those of firms not listed in the U.S., both because cross-listed firms are more able to take 
advantage of these opportunities and because a smaller fraction of the cash flow of these firms 
is expropriated by controlling shareholders. And they find that this effect is greater for firms 
from countries with poorer investor rights. 
Here an additional explanation of this value difference is proposed by equation 2.2-3: 
difference of expropriations by state rulers between the U.S. and other countries. If the 
corporate insiders can consume large private benefits in one country, it is not believable that 
the state rulers in this country are probity and blameless. Indeed, the corporate insiders always 
bribe the officials to let them expropriate minority shareholders. So the minority shareholders 
suffer double expropriations by both controlling shareholders and state rulers and calculate the 
negative impact of both expropriations on the corporate value.  
2.3 Expropriation by corporate insiders 
2.3.1 Optimal fraction of expropriation by corporate insiders 
It is supposed that the firm has been set up at period 0 by the entrepreneur and outside 
investors with total initial investment of I. Here it is assumed that the entrepreneur has invested 
                                                     
1 Referring to equation 2.3.2.2-2, we get ∂s/∂h>0. 
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IE, part of his initial wealth W0, in the firm and has share (f) of the equity ownership in it. His 
remaining wealth, W0- IE, he has invested in the market with the return rate i. Outside 
shareholders have invested IM =I- IE in the firm and hold share (1-f) equity ownership of the 
firm. This study does not consider the sales of equity by the entrepreneur and assumes that the 
entrepreneur is the manager. In the data, controlling shareholders typically serve as managers 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999).  
The cash flow realized by the firm at the end of period (t) is IRt. The entrepreneur diverts 
share s (0≤s≤1) of the cash flow, but he only receives sIRt -e (q, k, s) IRt, where e (q, k, s) is the 
cost-of-theft function. Here q denotes the quality of outside shareholder protection; k denotes 
the quality of basic legal environment. The function e (q, k, s) is assumed to satisfy: 
(a) e(0, k, s)=0; 
(b) eq(q, k, s)>0, when k, s >0; 
(c) e(q, 0, s)=0; 
(d) ek(q, k, s)>0, when q, s >0; 
(e) e(q, k, 0)=0; 
(f) es(q, k, s)>0, when q, k >0; 
(g) ess(q, k, s)>0, when q, k >0; 
(h) esq(q, k, s)>0, when k>0; 
(i) esk(q, k, s)>0, when q >0. 
Assumption (a) means that no fine is incurred when there is no protection of outside 
shareholders; (b) means, the more outside shareholders are protected, the higher the cost to 
expropriate a given fraction of profit; (c) means that no fine is incurred when there is no legal 
sense in one country and the existing laws are not enforced; (d) means that the more intense the 
legal sense in one country is, the more the expropriators must pay for their misdeed because 
the possibility of being caught is higher; (e) implies that no fine is incurred when diversion is 
zero; (f) implies that the more the expropriators steal, the more they have to pay for their 
misdeed; (g) implies that the marginal cost of stealing rises as more is stolen; (h) means that 
the marginal cost of stealing is higher when the quality of minority shareholder protection is 
higher; and finally (i) implies that the marginal cost of stealing is higher when the legal sense 
in one country is better. It is assumed that the cost (e) is borne by the entrepreneur himself 
rather than all the shareholders. 
The remaining cash flow after expropriation by insiders is IRt(1-s), of which the state rulers 
divert share h (0≤h≤1). The cash flow that can be distributed as dividend is IRt(1-s)(1-h), of 
which the controlling shareholders get IRt(1-s)(1-h)f, proportional to their share in the firm. At 
the end of each period, the entrepreneur also gets profit from his investment on the capital 
market, (W0-IE)i’. Except for these new created cash flows he owns share (f) of the firm value 
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and the initial capital (W0- IE) on the capital market. For the purpose of simplification all the 
new acquired cash is supposed to be consumed by the entrepreneur in the next period after he 
gets it and there is no reinvestment. So, with the corporate value model built in the last section, 
at the end of each period, just after the dividend is distributed, the wealth held by the 
entrepreneur is  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )'1,,11 0 iIWfVIRskqesIRfhsIRW Ettttt +−++−+−−=             (2.3.1-1) 
The first term is his share of cash dividend; the following two terms are his net gain from 
expropriation; the fourth term is the market value of the stock held by the entrepreneur in the 
firm. This means that the firm is publicly listed and the entrepreneur can conveniently 
exchange his shares into cash. So, the insiders’ profit from the firm is not only the private 
benefit and the dividend, but also depends on the value of the firm; and the last term is his 
principal and profit of the portfolio investment on the capital market.  
Since the solution for optimal s is independent of the cash flow from the capital market, at 
the end of period t, the entrepreneur will try to maximize 
( )( ) ( ) fVIRskqesIRfhsIRU ttttt +−+−−= ,,11                        (2.3.1-2) 
The first order condition for this problem is given by 
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This can be written as 
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The second order condition is 
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Remembering equation 2.2-2 
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∂2Vt/∂2s=0 is obtained, and with the assumption (g) ess(q, k, s)>0, this second order condition 
is satisfied, so that the optimal fraction of profits expropriated by inside expropriators (s*) 
exists, and s* can be written as s*(q, k, h, f, Vt), a function of q, k, h, f, and Vt. Because the 
fraction of profits expropriated by state rulers (h) is influenced by p, constraint on state rulers 
and the firm value (Vt) is influenced by i and Rt, capital cost and rate of return of the firm. So, 
the optimal fraction (s*) is also impacted by p, i and Rt. The impact of all these factors on the 
optimal fraction (s*) will be investigated in the next section. 
 17
2.3.2 Important factors determining the fraction expropriated by 
corporate insiders 
2.3.2.1 Impact of ownership concentration on expropriation by corporate insiders 
In the last section, the condition has been deduced, under which the corporate insiders can 
maximize their gain from the firm they control. This section goes on to examine this first-order 
condition to get several testable implications of the model. This subsection researches the 
relationship between ownership concentration and corporate insiders’ expropriation. 
Differentiating the first-order condition (equation 2.3.1-4) with respect to f, the following is 
obtained. 
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Rearranging the terms and recalling assumption (g), ess(q, k, s)>0, and equation 2.2-2, ∂Vt/∂s<0, 
the equation  
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Result 2.3.2.1-1: The more shares of ownership the corporate insider holds in the company, 
the less fraction of profit he diverts from the company. 
When the controlling shareholders have higher ownership in the company, they have more 
shares of the cash dividend and the firm value. Hence, they have more incentive to distribute 
dividend in a non-distorting way rather than expropriate minority shareholders in a distorting 
way, and consequently the lower the equilibrium level of expropriation, under a given level of 
q and k. Higher cash-flow ownership reduces minority expropriation, which is also the well-
known Jensen and Meckling (1976) result that higher ownership concentration leads to more 
efficient actions. Other papers (Burkart et al., 1997; Claessens et al., 1999; La porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002) derive similar results. 
If ∂s*/∂f is differentiated further with respect to q,  
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In general, it is not certain that the numerator of this expression is positive. However, the 
cost-of-theft function is assumed to be a power function of q, k and s, such that  
( ) nml skaqskqe =,,                                              (2.3.2.1-4) 
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Here, a is a positive constant. According to assumption (b) and (d), it must be satisfied, l and 
m≥1; and according to assumption (g), n≥2 is obtained. In this case, all the assumptions on the 
function e (q, k, s) hold and differentiations yield 
( ) ( ) 01,, 21 ≥−= −− nmlssq snnkalqskqe ; And                    (2.3.2.1-5) 
( ) 0,, =skqesss  (When n=2) or 
( ) ( )( ) 021,, 3 ≥−−= −nmlsss snnnkaqskqe  (When n>2)           (2.3.2.1-6) 
With this power function it can be also deduced that, 
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( ) ( ) 01,, 2 ≥−= −nmlss snnkaqskqe                           (2.3.2.1-8) 
So from equation 2.3.2.1-3 it is deduced that, 
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But the value of ∂s*/∂f is negative, so the absolute value of ∂s*/∂f is negative related to q, 
which means  
Result 2.3.2.1-2: The more the minority shareholders are protected, the lower the effect of a 
higher ownership concentration on reducing the fraction of profit diverted by corporate 
insiders. 
To better understand this result, an ideal perfect situation can be imagined, where the 
corporate insiders have no any chance to steal from the company. This means the minority 
shareholders are perfectly protected. In this case, no matter how much shares the insiders have 
in the company they will not divert from the company, so that the effect of a change in 
ownership concentration on the level of diversion is zero in this imagined situation.  
This conclusion predicts that, in countries with poor minority investor protection, firm value, 
dividends and private benefit is more sensitive to ownership concentration. The ownership 
concentration will be higher than those countries with better minority investor protection, 
because higher ownership concentration in these countries brings more reduction of 
expropriation by corporate insiders. This greatly increases the cash flow available to the 
                                                     
1 Referring to equation 2.3.2.3-2 we can get this result. 
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minority shareholders. This is consistent to Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), but in their study 
they define q as investor protection and do not consider the expropriation by state rulers.  
If ∂s*/∂f is further differentiated with respect to p, the following equation is obtained. 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )[ ]2
2
2
,,
,,1,,
skqeIR
p
sskqe
s
VhIR
ps
V
p
hIRskqe
pf
s
sst
sss
t
t
t
tss ∂
∂⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂∂
∂+∂
∂
=∂∂
∂
∗∗
∗
  (2.3.2.1-11) 
As done above, assuming the cost-of-theft function to be a power function and recalling 
equation 2.2-2 in this situation, the expression can be written as 
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Because the value of ∂s*/∂f is negative, the absolute value of ∂s*/∂f is positively related to p, 
which means 
Result 2.3.2.1-3: The lower the constraint on state rulers, the smaller the effect of a higher 
ownership concentration on reducing the fraction of profit diverted by corporate insiders. 
Here, an extremely awful situation can be imagined to explain this result. The firm exists in 
a country where the officials are very greedy and not constrained by laws or regulations, so 
that they take away every cent left by the insiders in the company. In this case, the insiders will 
divert all the profit from the company no matter how many shares they hold, so that the effect 
of change in ownership concentration on the level of diversion is also zero in this situation.  
This conclusion predicts that, in countries with poor constraint on state rulers, firm value, 
dividends and private benefits are less sensitive to ownership concentration. This is because 
higher ownership concentration in these countries does not lead to great reduction of 
expropriation by corporate insiders and hence the cash flow available to the minority 
shareholders will not increase a lot. This is consistent to La Porta et al., (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002), who found support for the lower sensitivity of Tobin’s Q 
to ownership concentration in countries with poor investor protection.  
Finally, if ∂s*/∂f is differentiated with respect to k, it is written 
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(2.3.2.1-13) 
                                                     
1 Because the cost of expropriation by the state ruler increases with p, we can assume that the state ruler diverts less when 
p is greater which means ∂h*/∂p<0. Referring to equation 2.4.2-2, this conclusion will be deduced. 
2 Referring to equation 2.3.2.3-6 we have ∂s*/∂p<0. 
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Similarly, to the power function and recalling equations 2.2-2 and 2.3.2.1-6, it can be written 
as 
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(2.3.2.1-15) 
The first term is negative2 and implies that the effect of k on expropriation by state rulers. 
This is similar to the effect of p: the less the state rulers are constrained by legal sense, the 
smaller the effect of a higher ownership concentration on reducing the fraction of profit 
diverted by corporate insiders. The second term is positive and implies the effect of k on 
expropriation by insiders. This is similar to the effect of q: the more the corporate insiders are 
constrained by legal sense, the less the effect of a higher ownership concentration on reducing 
the fraction of profit diverted by corporate insiders. So, the influence of legal sense (k) on the 
effect of higher ownership concentration on reducing expropriation by corporate insiders is 
two-edged and the ultimate influence depends on which effect dominates.  
Actually, the improvement of k will decrease expropriation by all the expropriators, insider 
controllers and state rulers. If these Twin Agency Problems are lightened, the ownership 
concentration will also be lightened. In an ideal society (without any misdeed) both the 
corporate insiders and state rulers will not expropriate the company and the dispersed 
ownership can be achieved.  
Now it can be explained why La Porta et al., (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2002) have a conclusion different from Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). The reason 
may be that they do not separate investor protection into minority shareholder protection, 
constraint on state rulers and legal sense. In this model, it is seen that q, p and k have different 
implications on the effects of higher ownership concentration on reducing expropriation by 
corporate insiders. Ownership concentration may be most useful to solve the agency problem 
in countries with better constraints on state rulers but poor minority shareholder protection. 
                                                     
1 Referring to equation 2.3.2.3-4, the expression of ∂s*/∂k is obtained. 
2 Because the cost of expropriation by the state ruler increases with k, it can be assumed that the state ruler diverts less 
when k is greater, which means ∂h*/∂k<0. Referring to equation 2.4.2-4,  this conclusion will be deduced. 
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2.3.2.2 Impact of expropriation by state rulers on expropriation by corporate insiders 
In the introduction, it is mentioned that these two problems are twin problems rather than 
two separate ones, because the fraction of profit expropriated by corporate insiders will be 
influenced by the fraction expropriated by state rulers. The corporate insiders can best reduce 
the risks of state expropriation by taking actions that both increase their discretion and also 
make it harder to monitor their action. So in this section, the impact of the fraction 
expropriated by state rulers (h) on the fraction expropriated by corporate insiders (s) is 
examined. 
If differentiating the first order condition with respect to h, it is obtained that 
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According to assumption (g),  
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Result 2.3.2.2-1: The more the state ruler expropriates, the more the controlling shareholder 
diverts if they have ownership in the company. 
More expropriation by the state ruler leads to greater consumption of private benefits by 
insiders because any money the insider leaves in the firm will be partially expropriated by the 
state. The entrepreneur can take actions to reduce the state’s expropriation, one of which is 
consuming more private benefits, but they have many other tools at their disposal to reduce 
expropriation by the state.  
If differentiating ∂s*/∂h further with respect to f, the following equation is obtained. 
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Result 2.3.2.2-2: The more the ownership held by corporate insiders in the firm, the greater 
the effect of higher fraction expropriated by state rulers on increasing the fraction expropriated 
by corporate insiders. 
From equation 2.3.2.2-2 it can be seen that when the entrepreneur has no share in the firm, 
the value of ∂s*/∂h is zero, which means the fraction expropriated by corporate insider is 
independent of the fraction expropriated by state rulers, because all the money the corporate 
insider leaves in the firm belongs to others, so that he has less or no willingness to reduce the 
expropriation by state rulers. But if he has higher ownership in the firm he will try his best to 
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reduce the expropriation by the state rulers because the more the state rulers take away, the less 
he can get as cash dividend. 
2.3.2.3 Impact of investor protection on expropriation by corporate insiders 
In this section, the impact of q, k and p on the expropriation by inside expropriators is 
examined. At first, differentiating the first order condition (equation 2.3.1-4) with respect to q, 
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With our assumption (g) and (h) on the cost-of-theft function e,  
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Result 2.3.2.3-1: The better the minority shareholder protection, the less the fraction of e               
expropriation by corporate insiders. 
This prediction flows because better protection (higher q) implies that diversion is more 
costly because the law is designed more carefully and has fewer leaks. The inside expropriators 
are more likely to be caught and severely punished. This result is consistent with Nenova 
(2000). 
Now, taking the differentiation of the first order condition with respect to k, it is given  
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Remembering assumption (i), this implies that 
( ) ( )( ) 0,,
,,
11 p∗
∗−
=
+
∗∗
∗ −+∂
∂+∂
∂
=∂
∂ ∑
skqeIR
skqeIR
i
IR
k
hf
k
hfIR
k
s
sst
skt
tn
m
m
mt
t
1                   (2.3.2.3-4) 
Result 2.3.2.3-2: The better the legal sense, the less the fraction of expropriation by 
corporate insiders. 
From equation 2.3.2.3-4, it is seen that legal sense influences the fraction expropriated by 
corporate insiders in two ways. On the one hand, it increases the cost of theft burdened on the 
corporate insiders, which forces the insiders to steal less. On the other hand, it reduces the 
fraction taken away by state rulers, which also decreases the expropriation by the corporate 
insiders (see result 2.3.2.2-1). This result also implies that the improvement of legal sense can 
lighten the two kinds of expropriations at the same time (both the expropriation by insiders and 
state rulers), so measures on improving legal sense may get twice the result with half the effort. 
                                                     
1 Because ∂h*/∂k<0. Referring to equation 2.4.2-4 this conclusion will be deduced. 
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Finally, differentiating the first order condition with respect to p, the equation below is 
obtained 
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With the assumption (g) of the cost function e, equation 2.3.2.3-6 is obtained. 
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Result 2.3.2.3-3: The more the state rulers are constrained, the less the corporate insiders 
expropriate if they have ownership in the company. 
The improvement of constraint on state rulers (p) reduces the fraction expropriated by 
corporate insiders because this improvement forces the state rulers to take less from the firm, 
and leads to lower fraction expropriated by corporate insiders (see result 2.3.2.2-1). On the one 
hand, the money the insider leaves in the firm will be less expropriated by state rulers and 
insider gets more cash dividends. On the other hand, the firm value rises when the state rulers 
expropriate less and this makes the insiders to care more about their share value they hold than 
the private benefit, thus they consume less private benefit.  
If differentiating ∂s*/∂p further with respect to f, equation 2.3.2.3-7 is obtained. 
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But the value of ∂s*/∂p is negative, so the absolute value of ∂s*/∂f is positively related to p, 
which means  
Result 2.3.2.3-4: The more ownership the corporate insiders hold in the firm, the more the 
effect of better constraint on state rulers on reducing the fraction of profit diverted by corporate 
insiders. 
From equation 2.3.2.3-6 it can be seen that when the entrepreneur has no share in the firm, 
the value of ∂s*/∂p is zero. This means that the fraction expropriated by corporate insider is 
independent of the constraint on state rulers. He will not reduce their private benefit when the 
constraint on state rulers is improved because all the money the corporate insider leaves in the 
firm belongs to others, so that he does not care how corrupt the state rulers are and how much 
the state rulers will take away from the firm. But if he has higher ownership in the firm he will 
greatly reduce his private benefit expropriated from the firm when the constraint on state rulers 
is improved.  
                                                     
1 Because ∂h*/∂p<0. Referring to equation 2.4.2-2  this conclusion will be deduced. 
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2.3.2.4 Impact of future profitability and capital cost on expropriation by corporate 
insiders 
In this model, the firms survive several periods. So the insiders must think about the 
expected profits in the future when they make their decisions.  
Supposing the rate of return in the future is constant, R, the firm value can be written as 
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Differentiating equation 2.3.1-4 with respect to R, it becomes 
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With the constant R, equation 2.2-2 changed to  
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So it is obtained that  
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Substituting equation 2.3.2.4-4 into equation 2.3.2.4-2, remembering assumption (g) and 
rearranging it, it becomes 
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Result 2.3.2.4-1: The higher the expected rate of return in the future, the less the fraction 
expropriated by corporate insiders. 
From result 2.2-1 it is known that the expropriation by corporate insiders decreases the firm 
value which means that the value of ∂Vt/∂s is negative. Equation 2.3.2.4-4 indicates that the 
value of ∂Vt/∂s is negatively related to R and the absolute value of ∂Vt/∂s is positively related to 
R. This means that the higher the rate of return in the future, the greater the effect of 
expropriation by corporate insiders on decreasing the firm value so that the loss burdened by 
the insiders will also increase. Therefore, when the rate of return is expected to rise, the insiders 
care more about the value of stock he holds and will divert less from the company. The private 
benefit the insider loses, when he expropriates less, will be more compensated by the increase 
of share value he holds in the firm.  
If differentiating the equation 2.3.1-4 with respect to i, it is 
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With equation 2.2-2 it becomes  
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Substituting equation 2.3.2.4-7 into 2.3.2.4-6, it becomes 
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Result 2.3.2.4-2: The corporate insider expropriates more when the capital cost increases. 
As mentioned before, the expropriation by corporate insiders decreases the firm value. 
Equation 2.3.2.4-7 indicates that the value of ∂Vt/∂s is positively related to i but its absolute 
value is negatively related to i. This means that the higher the capital cost, the less the effect of 
expropriation by corporate insiders on decreasing the firm value so that the loss burdened on 
the insiders will also decrease. Contrary to his reaction to the change of R, when the capital 
cost rises, the insider cares less about the value of stock he holds and will divert more from the 
company. The stock value the insider loses (when he expropriates more), will be more 
compensated by his private benefit from the company. 
Capital cost is decided by the market and adjusted with the risk of the firm or project. When 
the future becomes more risky, the investors including the entrepreneur ask for more risk 
premium. This increases the capital cost and the entrepreneur will think more of the cash flow 
he gets at the moment and take more away from the company. Other factors, like inflation and 
the change of risk free interest rate (which also lead to a rise in i), have similar effects on the 
fraction expropriated by corporate insiders.  
Using firm-level data from 38 countries, Himmelberg et al. (2002) estimated the relationship 
among investor protection, inside ownership, and the marginal cost of capital. They found that 
the weaker the investor protection, the higher the concentration of inside equity ownership; and 
the higher the concentration of inside ownership, the higher the implied cost of capital. They 
interpret this relationship with idiosyncratic risk. The marginal cost of capital is a weighted 
average of terms reflecting both idiosyncratic and systematic risk. Weak investor protection 
increases the weight on idiosyncratic risk. By retaining a higher fraction of equity, insiders can 
credibly commit to low rate of expropriation, but are forced to bear higher levels of 
diversifiable risk (idiosyncratic risk), which increases the capital cost.  
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For the companies with debt, i can be understood as weighted average capital cost (WACC). 
Under certain conditions, appropriate debt will decrease WACC, which decreases the interest 
of insiders to expropriate. Analysis by Friedman et al. (2003) suggested that in a weaker legal 
environment, the entrepreneur finances projects with more debt relative to equity, even though 
this increases the probability of bankruptcy. Their interpretation is, for a given level of desired 
funding, increased use of debt reduces reliance on outside equity, thus allowing the 
entrepreneur to retain more ownership. This reduces the moral hazard problem of the 
entrepreneur, potentially increasing the value of the firm. According to the model in this study, 
creditors together with the minority shareholders are seen as outside investors and both at the 
risk of expropriation. These creditors are better protected because the entrepreneurs must think 
about the possibility of bankruptcy if they expropriate too much and cannot pay back the debt. 
The state rulers are also not glad to see the bankrupt of many firms in their area. So the use of 
debt increases the cost-of-theft and is helpful to lighten these agency problems.  
Stulz (1999) examines the impact of globalization on the cost of equity capital and argues 
that the cost of equity capital decreases because of the globalization for two important reasons. 
Firstly, globalization reduces the expected return that investors require to invest in equity to 
compensate them for the risk they bear. This is because globalization can decrease risk for the 
world equity markets as a whole and hence reduce each country’s cost of capital by making 
risks diversified that would not otherwise be the case. Secondly, globalization improves firm 
governance, which decreases the cost of capital. Globalization affects firm governance in 
several ways: new shareholders in the firm have skills and information that enables them to 
monitor management in ways local investors could not. Globalization creates competition 
among suppliers of capital, which reduces the cost of capital for firms in that it reduces the 
rents that accrue to the capital providers and reduces transaction costs. Globalization makes a 
firm that is safe from takeovers in a closed market not safe in an open market, so that 
globalization increases the monitoring of managers both from existing shareholders and from 
potential bidders. Globalization gives firms access to financial technology that enables them to 
raise funds using new securities and to manage their risks more effectively. But empirical 
evidence shows that the effect of globalization on the cost of capital is significant but small and 
one important reason is the existence of home bias. For globalization to reduce the cost of 
capital, the shareholder basis has to become truly global, but this does not occur. So investor 
protection and financial globalization interact and drive together the process of the 
development of financial market.  
Both R and i have impact on the expropriation by insiders because they influence the 
corporate value. If a firm suffers a substantial drop in profitable investment opportunities or 
higher capital cost the controlling shareholders divert more corporate resources. In extreme 
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cases, when the market value of firm falls to zero, the entrepreneur will take away as much as 
he can from the firm. Many studies show evidence consistent to this conclusion. Some paper 
(Johnson et al., 2000; Johnson and Shleifer 2000) documented such behavior by Asian firms in 
the Asian financial crises. The downturns in these countries have been associated significantly 
with more expropriation of cash and tangible assets by managers. In the United States, the 
media alleges that similar actions were taken by the top management of Enron, Tyco, 
WorldCom, and other firms prior to their filing bankruptcy. Similar finding is shown in the 
study of Durnev and Kim (2005).  
Both results 2.3.2.4-1 and 2.3.2.4-2 also imply that economic policies play an important role 
in guiding firms toward good governance practices. “Policy makers often debate the merits of 
pro-growth versus distribution oriented policies. One important consequence they must 
consider in this debate is that pro-growth policies generate more profitable investment 
opportunities and stimulate the external financing needs of corporations. Both of these 
conditions provide controlling shareholders with incentives to improve governance practice. In 
contrast, distribution-oriented policies tend to weaken property rights, reducing the incentives 
to increase cash flow rights for controlling shareholders. Any tax increase for redistribution 
purposes also decrease the cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Reduction in cash flow 
rights increases agency conflicts and may weaken investor protection” (Durnev and Kim, 2005, 
page 1488). It is shown by Desai et al. (2005) that the design of the corporate tax system affects 
the amount of private benefits extracted by company insiders. A higher tax rate increases the 
amount of income insiders divert and thus worsens governance outcomes.  
2.4 Expropriation by state rulers 
2.4.1 Optimal fraction of expropriation by state rulers 
In economics, much of the biggest defect is the assumption about government. Most 
economists advocate the helping-hand model of government, but some prefer the invisible 
hand. Shleifer and Vishny (1999) argue that both the invisible and helping-hand views of 
government are not useful frameworks for delivering practical policy advice, because both 
views ignore the role of politicians. The invisible hand view argues that government should 
play a minimal role in society. But in practice, the government sector in many economies has 
grown rapidly over the last century. The invisible view can offer no explanation. On the other 
hand, although the helping view offers an explanation for why government should interfere in 
the market place, the conceit that governments are run by altruistic official seems to be 
incredible.  
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Shleifer and Vishny (1999) view the government as the grabbing hand because individuals 
working in the public sector act in their own self-interest, just like anyone else. This “grabbing 
hand” view recognizes that both despotic and democratic governments are likely to pursue 
goals that are very different from ‘social welfare’. Dictators use their powers to keep 
themselves in office, to direct resources to political supporters, to destroy political challengers, 
and to enrich themselves, often at the expense of public welfare. Democracies often generate 
incentives that make politicians more sensitive to public welfare, in part because they need to 
be re-elected, but democratically elected politicians typically do not maximize social welfare 
either. In particular, the winning majorities in democracies pursue highly wasted policies of 
redistribution from their losing minorities. 
This section examines how this grabbing hand expropriates resources from the firms for the 
officials’ own benefits. By state expropriation, state rulers can decrease the returns of all firms, 
but they can also discriminate across firms so that they decrease the returns of some firms and 
improve the returns of others. The state can tax cash flows, confiscate assets, forbid particular 
activities, or require bribes to enrich themselves. Therefore, the term “expropriation” covers a 
wide range of activities. Some capital expropriated by the state is used for welfare and also 
benefits the companies, but others are illegal and benefit only state rulers. This study considers 
only the illegal grab, which benefits only the state rulers themselves.  
According to the assumption in section 2.3, the remaining cash flow after expropriation by 
insider is IRt(1-s), from which the state ruler diverts share h. Similar to the corporate insider, 
state ruler only receives hIRt (1-s)-g(p, k, h)IRt (1-s), where g(p, k, h) is the cost-of-grabbing 
function. Here p denotes the quality of protection of all shareholders or an exogenous index of 
constraints on state rulers. It can be the punishment when they break the law, or the risk of 
being overthrown or not being re-elected. K denotes the quality of basic legal environment; and 
h is the fraction expropriated by state rulers. The function g(p, k, h) is assumed to satisfy: 
(j) g(0, k, h)=0; 
(k) gp(p, k, h)>0, when k, h>0; 
(l) g(p, 0, h)=0; 
(m) gk(p, k, h)>0, when p, h>0; 
(n) g(p, k, 0)=0; 
(o) gh(p, k, h)>0, when p, k>0; 
(p) ghh(p, k, h)>0, when p, k>0; 
(q) ghp(p, k, h)>0, when k>0; 
(r) ghk(p, k, h)>0, when p>0. 
Assumption (j) means no fine is incurred when there is no constraint on state rulers; (k) 
means, the more the state rulers are constrained, the more the state rulers pay when they grab 
 29
the company; (l) means that no fine is incurred when the legal sense in one country is poor and 
the existing laws are not enforced; (m) means that the stronger legal sense the people in one 
country, the more fines the expropriators must pay because the possibility of been caught is 
higher; (n) implies that no fine is incurred when diversion is zero; (o) implies that the state 
rulers must pay more when they grab more from the company; (p) implies that the marginal 
cost of grabbing rises as more is taken away; (q) means that the marginal cost of expropriation 
is higher when the constraint on state rulers is more; and finally, (r) implies that the marginal 
cost of stealing is higher when the legal sense is better in a country. It is assumed that the cost-
of-grabbing is borne by the state rulers themselves rather than by the investors.  
Under these assumptions, the net payoffs to the state rulers from one firm at the end of 
period t is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]hkpghsIRsIRhkpghsIRG ttt ,,11,,1 −−=−−−=          (2.4.1-1) 
To maximizing the payoffs above the first order condition 
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This can be written as 
( ) 1,, =∗hkpgh .                                                   (2.4.1-3) 
The second order condition is  
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With the assumption (p) this condition is satisfied, so that the optimal fraction of grabbing h* 
exists, and h* can be written as a function of p and k, h*(p, k).  
2.4.2 Impact of investor protection on expropriation by state rulers 
The condition under which the state rulers can maximize their gain from the firm in their 
area has been deduced. This section goes on to examine this first-order condition to get several 
testable implications of the model. As it is assumed before, the fraction expropriated by state 
rulers does not depend on the action of the corporate insiders and not depend on the corporate 
value. Their action is only influenced by investor protection, p and k.  
Firstly, differentiating the first-order condition 2.4.1-3 with respect to p, it is  
( ) ( ) 0,,,, =∂∂+
∗
∗∗
p
hhkpghkpg hhhp .                                         (2.4.2-1) 
With assumptions (p) and (q) on the cost-of-grabbing function, it becomes 
                                                     
1 Here the state rulers do not know how much has been taken away by the inside expropriators so IRt(1-s) is seen as 
a variable unrelated to h and ∂s/∂h is not considered here. 
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Result 2.4.2-1: The better the state rulers are constrained, the less the fraction expropriated 
by them is. 
Here, p is an index of constraint on the state. When p is extremely high, no expropriation by 
state rulers takes place. On the contrary, when p is 0, it costs nothing to grab the firm so that 
the state rulers take away all of the profit left by the entrepreneur. But this cannot happen, 
because the controlling shareholder is able to know it empirically and takes away all the profit 
as private benefit and leave nothing for the state rulers and minority shareholders so that no 
portfolio investor will invest in that country. 
Then taking the differentiation of the first-order condition 2.4.1-3 with respect to k, equation 
2.4.2-3 is obtained 
( ) ( ) 0,,,, =∂∂+
∗
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k
hhkpghkpg hhhk                                      (2.4.2-3) 
With assumptions (p) and (r) on the cost-of-grabbing function, this becomes 
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Result 2.4.2-2: The better the legal sense, the less the fraction expropriated by state rulers. 
This prediction follows because better legal sense implies that the laws can be better 
enforced and the probability of being caught and fined is higher when the state rulers break the 
law. Higher cost-of-grabbing forces the state rulers to reduce their grabbing from the firm.  
2.5 Important factors determining firm value 
In section 2.2 the firm value model under the assumption of Twin Agency Problems is built 
and t is deduced that the more the corporate insiders and the state rulers expropriate, the less 
the firm value (see result 2.2-1). In this section, other important factors influencing firm value 
is going to be examined. 
As deduced in section 2.2 (equation 2.2-1), the corporate value at the end of period t after 
dividend distribution is 
( )( )
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So it can be seen that firm value increases with the firm’s required investment I and the rate 
of return of firm’s investment opportunity Rt, so that the stock of the firm can be sold at higher 
prices when the expected cash flow in the future is greater.  
Differentiating the corporate value with respect to i and recalling the equation 2.3.2.4-8, it is  
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Result 2.5-1: The firm value decreases with the capital cost. 
Firm value decrease with i, the rate of return demanded by the investors, so the stock value 
falls with the increase of inflation, risk free interest and the instability of profit generated by the 
firm.  
Remembering the firm value model under the supposition of a constant R, equation 2.3.2.4-1, 
if differentiated with respect to R, is 
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With the equation 2.3.2.4-5 it is known that 
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Result 2.5-2: The firm value increases with the expected rate of return in the future. 
Now, differentiating the firm value with respect to f, the ownership held by the controlling 
shareholder in the firm, the following result is obtained 
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Result 2.5-3: Firm value increases with the ownership concentration f. 
The more shares the controlling shareholder has in the firm, the less he diverts as private 
benefit from the firm and thus more profit is left which can be distributed as cash dividend to 
all shareholders, including minority shareholders. This predicts that firms with higher 
ownership concentration will be higher valued, so that ownership concentration will be popular 
as long as these agency problems are not solved.  
La Porta et al. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999) used data on ownership 
structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling 
shareholders of these firms. They found that, except in economies with very good shareholder 
protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means’s (1932) 
image of ownership of the modern corporate. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by 
families or the state. Equity control by financial institution is far less common.  
Claessens et al. (2000) investigated the separation of ownership and control in 2,980 publicly 
traded companies in nine East Asian countries. They found that more than two-thirds of the 
firms are controlled by a single shareholder. Separation of management from ownership control 
is rare, and the top management of about 60% of the firms that are not widely held is related to 
the family of the controlling shareholder. 
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Next, taking differentiation of the firm value with respect to q, k and q, respectively, it is  
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Result 2.5-4: Firm value increases when the protection of minority shareholders (q), legal 
sense (k) and constraint on state rulers (p) are improved.  
The firms in countries with better law and regulation are higher valued than those in 
countries with poor protection of investors. Specially, the effect of advancement of k and p is 
greater because not only the expropriation by the corporate insiders but also the expropriation 
by state rulers decrease with k and p. And with the improvement of q, k and p in one country, 
the market value of the firms rises, even if the investment-opportunities of the firms are not 
more profitable than before.  
The firm’s value can also be reflected with Tobin’s Q, (1+Rt)(1-s)(1-h) in this model, and we 
can get similar conclusion that Tobin’s Q and dividends are higher in countries with better 
investor protection. These results are consistent with the findings in other studies (Claessens et 
al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2000a; 2000b; 2002). 
2.6 Impact of investor protection on expropriators’ benefit 
2.6.1 Impact of investor protection on corporate insiders’ benefit 
With results 2.3.2.3-1, 2.3.2.3-2 and 2.3.2.3-3 we know that the fraction (s*) diverted by 
insiders is negatively related to q, k and p. Many economists argue that the government should 
improve the investor protection, but what can the governors benefit from doing so? Will the 
entrepreneurs canvass the politicians to do that or not to do that? Next the effect of the 
improvement of q, k, and p on these expropriators’ own interest from the existing firms at the 
end of period t is discussed. 
It is known that the wealth of the entrepreneur from the firm at period t is 
                                                     
1 Referring to equation 2.3.2.3-2, ∂s/∂q<0. 
2 Referring to equation 2.4.2-4, ∂h/∂k<0; referring to equation 2.3.2.3-4, ∂s/∂k<0. 
3 Referring to equation 2.4.2-2, ∂h/∂p<0; referring to equation 2.3.2.3-6, ∂s/∂p<0. 
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Differentiating this wealth of entrepreneur with respect to q, it becomes 
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Substituting the expressions of es(q, k, s*) (equation 2.3.1-4), ∂Vt/∂s (equation 2.2-2) and 
∂Vt/∂q (equation 2.5-5) in the formula above, rearranging it and remembering assumption (b), 
eq(q, k, s)>0, the following equation is obtained. 
( ) 0,, p∗−=∂∂ skqeIRqU qtt                                               (2.6.1-2) 
Result 2.6.1-1: The improvement of protection of minority shareholders will reduce the 
controlling shareholders’ benefit from the existing firm. 
This implies that the controlling shareholder has no incentive to improve the corporate 
governance to make the minority shareholders better protected because it increases his cost of 
expropriation and forces him to decrease his private benefit from the firm, which hurts his 
interest. So we cannot believe that the insiders will do anything better after they have received 
the money from the outside investors. The controlling shareholders generally do not appear to 
support legal reform that would enhance minority shareholders’ rights. In fact, they typically 
lobby against it. This may seem puzzling because the value of dividend rights that controlling 
shareholders retain would increase significantly if minority protection is improved. The puzzle 
disappears if it is recognized that, as the potential to expropriate the minority shareholders 
diminishes, so would the value of control, which may be a significantly larger part of the 
controlling shareholders’ total wealth. Improvement of minority protection is thus, in the first 
instance, a transfer from the controlling to the minority shareholders. Another potential agent 
of lobbying for corporate governance reform is the entrepreneur who is interested in issuing 
equity in the future1, but does not usually have a political voice nearly as persuasive as the 
established corporate families.  
Now, differentiating Ut with respect to k, it is 
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Substituting expressions of es(q, k, s*) (equation 2.3.1-4), ∂Vt/∂s (equation 2.2-2) and ∂Vt/∂k 
(equation 2.5-6) in the equation above and rearranging it, makes it, 
                                                     
1 This conclusion is deduced later in section 3.1.2.1. 
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Result 2.6.1-2: The improvement of legal sense increases the controlling shareholders’ 
benefit from the existing firm, when 
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Result 2.6.1-3: The improvement of legal sense has no influence on the controlling 
shareholders’ benefit from the existing firm, when 
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Result 2.6.1-4: The improvement of legal sense decreases the controlling shareholders’ 
benefit from the existing firm, when 
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On the one hand, the improvement of legal sense decreases expropriation by state rulers, 
which increases the cash dividend and the corporate value, so that the controlling shareholders 
benefit from this advancement. On the other hand, it also increases the cost-of-theft burdened 
on the controlling shareholders, so that they are forced to consume less private benefit from the 
firm. The net gain or loss depends on which effect dominates.  
Finally, taking the differentiation of Ut with respect to p, it is deduced that 
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Substituting the expressions of es(q, k, s*) (equation 2.3.1-4), ∂Vt/∂s (equation 2.2-2) and 
∂Vt/∂p (2.5-7) in the equation above and rearranging it, gives 
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Result 2.6.1-5: The improvement of constraint on state rulers increases the controlling 
shareholders’ benefit from the existing firm. 
This improvement decreases the expropriation of state rulers and hence enhances the cash 
dividend and the corporate value, so that the expected profit controlling shareholders derive 
from the firm increases with p, and they will encourage the government to improve the law and 
regulation, which reduces the grabbing by state rulers and benefits all the investors.  
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2.6.2 Impact of investor protection on state rulers’ benefit 
In section 2.4, it is deduced that the fraction expropriated by state rulers is negatively related 
with k and p, but the gain of state rulers also depends on q, because q has effect on how much 
has been left by inside expropriators. In this section, the impact of q, k and p on state rulers’ 
benefit will be examined. 
As shown by equation 2.4.1-1, the payoff to state rulers from the firm is 
( ) ( )[ ]hkpghsIRG t ,,1 −−=  
At first, differentiating the payoff of state ruler with respect to q to examine the effect of 
improvement of q on the benefit of state ruler, 
( )[ ]∗∗∗ −∂∂= hhkpgqsIRG tq ,,                                           (2.6.2-1) 
Because the payoff (G) to the state rulers must be positive, so that h-g(p, k, h)>0 must be 
satisfied under the condition h>0, otherwise they would not expropriate. And recalling result 
2.3.2.3-1, the following is obtained. 
0fqG , When h*>0                                                 (2.6.2-2) 
Result 2.6.2-1: The improvement of protection of minority shareholders increases the state 
rulers’ benefit from the existing firm. 
The state ruler has incentive to protect the minority shareholders better because it forces the 
controlling shareholders to leave more in the firm, so that together with the outside investors, 
the state rulers can also benefit from this improvement. 
Differentiating G with respect to k, it becomes 
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Substituting equation 2.4.1-3 in the above equation and rearranging it, gives 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −−−∂∂= hkpgsIRhhkpgksIRG kttk ,,1,,                     (2.6.2-4) 
Because g(p, k, h)-h<0 and ∂s/∂k<0, so that the first term is positive, and the second is 
negative because gk(p, k, h)>0. So, whether the value of Gk is positive or negative is uncertain, 
and the results are as the follows; 
Result 2.6.2-2: The improvement of legal sense increases the state rulers’ benefit from the 
existing firm, when 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −−∂∂ hkpgsIRhhkpgksIR ktt ,,1,, f                        (2.6.2-5) 
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Result 2.6.2-3: The improvement of legal sense has no influence on the state rulers’ benefit 
from the existing firm, when 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −=−∂∂ hkpgsIRhhkpgksIR ktt ,,1,,                        (2.6.2-6) 
Result 2.6.2-4: The improvement of legal sense decreases the state rulers’ benefit from the 
existing firm, when 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −−∂∂ hkpgsIRhhkpgksIR ktt ,,1,, p                        (2.6.2-7) 
On the one hand, the improvement of legal sense decreases the expropriation by inside 
expropriators, which enhances the gain of state rulers. On the other hand, the cost-of-grabbing 
burdened on state rulers is also increased by this advancement. Whether the state rulers will 
benefit or lose from this progress depends on which effect dominates.  
Finally, differentiating G with respect to p, 
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Substituting equation 2.4.1-3 in the equation above, it is written as 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −−−∂∂= hkpgsIRhhkpgpsIRG pttp ,,1,,               (2.6.2-9) 
Because g(p, k, h)-h<0 and ∂s/∂p<0, so that the first term is positive, and the second is 
negative because gp(p, k, h)>0. Similar to the effect of k, whether the value of Gp is positive or 
negative is uncertain. The results are as the following  
Result 2.6.2-5: The improvement of constraint on state rulers increases the state rulers’ 
benefit from the existing firm, when 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −−∂∂ hkpgsIRhhkpgpsIR ptt ,,1,, f                        (2.6.2-10) 
Result 2.6.2-6: The improvement of constraint on state rulers has no influence on the state 
rulers’ benefit from the existing firm, when 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −=−∂∂ hkpgsIRhhkpgpsIR ptt ,,1,,                        (2.6.2-11) 
Result 2.6.2-7: The improvement of constraint on state rulers decreases the state rulers’ 
benefit from the existing firm, when 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −−∂∂ hkpgsIRhhkpgpsIR ptt ,,1,, p                        (2.6.2-12) 
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On the one hand, the improvement forces the state rulers to reduce the fraction of 
expropriation, which decreases the payoff to them. On the other hand, the improvement of 
constraint on state rulers will make the controlling shareholders divert less and leave more in 
the firm, which increases the payoff to the state ruler. Therefore, whether the state ruler has 
incentive to constraint themselves more and to improve the common investment environment 
depends on which effect dominates. If the effect on the corporate insider dominates, the state 
rulers will be encouraged to do so.  
2.7 Impact of future profitability and capital cost on corporate insiders’ 
benefit 
In section 2.3.2.4 it was discussed about the impact of future profitability and capital cost on 
the fraction diverted by corporate insiders. This section illustrates the influence of future 
profitability and capital cost on their benefit from the existing firm.  
Differentiating Ut with respect to R, the equation below is obtained. 
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Substituting equations 2.3.1-4, 2.5-2 and 2.2-2 in the equation above, gives 
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Result 2.7-1: The controlling shareholders’ benefit from the existing firm increases when the 
expected rate of return in the future increases. 
Result 2.3.2.4-1 has shown that the higher the expected rate of return in the future, the less 
the fraction expropriated by corporate insiders. Because the insiders care more about the value 
of the stocks he holds in the firm, he will divert less from the company, if the rate of return 
increases. The private benefit the controlling shareholder loses when he expropriates less will 
be more compensated by the increase of share value he holds in the firm. Now result 2.7-1 also 
proves that the total benefit of the controlling shareholder’s from the existing firm increases 
when the expected rate of return of the firm rises. 
Differentiating Ut with respect to i, it becomes 
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Substituting equations 2.3.1-4, 2.5-1 and 2.2-2 in the above equation, it is expressed as  
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Result 2.7-2: The controlling shareholders’ benefit from the existing firm increases when the 
capital cost of the firm decreases.  
As was shown on result 2.3.2.4-2, the corporate insider expropriates less when the capital 
cost decreases. Because the controlling shareholders care more about the value of the stocks he 
holds in the firm, he will divert less private benefit from the company when the capital cost 
falls. The private benefit the controlling shareholder loses when he expropriates less will be 
more compensated by the increase of share value he holds in the firm. Now result 2.7-2 again 
proves that the total benefit of the controlling shareholders from the existing firm increases 
when the expected rate of return of the firm rises. 
2.8 Summary 
This Chapter presents an improved multi-period model on the basis of Stulz’s theory of 
“Twin Agency Problems” and researches the expropriators’ decisions on expropriating the 
existing firm.  
Firstly, the assumption and description of the model is introduced. The firm exists in an 
imperfect environment, so that both controlling shareholders and state rulers, called 
expropriators, have the opportunity to use their power to improve their own benefit at the 
expense of the outside investors, also called minority shareholders. These expropriations are 
not free and by doing so they risk being sued and fined. The cost of expropriation depends on 
the quality of protection of minority shareholders (q), the level of legal sense (k), the severity 
of the constraint on state rulers (p) and the fraction of the profit they expropriate from the firm 
(s). 
A corporate value model with the consideration of Twin Agency Problems is built and it is 
deduced from this model that the more the corporate insiders and state rulers expropriate, the 
lower the firm value.  
Next, the optimal fraction of expropriation by corporate insiders and the important factors 
determining this fraction are investigated. The corporate insiders will trade off their gain and 
loss in the process of expropriation and decide their optimal expropriation fraction. This 
optimal fraction chosen by corporate insiders is negatively related to the extent of ownership 
concentration, the quality of protection of minority shareholders, the severity of the constraint 
on state rulers, the level of legal sense and the expected rate of return, but positively related to 
the fraction diverted by state rulers and the capital cost of the firm 
After that the optimal fraction of expropriation by state rulers and the important factors 
determining this fraction are studied. Expropriation by state rulers takes place after the 
expropriation by controlling shareholders and the optimal expropriation fraction chosen by 
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state rulers is negatively related to the quality of constraint on state rulers and the level of legal 
sense. 
Analyzing the important factors affecting corporate value, it is obtained that the corporate 
market value increases with higher expected rate of return, the higher degree of ownership 
concentration, better protection of minority shareholders, better legal sense and more constraint 
on state rulers, but decreases with higher capital cost.  
The improvement of protection of minority shareholder, legal sense and constraint on state 
rulers can reduce the expropriation by controlling shareholders and state rulers. This 
improvement also reduces corporate insiders’ or state rulers’ benefit from the existing firms so 
that they are reluctant to do so. 
On the contrary, higher expected rate of return and lower capital cost not only decreases the 
expropriation by the corporate insiders but also increases their benefit from the firm, so that 
active economic policies will be welcome. 
 
The followings are conclusions deduced in this Chapter: 
Result 2.2-1: The more the corporate insiders and the state rulers expropriate, the less the 
firm value. 
Result 2.3.2.1-1: The more share of ownership the corporate insider holds in the company, 
the less fraction of profit he diverts from the company. 
Result 2.3.2.1-2: The more the minority shareholders are protected, the less the effect of a 
higher ownership concentration on reducing the fraction of profit diverted by corporate 
insiders. 
Result 2.3.2.1-3: The less the state rulers are constrained, the smaller the effect of a higher 
ownership concentration on reducing the fraction of profit diverted by corporate insiders. 
Result 2.3.2.2-1: The more the state ruler expropriates, the more the controlling shareholder 
diverts, if they have ownership in the company. 
Result 2.3.2.2-2: The more the ownership held by corporate insiders in the firm, the greater 
the effect of higher fraction expropriated by state rulers on increasing the fraction expropriated 
by corporate insiders. 
Result 2.3.2.3-1: The more the minority shareholder protection, the less the fraction of 
expropriation by corporate insiders. 
Result 2.3.2.3-2: The more intense the legal sense, the less the fraction of expropriation by 
corporate insiders. 
Result 2.3.2.3-3: The more the state rulers are constrained, the less the corporate insiders 
expropriate if they have ownership in the company. 
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Result 2.3.2.3-4: The more ownership the corporate insiders hold in the firm, the greater the 
effect of better constraints on state rulers on reducing the fraction of profit diverted by 
corporate insiders. 
Result 2.3.2.4-1: The higher the expected rate of return in the future, the less the fraction 
expropriated by corporate insiders. 
Result 2.3.2.4-2: The corporate insider expropriates more when the capital cost increases. 
Result 2.4.2-1: The more the state rulers are constrained, the less the fraction expropriated 
by them. 
Result 2.4.2-2: The more intense the legal sense, the less the fraction expropriated by state 
rulers. 
Result 2.5-1: The firm value decreases with the capital cost. 
Result 2.5-2: The firm value increases with the expected rate of return in the future. 
Result 2.5-3: Firm value increases with the ownership concentration, f. 
Result 2.5-4: Firm value increases when the protection of minority shareholders (q), legal 
sense (k) and constraint on state rulers (p) are improved.  
Result 2.6.1-1: The improvement of protection of minority shareholders will reduce the 
controlling shareholders’ benefit from the existing firm. 
Result 2.6.1-2: The improvement of legal sense increases the controlling shareholders’ 
benefit from the existing firm, when the effect of this improvement on decreasing the 
expropriation by state rulers is more than the effect on increasing the cost-of-theft burdened on 
the controlling shareholders 
Result 2.6.1-3: The improvement of legal sense has no influence on the controlling 
shareholders’ benefit from the existing firm, when the effect of this improvement on 
decreasing the expropriation by state rulers is as much as increasing the cost-of-theft burdened 
by the controlling shareholders 
Result 2.6.1-4: The improvement of legal sense decreases the controlling shareholders’ 
benefit from the existing firm, when the effect of this improvement on decreasing the 
expropriation by state rulers is less than increasing the cost-of-theft burdened on the 
controlling shareholders 
Result 2.6.1-5: The improvement of constraint on state rulers increases the controlling 
shareholders’ benefit from the existing firm. 
Result 2.6.2-1: The improvement of protection of minority shareholders increases the state 
rulers’ benefit from the existing firm. 
Result 2.6.2-2: The improvement of legal sense increases the state rulers’ benefit from the 
existing firm, when the effect of this improvement on decreasing the expropriation by 
 41
controlling shareholders is more than the effect on increasing the cost-of-grabbing burdened on 
state rulers. 
Result 2.6.2-3: The improvement of legal sense has no influence on the state rulers’ benefit 
from the existing firm, when the effect of this improvement on decreasing the expropriation by 
controlling shareholders is as much as the effect on increasing the cost-of-grabbing burdened 
on state rulers. 
Result 2.6.2-4: The improvement of legal sense decreases the state rulers’ benefit from the 
existing firm, when the effect of this improvement on decreasing the expropriation by 
controlling shareholders is less than increasing the cost-of-grabbing burdened on state rulers. 
Result 2.6.2-5: The improvement of constraints on state rulers increases the state rulers’ 
benefit from the existing firm, when the effect of this improvement on decreasing the 
expropriation by controlling shareholders is more than increasing the cost-of-grabbing 
burdened on state rulers. 
Result 2.6.2-6: The improvement of constraints on state rulers has no influence on the state 
rulers’ benefit from the existing firm, when the effect of this improvement on decreasing the 
expropriation by controlling shareholders is as much as increasing the cost-of-grabbing 
burdened on state rulers. 
Result 2.6.2-7: The improvement of constraints on state rulers decreases the state rulers’ 
benefit from the existing firm, when the effect of this improvement on decreasing the 
expropriation by controlling shareholders is less than increasing the cost-of-grabbing burdened 
on state rulers. 
Result 2.7-1: The controlling shareholders’ benefit from the existing firm increases when the 
expected rate of return in the future increases. 
Result 2.7-2: The controlling shareholders’ benefit from the existing firm increases when the 
capital cost of the firm decreases.  
 42
3 Expropriators’ and Outside Investors’ Decision on 
Establishing New Company 
3.1 Corporate insiders’ decision 
3.1.1 Corporate insiders’ financing decision 
In Chapter 2 all the discussions are based on the assumption that the firm is already set up at 
period 0. In this Chapter 3 we explore the conditions on which the firm can be set up and the 
implication of the Twin Agency Problems on the entrepreneurs’ financing and investment 
decision and the impact on the outside investors’ decision. 
At period 0 the entrepreneur must decide, whether he should start a firm and how much he 
should invest in it. If he starts a firm and invests IE in it, his wealth at the end of period t is Wt, 
as equation 2.3.1-1 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )'1,,11 0 iIWfVIRskqesIRfhsIRW Ettttt +−++−+−−=  
Here the first term is his share of cash dividend from the firm he built. The following two 
terms are his net gain from expropriation. The fourth term is the market value of the stock held 
by the entrepreneur in the firm he built; and the last term is his principal and profit of the 
portfolio investment on the capital market.  
But if he doesn’t start a firm and chooses to invest all his capital on the market as portfolio 
investor, his wealth is 
( )'10 iWWt += .                                                   (3.1.1-1) 
So the net value of starting a firm is  
( )( ) ( ) ( )'1,,11 iIfVIRskqesIRfhsIRW Ettttt +−+−+−−=Δ ∗∗∗∗  
ME III −=                                                        (3.1.1-2) 
IM is collected from the capital market through the sale of share (1-f) of the cash flow. 
Because the demanded rate of return, namely the capital cost, is i, the cash flow to be sold can 
be priced as 
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1                                   (3.1.1-3) 
Only when ΔWt>0, the firm will be set up and the entrepreneur will choose the optimal 
fraction of ownership in the firm (f) to maximize this ΔWt. The first order condition of this 
problem is  
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Substituting equations 2.2-2, 2.3.1-4, 2.3.2.1-1, 2.3.2.1-2, and 2.5-4 in the equation above, it 
is rearranged as  
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Referring to equation 2.3.1.1-2 and equation 2.5-4, we know the last two terms are positive. 
The value of the first term depends on i and i’: when i<i’, it is negative; when i≥i’, it is positive. 
When the capital market is in equilibrium and the risk is not considered, i can then be assumed 
to be equal to i’. If i is higher than i’, the enterprisers will finance the company only with their 
own capital because the external capital is too expensive. If i is lower than i’, outside investors 
won’t buy the stock of this company, because the yield is too low.  
If ΔW>0 is satisfied, the capital market is in equilibrium and the entrepreneur has enough 
capital, he will finance the firm with all his own wealth to maximize his ownership in the 
company, and ΔWt can be written as 
( )( ) ( ) ( )'1,,11 iIVIRskqesIRhsIRW ttttt +−+−+−−=Δ ∗∗∗∗            (3.1.1-6) 
Result 3.1.1-1: The firm will be financed only by the entrepreneur himself, when 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0'1,,11 fiIVIRskqesIRhsIR tttt +−+−+−− ∗∗∗∗ ; 
0WI ≤                                                             (3.1.1-7) 
This means that the entrepreneur will finance the firm only with his own wealth as the single 
shareholder if he has enough money and starting a firm is more valuable than being a portfolio 
investor. In this equilibrium situation the legitimate profit they get from their own company 
(cash dividend and stock value) is the same as those they would get if they had invested capital 
IE on the capital market. If they have higher ownership in the company they will expropriate 
less private benefit and the cost wasted in this misdeed is also lowered, so that the firm value is 
enhanced and their total benefit is increased.  
Sometimes the entrepreneurs do not have enough money and can only invest all their initial 
wealth in the firm and collect the rest capital needed from outside investors, so ΔWt is  
( )( ) ( ) ( )'1,,11 0 iWfVIRskqesIRfhsIRW ttttt +−+−+−−=Δ ∗∗∗∗       (3.1.1-8) 
The rest of the capital needed from the outside investors is  
0WII
D −=                                                          (3.1.1-9) 
Just like IM, ID must be collected from the capital market through the sales of share (1-f) of 
the cash flow. The price of the cash flow to be sold is the same as shown by equation 3.1.1-3: 
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This is the capital supplied by the investors at the end of the period (t-1), or at the initial 
stage of the period t. Only when IS≥ID is satisfied, can the firm be set up. Here it is assumed 
that the entrepreneur will regulate the fraction f to get just the amount of capital he needs. And 
this situation can be written as  
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Substituting equation 3.1.1-10 into equation 3.1.1-8, equation 3.1.1-11 can be obtained. 
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Result 3.1.1-2: The entrepreneur will invest all his initial wealth W0 to set up a firm and 
collect the remaining capital (I-W0) he needs from the capital market, when 
( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) 0'1,,1
1
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And 0WI f  
This implies that the entrepreneur will invest as much as he has in the firm to attain 
maximum ownership in the firm, if starting a firm is more valuable than being a portfolio 
investor. As is mentioned before, higher ownership held by the controlling shareholders 
increases the firm value. In this situation, i might be higher than i’, because the enterprisers do 
not have enough capital and must collect the rest from the market even though it is too 
expensive, as long as the net value of starting a firm is positive.  
3.1.2 Corporate insiders’ investment decision 
3.1.2.1 Impact of investor protection on corporate insiders’ investment decision 
In the last section it has been discussed how the entrepreneurs should finance their firms in 
case they will start a firm. This section examines the impact of investor protection on 
entrepreneurs’ willingness to set up a firm. Whether the firm can be set up, depends on if the 
value of ΔWt is negative or positive. 
At first, taking the differentiation of ΔWt with respect to q, from equations 3.1.1-6 and 3.1.1-
11, the following equation is obtained. 
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Substituting equations 2.3.1-4, 2.5-5 and 2.2-2 in the equations above, these equations can 
then be written as 
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Result 3.1.2.1-1: The improvement of protection of outside shareholders increases the 
willingness of entrepreneurs to set up a firm, when 
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Result 3.1.2.1-2: The improvement of protection of outside shareholders has no impact on 
the willingness of entrepreneurs to set up a firm, when 
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Result 3.1.2.1-3: The improvement of protection of outside shareholders decreases the 
willingness of entrepreneurs to set up a firm, when 
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On the one hand, the improvement of outside shareholder protection increases the cost of 
expropriation, which forces the corporate insider to consume less private benefit and decrease 
the entrepreneur’s gain from setting up a firm. On the other hand, this improvement increases 
the price of the equity to be sold, which means the entrepreneur can keep more fraction of the 
ownership (f) in the company, which increases both his cash dividend and stock value. 
Therefore, unlike the controlling shareholder, who has set up firms, the entrepreneur, who 
wants to start a firm, may canvass the government to improve the protection of minority 
shareholders, or they will make individual promise of better corporate governance to the 
potential outside investors. But as it has been mentioned before, these intending entrepreneurs 
do not usually have a political say as persuasive as the established corporate families. Their 
requests might be refused by officials who have been bribed by the existing entrepreneurs. The 
credibility of the individual promise is doubted in a country where the people have no trust in 
each other and the law system to support this trust is lacking. 
Next, differentiating equation 3.1.1-6 and 3.1.1-11 with respect to k, is written as  
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Substituting equation 2.3.1-4 into the equations above will give the following equation, 
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(With external capital) (3.1.2.1-14) 
Result 3.1.2.1-4: The improvement of legal sense increases the willingness of entrepreneurs 
to set up a firm, when 
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Result 3.1.2.1-5: The improvement of legal sense has no influence on the willingness of 
entrepreneurs to set up a firm, when 
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Result 3.1.2.1-6: The improvement of legal sense decreases the willingness of entrepreneurs 
to set up a firm, when 
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(With external capital) (3.1.2.1-20) 
On the one hand, Similar to the effect of q, the improvement of legal sense (k) increases the 
cost of expropriation by insiders, which forces the corporate insider to consume less private 
benefit and decreases the entrepreneur’s gain from setting up a firm. On the other hand, this 
improvement reduces the expropriation by state rulers and increases the price of the equity to 
be sold, which means the entrepreneur can get more fractions (f) of the cash flow distributed as 
dividends and keep more shares of the firm equity. Therefore, same as the entrepreneur, who 
has set up a firm, the entrepreneur, who wants to start firms, may also canvass the government 
to improve the legal sense. 
Now, differentiating equation 3.1.1-6 and 3.1.1-11 with respect to p, it is deduced that 
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(With external capital) (3.1.2.1-22) 
Substituting equations 2.3.1-4, 2.5-7 and 2.2-2 in the equations above and rearranging gives 
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(With external capital) (3.1.2.1-24) 
Result 3.1.2.1-7: The improvement of constraint on the state increases the willingness of 
entrepreneurs to set up a firm. 
Here, p is an exogenous index of constraints on the state. When p is extremely high, no 
expropriation by state rulers takes place. If p is zero, the state rulers expropriate every thing 
and there is no product because no firm will be started. The willingness of entrepreneurs to 
take advantage of investment opportunities is inversely related to the level of constraints on the 
state rulers. For a given level of constraint on the state, entrepreneurs will start a firm only if 
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their expected profit from the firm exceeds their opportunity cost, which is their profit from the 
portfolio investment. Consequently, under the assumptions in this study, there is a threshold 
for p, P, so that if p<P, the entrepreneurs do not take advantage of their investment 
opportunities because their participation constraint is not satisfied. The entrepreneur, who 
wants to start a firm, will encourage the government to improve the constraint on state rulers, 
which benefits all investors. 
3.1.2.2 Impact of future profitability and capital cost on corporate insiders’ investment 
decision 
In section 2.5 it is proved that the firm value is influenced by future profitability and capital 
cost, so that when the entrepreneur is considering setting up a firm he must think about the 
expected profitability and capital cost of the firm, which is going to be built. In this section, the 
impact of future profitability and capital cost on corporate insiders’ investment decision is 
discussed.  
Differentiating ΔWt with respect to i, it is obtained  
( )[ ]
i
Vskqeh
i
sIR
i
W t
st
t
∂
∂+−∂
∂=∂
Δ∂ ∗∗ ,,  (Without external capital) (3.1.2.2-1) 
( ) ( )
( )( )[ ]( )( )( ) ( )[ ]∗
∗
−∂
∂++
+−+−−−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−−∂
∂
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++
++=∂
Δ∂
skqe
i
sIR
i
ifVhsIR
i
shIR
i
Vf
i
if
i
W
sttt
t
tt
,,1
1
'1111
11
1
'1
2
**
*
 
(With external capital) (3.1.2.2-2) 
With equations 2.3.1-4, 2.5-1 and 2.2-2 these expressions can be written as 
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Result 3.1.2.2-1: The rise of capital cost decreases the entrepreneurs’ willingness to set up a 
firm. 
It is obvious that higher capital cost reduces the expected market value of the company, 
which decreases the interest of the enterprisers to set up a new company. For the companies 
with external capital, higher capital cost compels the potential enterprisers to sell more 
fractions of the future cash flow right to get the capital needed. This reduces their share of the 
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cash flow and their wealth in the company so that they would rather invest the capital on the 
market as portfolio investors when the capital cost is too high.  
Finally, differentiating ΔWt with respect to R,  
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With equations 2.3.1-4, 2.5-3 and 2.2-2 these expressions can be written as 
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Result 3.1.2.2-2: The rise of the expected rate of return in the future increases the 
entrepreneurs’ willingness to set up a firm. 
Contrary to the capital cost i, higher rate of return increases the company value and the 
enterprisers can keep more shares of the cash flow right of the companies when they collect 
capital from the market so that they are more encouraged to set up new companies than act as 
portfolio investors.  
3.2 Outside investors’ investment decision 
3.2.1 Impact of investor protection on outside investors’ investment 
decision 
If the entrepreneurs do not have enough money they must collect capital from the market. 
Whether the firm can be started also depends on the outside investors’ decision. 
At first, the impact of investor protection on the capital market is examined. Differentiating 
the capital supply with respect to q, k, and p,  
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Result 3.2.1-1: Intensifying the protection of minority shareholders, legal sense and the 
constraint on state rulers, increases the sum of capital collected from the financial market. 
The minority shareholders have no voice on the board of directors or in the meeting of 
politicians, and they even have no rights of vote in despotic countries. But they can vote with 
feet. When the expropriation is severe, they will hold the money in hand rather than contribute 
it to the firm. With the advancement of laws and regulations the minority investors have more 
trust in the government and the entrepreneurs, and then the capital market becomes more active 
and flourishes. This is because, the entrepreneurs have less difficulty in financing their projects 
and more firms can be started. Consequently, the whole economy in the country becomes more 
prosperous. 
Glaeser et al. (2001) compared the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech 
Republic in the 1990s. They realized that the stringent – and stringently enforced – regulations 
in Poland, expressed in both company and securities laws, have stimulated rapid development 
of securities markets, and enabled a number of firms to raise external funds. The expropriation 
of investors has been relatively modest, and the qualitative evaluations of the Polish market 
have been very positive. In contrast, the lax – and laxly enforced – regulations in the Czech 
Republic were associated with low liquidity and a notable absence of equity finance by either 
new or existing firms. The expropriation of investors was rampant, and acquired a new Czech-
specific name: tunneling. Consistent with these concerns, the qualitative assessments of the 
Czech market have been poor (Coffee, 1996 and 1998; Weiss and Nikitin, 1999; Pistor, 1999). 
The Czech government has sharply tightened its regulations since 1996.  
From result 3.2.1-1 we know that IS is positively related to q, k and p. The condition that the 
firm can be set up is IS≥ID. So, assuming that q, k and p are variable, it can be deduced that q, k 
and p are positively related to ID. 
Result 3.2.1-2: The more capital the entrepreneur needs to set up firm, the more incentive he 
has to improve the quality of outside investor protection on firm level (q) and to canvass the 
government to improve the protection of investors on state level (k and p). 
If investors are poorly protected, the entrepreneurs must give up more cash flow rights of the 
company to the minority shareholders. Collecting capital from the minority shareholders 
becomes too expensive, so it is optimal for firms to be held closely. So the entrepreneurs, who 
are in great need of capital, are very willing to improve the protection of investors to sell the 
shares at a higher price and get capital with lower cost. It can be predicted that firms in 
countries with poor investor protection are held closely and investors cannot hold the market 
portfolio. This can explain part of the home bias puzzle. Durnev and Kim (2005) also found 
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that needs for external financing have greater impact on governance choices of firms in 
countries with weaker legal frameworks because those firms are more subject to the deleterious 
effects of poor legal protection when they attempt to raise external capital.  
Giannetti and Simonov (2006) argue that the choices of market participants are driven, 
among other reasons, by fear of expropriation. All categories of investors (domestic and 
foreign, institutional and small individual investors) who generally enjoy only security benefits, 
expect lower returns form companies with weak corporate governance relative to the risk they 
involve. They are reluctant to hold shares in companies where extraction of private benefits is 
expected to be large. In contrast, large domestic individual investors and individuals, who are 
board members, do not appear concerned about weak corporate governance. Hence, they are 
more likely to invest in companies where the controlling shareholders have strong incentives to 
extract private benefits. Their results point a clear relation between quality of corporate 
governance and shareholder base and indicate that firms should use corporate governance to 
attract shareholders if they wish to expand their shareholder base and raise new capital. Kumar 
et al. (2001) examined data on firm size from Europe. They found that countries with better 
institutional development, as measured by the efficiency of their judicial system, have larger 
firms.  
3.2.2 Impact of future profitability and capital cost on outside investors’ 
decision 
The expected rate of return and capital cost will also sway the outside investors’ decision. 
Differentiating the capital supply with respect to i, recalling equations 2.2.2.4-2 and 2.5-1, 
the following equation is obtained 
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Result 3.2.2-1: The lower the capital cost; the more the capital that can be collected from the 
outside investors. 
Here, the outside investors can be minority shareholders and creditors, and i is the Weighted 
Average Capital Cost (WACC) of the external capital. The controlling shareholders can 
choose the optimal capital structure to minimize the capital cost (i) in order to minimize the 
fraction of future cash flow they should sell to the outside investors to get the external capital 
they need. 
Differentiating the capital supply with respect to R, and recalling equations 2.3.2.4-1 and 2.5-
3, it is deduced 
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Result 3.2.2-2: The higher the expected rate of return; the more the capital that can be 
collected from the outside investors. 
Result 3.2.2-1 and 3.2.2-2 indicate that the supply of the external capital depends on the rate 
of return demanded by outside investors and the expected profitability in the future. These are 
both connected to the level of economic and financial development in a country. When 
economic and financial development is poor, external capital is expensive and new investment 
opportunities may not be worthy to catch. Hence, the controlling shareholders have lower 
incentives to improve the firm-level governance and the protection of minority shareholders. 
Doidge et al. (2006) showed a similar conclusion that the interest to adopt better governance 
mechanisms at the firm level increases with a country’s financial and economic development.  
3.3 State rulers’ decision 
In section 2.6.2 we have discussed the impact of investor protection on state rulers’ interest, 
but the analysis in that section considers only the payoff from the existing companies. In 
reality, to enlarge their income resource the state rulers have incentive to make progress in 
investor protection when this progress will encourage more firms to be set up. 
Result 2.6.2-1 indicates that the improvement of protection of minority shareholder can 
increase the state rulers’ benefit from the existing firms. Result 3.1.2.1-1 indicates that this 
improvement will also encourage the intending entrepreneurs to build more firms if the 
inequality 3.1.2.1-5 or 3.1.2.1-6 is satisfied, which enables the state rulers to divert from more 
firms. So the following conclusion can be made: 
Result 3.3-1: The state rulers have incentive to improve the protection of minority 
shareholders (q) to encourage the intending entrepreneurs to start new firms when 
( )( ) ( ) 0,,11 f∗∗∗ −∂∂−− skqeqsfh q                                (3.3-1) 
This implies that the state rulers will improve the protection of minority shareholder to let 
more firms set up if this change can increase the entrepreneurs’ willingness to set up firms, 
because this improvement increases the state rulers’ total benefit from all the companies 
(existing and potential companies) in their region (∑G). 
Result 2.6.2-2 implies that the improvement of legal sense increases the state rulers’ payoff 
from existing firms under the condition that  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −−∂∂ hkpgsIRhhkpgksIR ktt ,,1,, f                     (3.3-2) 
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And as is shown by result 3.1.2.1-4 the improvement of legal sense will also increase the 
willingness of entrepreneurs to set up a firm, when 
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So it comes to the conclusion that; 
Result 3.3-2: The state rulers have incentive to improve legal sense (k) to encourage the 
entrepreneurs to start firms when 
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This means that the state rulers will improve the legal sense to let more firms set up if this 
change can enhance the entrepreneurs’ willingness to set up firms and if this change will not 
decrease their income from the existing firms. If this change decreases their gains from the 
existing firms they will probably also make this change when the gain from the new firms is 
greater than the loss from the existing firms. 
Result 2.6.2-5 implies that the improvement of constraint on state rulers increases the payoff 
to the state rulers under the condition that 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −−∂∂ hkpgsIRhhkpgpsIR ptt ,,1,, f                  (3.3-5) 
And result 3.1.2-7 shows that the improvement of constraint on the state also increases the 
entrepreneurs’ willingness to set up new firm. So it is obtained, 
Result 3.3-3: The state rulers have incentive to improve the constraint on state rulers (p) to 
encourage the entrepreneurs to start firms when 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )∗∗∗∗∗ −≥−∂∂ hkpgsIRhhkpgpsIR ptt ,,1,,                   (3.3-6) 
This indicates that the state rulers will increase the constraint on themselves to let more 
firms set up when this change will not decrease their income from the existing firms. Similar to 
the result 3.3-2 above, when this change decreases their gain from the existing firms they will 
probably also make this change if the gain from new firms are greater than the loss from the 
existing firms. 
3.4 Summary 
With the model built in Chapter 2, this Chapter examines the decisions of expropriators’ and 
outsiders before the company is established. 
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Firstly, the corporate insiders financing and investment decision is investigated. The 
controlling shareholders will invest all his initial wealth in the firm if he decides to start a firm. 
If the corporate insiders do not have enough money to start the firm they must collect capital 
from the outside investors by selling part of the future cash flow of the firm in the capital 
market. The willingness of the controlling shareholders to start a firm will be increased by 
higher expected rate of return, lower capital cost and the improvement of constraint on state 
rulers. This willingness is also affected by the quality of minority shareholder protection and 
the legal sense, but whether the improvement of minority shareholder protection and legal 
sense will increase or decrease this willingness is uncertain. 
Secondly, outside investors’ investment decision is researched, depending on the factors 
which affect the sum that can be collected from capital market. Because the capital supply of 
the market will be increased by the improvement of protection of minority shareholder, legal 
sense and constraint on state rulers, the corporate insider has more incentive to improve the 
quality of outside investor protection on firm level (q) and to canvass the state rulers to 
improve the protection of investor at state level (k and p). 
Lastly, the state rulers’ behavior before the establishing of the firm is studied. The state 
rulers will improve the protection of minority shareholder, legal sense and the constraint on 
themselves when this change can encourage the entrepreneurs to start more firms and increase 
their total benefit from the existing firms and the firms to be set up. 
 
The followings are conclusions deduced from this Chapter: 
Result 3.1.1-1: The firm will be financed only by the entrepreneur himself, if starting a firm 
is more profitable than being portfolio investor and if he has enough money. 
Result 3.1.1-2: The entrepreneur will invest all his initial wealth W0 to set up a firm and 
collect the rest capital (I-W0) he needs from the capital market, if starting a firm is more 
profitable than being portfolio investor and if he hasn’t enough money. 
Result 3.1.2.1-1: The improvement of the protection of outside shareholders increases the 
willingness of entrepreneurs to set up a firm, if the effect of this improvement on increasing the 
price of the equity to be sold is higher than increasing the cost of expropriation by the 
corporate insiders. 
Result 3.1.2.1-2: The improvement of protection of outsider shareholders has no impact on 
the willingness of entrepreneurs to set up a firm, if the effect of this improvement on increasing 
the price of the equity to be sold is as much as increasing the cost of expropriation by the 
corporate insiders. 
Result 3.1.2.1-3: The improvement of protection of outsider shareholders decreases the 
willingness of entrepreneurs to set up a firm, if the effect of this improvement on increasing the 
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price of the equity to be sold is lower than increasing the cost of expropriation by the corporate 
insiders. 
Result 3.1.2.1-4: The improvement of legal sense increases the willingness of entrepreneurs 
to set up a firm, if the total effect of this improvement on increasing the price of the equity to 
be sold and decreasing the expropriation by state rulers is higher than increasing the cost of 
expropriation by the corporate insiders. 
Result 3.1.2.1-5: The improvement of legal sense has no influence on the willingness of 
entrepreneurs to set up a firm, if the total effect of this improvement on increasing the price of 
the equity to be sold and decreasing the expropriation by state rulers is as much as increasing 
the cost of expropriation by the corporate insiders. 
Result 3.1.2.1-6: The improvement of legal sense decreases the willingness of entrepreneurs 
to set up a firm, if the total effect of this improvement on increasing the price of the equity to 
be sold and decreasing the expropriation by state rulers is lower than increasing the cost of 
expropriation by the corporate insiders. 
Result 3.1.2.1-7: The improvement of constraint on the state increases the willingness of 
entrepreneurs to set up a firm. 
Result 3.1.2.2-1: The rise of capital cost decreases the entrepreneurs’ willingness to set up a 
firm.  
Result 3.1.2.2-2: The rise of the expected rate of return in the future increases the 
entrepreneurs’ willingness to set up a firm. 
Result 3.2.2-1: The improvement the protection of minority shareholders, legal sense and the 
constraint on state rulers increases the sum of capital which can be collected from the market. 
Result 3.2.1-2: The more capital the entrepreneur needs to set up the firm, the more 
willingness he has to improve the quality of outside investor protection on firm level (q) and to 
canvass the government to improve the protection of investor on state level (k and p). 
Result 3.2.2-1: The lower the capital cost; the more the capital that can be collected from the 
outside investors. 
Result 3.2.2-2: The higher the expected rate of return; the more the capital that can be 
collected from the outside investors. 
Result 3.3-1: The state rulers have the willingness to improve the protection of minority 
shareholders (q) if this improvement can encourage the entrepreneurs to start new firms. 
Result 3.3-2: The state rulers are willing to improve legal sense (k) if this improvement can 
encourage the entrepreneurs to start new firms and will not decrease the state rulers’ total 
income from the existing firms and the firms to be set up. 
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Result 3.3-3: The state rulers are willing to improve the constraint on state rulers (p) to 
encourage the entrepreneurs to start firms if this improvement will not decrease the state rulers’ 
total income from the existing firms and the firms to be set up. 
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4. Possible Solutions Proposed by the Model to the Twin Agency 
Problems 
4.1 What should be done to solve the Twin Agency Problems? 
On the basis of the theoretical analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 we have obtained some results, 
which provide what we should do to weaken the expropriation by corporate insiders and state 
rulers. The figure below shows the relationship between some determinant factors and the 
fraction of profit expropriated by corporate insiders and state rulers.  
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between determining factors and the fraction of profit expropriated by 
corporate insiders and state rulers1 
 
It is seen, to let the corporate insiders divert less, the fraction expropriated by state rulers 
(h)2 and the capital cost (i)3 should be decreased, and the level of ownership concentration (f)4, 
the quality of outside investor protection (q)5, the strength of legal sense among the people (k)6, 
the severity of constraint on state rulers (p)7 and expected rate of return in the future (R)8 
                                                     
1 Here minus means negative relationship and plus means positive relationship. 
2 Refer to result 2.3.2.2-1. 
3 Refer to result 2.3.2.4-2. 
4 Refer to result 2.3.2.1-1. 
5 Refer to result 2.3.2.3-1. 
6 Refer to result 2.3.2.3-2. 
7 Refer to result 2.3.2.3-3. 
8 Refer to result 2.3.2.4-1. 
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should be increased. To let state insiders divert less, the severity of constraint on the state 
rulers (p)1 and the strength of legal sense among the people (k)2 should be improved. And it 
indicates that the severity of constraint on the state rulers (p) and the strength of legal sense 
among the people (k) have impact on both the expropriation by corporate insiders and by state 
rulers. It means that the improvement of legal sense and the constraint on state rulers is more 
effective on weakening the Twin Agency Problems than other factors. 
But the question is whether all these measures could be done successfully? 
4.2 What could be done to solve the Twin Agency Problems? 
The investor protection should be improved, which is well known to politicians and 
economists, but doing this is not easy because it hurts some interest groups, who can exert an 
influence on the enactment of laws and policies. Table 1 shows the effect of the change of 
some factors on the benefit of entrepreneurs and state rulers. 
 
Table 1: Relativity between determinant factors and benefit of expropriators 
 q k p i R 
Ut -3 -/+4 +5 -6 +7 
ΔWt -/+8 -/+9 +10 -11 +12 
G +13 -/+14 -/+15   
∑G -/+16 -/+17 -/+18   
Firstly, looking at R and i, the expected rate of return in the future and capital cost, which 
can be adjusted by economic policies. As for R, the expected rate of return in the future should 
be increased by economic policies and these policies will be encouraged by all the 
entrepreneurs no matter they have built the firms or are going to set up a firm. But this action 
can be taken only in some periods to reduce the expropriation by controlling shareholders, and 
can not be relied on for long-term, because the economic cycle has both boom and decline. As 
                                                     
1 Refer to result 2.4.2-1. 
2 Refer to result 2.4.2-2. 
3 Here minus means negative relationship and it is the same to others. Refer to result 2.6.1-1. 
4 Here minus/plus means the relationship between these two factiors is not certain and this it is the same to others. Refer 
to result 2.6.1-2 ~ 2.6.1-4. 
5 Here plus means positive relationship and it is the same to others. Refer to result 2.6.1-5. 
6 Refer to result 2.7-2. 
7 Refer to result 2.7-1. 
8 Refer to result 3.1.2.1-1 ~3.1.2.1-3. 
9 Refer to result 3.1.2.1-4 ~ 3.1.2.1-6. 
10 Refer to result 3.1.2.1-7. 
11 Refer to result 3.1.2.2-1. 
12 Refer to result 3.1.2.2-2. 
13 Refer to result 2.6.2-1. 
14 Refer to result 2.6.2-2 ~ 2.6.2-4. 
15 Refer to result 2.6.2-5 ~ 2.6.2-7. 
16 Refer to result 3.3-1. 
17 Refer to result 3.3-2. 
18 Refer to result 3.3-3. 
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for i, the capital cost, should not be enhanced, for this policy will be opposed by all the 
entrepreneurs and will stimulate controlling shareholders to steal more from the firms. 
Therefore, the policy of reducing the capital cost will be approved of by all the entrepreneurs 
and will let them expropriate less from the firms. 
It is shown that, among the three factors concerning investor protection (q, k and p), the 
improvement of constraint on state rulers (p) will be welcomed by all the entrepreneurs no 
matter they have set up firms or are going to set up firms, and may be also welcomed by the 
state rulers. Therefore, this action should be taken at first, so that when measures to improve p, 
which benefits all the investors, are taken, embarrassment will be minimized. 
Another factor concerning investor protection should be thought about preferentially is k, 
quality of basic legal environment or legal sense. This may also be welcomed by both the 
entrepreneurs and the state rulers. And when the legal sense of all the people is improved 
through education nobody will resist it. 
Section 4.1 shows that p and k have impact on both the fractions expropriated by corporate 
insiders and by state rulers. The effect of improvement of legal sense and the constraint on 
state rulers on weakening the Twin Agency Problems is greater than other factors. So 
improving p and k should be an important problem researched by economists and politicians. 
The improvement of q, that is the protection of minority shareholders, is more difficult than 
the three steps we discussed above because it will be opposed by the enterprisers, who have 
founded the firms. If q, k and p are improved at the same time together with active economic 
policies, which means increases in R and decreases in i, less resistance may be encountered. 
4.3 Strategies should be taken by the state 
It is known from the above section that to improve the investor protection, the following 
must be done. Firstly, the constraint on state rulers (p) should be strengthened and the legal 
sense (k) should be improved. Secondly, active economic policies should be taken. Finally, the 
constraint on the insider expropriators (q) should be strengthened. Therefore, the following 
strategies could be a better choice for the government. 
 
A. Improving the legal sense through education 
Figure 1 shows that the improvement of legal sense reduces the expropriation by both the 
controlling shareholders and the state rulers, and table 1 shows that this improvement might be 
welcomed by all the expropriators. Practically, nobody will resist the improvement of legal 
sense. Legal sense of the people comes from culture, tradition, and belief, which has been 
formed from the childhood and can only be improved through education.  
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Faria et al. (2006) analyzed the determinants of international investors’ willingness to hold 
the external liabilities issued by emerging countries and find that institutional quality and 
educational attainment are significantly related to the holding of emerging countries liabilities. 
They also find institutional quality and educational attainment to be jointly significant and their 
individual roles cannot be disentangled. So they interpret the results to suggest that a 
combination of human capital (including informal human capital) and institutional quality has 
been a key determinant of emerging countries’ ability to attract international investors. On the 
basis of OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, Glaeser et al. (2004) suggests 
that human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, and poor countries 
(South Korea, Taiwan, and China) subsequently improve their political institutions after they 
have eliminated poverty through good policies, often pursed by dictators and not through good 
institution.  
During the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, education in China was broken off and 
all the children who grew up in this period have no normal school education. And since this 
revolution almost all the beliefs and traditional culture has been given up by the Chinese people 
and the president Mao was enthroned as a god by the Chinese in Mao’s age. Formal educated 
only re-started after the death of Mao, but former beliefs and culture were not restored. So, 
Chinese people have no gods and traditional beliefs to hold to, hence they have lost their moral 
principles.  
With the economic revolution and open policies, money has been the only pursuit of life and 
people can do anything to earn money as much as they can. They believe that only money can 
bring them security. In school children must spend more time learning English than Chinese, 
Chinese culture and history. Professional knowledge is more important than moral character. 
Honesty and righteousness are considered stupid and foolish. In such a society it is difficult to 
find officials and managers who are incorruptible and innocent. Laws and regulations have no 
constraint on them, because all laws and regulations are prescribed and implemented by these 
people and these laws and regulations have leaks. 
Hence, the most important and long term strategy is to rebuild the moral of the society, 
which requires time and education. The Christians are taught to obey the words of God when 
they go to the church during childhood with their parents, from which comes their original 
legal sense. Since belief is not encouraged in China, so kindergartens and schools are the 
important places where legal sense can be infused to the brain of future managers and officials.  
 
B. Improving the expected profitability with active economic policies 
Here active economic policies include creating more profitable investment opportunities, 
lowering rate of interest regulated by the central bank, lowering the rate of taxes, taking 
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preferential tax policies and so on. Active economic policies bring higher expected rate of 
return for the future and lower capital cost, which decreases the expropriation by the 
controlling shareholders and increases the benefit of the enterprisers, as is shown in both figure 
1 and table 1.  
On the one hand, these measures can encourage more intending entrepreneurs to set up firms 
and according to our results these new entrepreneurs have more incentive to improve investor 
protection, especially the protection of minority investors (q). On the other hand, these policies 
encourage the existing entrepreneurs to invest more in the company and enhance their expected 
rate of return in the future, which make the controlling shareholders concentrated more on the 
firm value and divert less from the company.  
As for the state rulers, if more firms are expected to be set up they will decrease their benefit 
from a single firm, because they know this reduction of expropriation can encourage more 
companies to be built and their total benefit from the firms will increase. 
Furthermore, active economic policies will be accepted by all expropriators and these 
policies won’t come up with resistance. But this kind of policies can only be seen as temporal 
measures and the balance of the treasury in one country must be considered.  
 
C. Strengthening the constraint on expropriators through laws and regulations 
The improvement of q and p will reduce expropriation (see figure 1) because the 
expropriators are more likely to be caught when they steal or grab from the firm and the 
punishment is more severe when they are caught. So, it increases the cost of expropriation and 
makes their expropriation more difficult. This strategy must be seen as long term policy. The 
laws and regulations must be improved and modified continuously, for situations and society 
change continuously.  
Laws and regulations can also be called institution. According to North (1990) “Institutions 
are the rulers of the game in a society … that shape human interaction.” As an implication, 
institutions “… structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic.” 
Alfaro et al. (2005) empirically investigated the reasons for the lack of capital flows from rich 
to poor countries and found that institutional quality is a key variable explaining the “Lucas 
Paradox of international capital flows.” Stulz (2005b) and Kho et al. (2006) both refer to the 
role of institutions in reducing the risk of expropriation for investors. If the quality of 
institutions is weak, investors risk expropriation by the state or those who control firms. State 
should ultimately grant and protect the rights of investors. Reducing expropriation risks leads 
to less concentrated ownership, which in turn may generate more investment, domestic as well 
as foreign, and higher economic growth (Smaghi 2006). 
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“A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of law enforcers from 
coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The higher the risk of coercion is, the 
greater the need for protection and control of law enforcers by the state is. Such control, 
however, also makes law enforcers beholden to the state, and politicizes justice” (Glaeser and 
Shleifer, 2002; page 1193). The difference in choice of legal system (civil law or common law) 
depends on the situation in one county. But some researches reveal that at the same level of 
development, civil law countries exhibit heavier regulation, less secure property rights, more 
corrupt and less efficient government, and even less political freedom than the common law 
countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer 2002; Djankov et al., 2002). “One area where the greater insecurity of property 
rights in the civil law countries shows up clearly is the development of financial markets” 
(Glaeser and shleifer 2002, page 1194). La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) discovered that common 
law countries are more financially developed than civil law countries. So, how to develop the 
financial market in a civil law country is an intractable problem for the jurists and economists. 
 
D. Implementing the above three strategies together 
In spite of the law system, strengthening the laws and regulations may come up with strong 
resistance, because it hurts the benefit of certain persons or existing interest groups (see table 1), 
who will canvass the government not to do so.  
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2003) examined the role of political connections for firms’ 
financing strategies and their long-run financial performance. They realized that firms with 
close political ties are less likely to have publicly traded foreign securities, this suggests that 
connections and global financing are substitutes. First, well-connected firms have access to 
preferential financing at home and therefore do not need to access foreign capital markets. 
Second, firms with political ties dislike the transparency and scrutiny that come with publicly 
traded securities. Third, foreign securities make it more difficult for insiders to extract private 
control benefits. Their results shed light on the difficulties of institutional reform and capital 
market liberalization in emerging market economies. Well-connected firms find global 
financing not very attractive. As a result, the opening up of capital markets is likely to remain 
limited in economies where political connections remain important (Stulz, 2005b). To the 
extent that foreign financing strengthens the competitive position of less-connected firms, firms 
with strong political connections can even be expected to resist changes in domestic institutions 
that facilitate global financing, such as increases in corporate transparency (Rajan and Zingales, 
2003). Institutional reforms in such environment promise to be particularly difficult because it 
is the firms with political clout that prefer less financial liberalization (Chui et al., 2000). 
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If the strategy of strengthening laws and regulation is taken up together with other two 
strategies above, the resistance may be cut down. When the legal sense is being improved 
nationwide, the resistance to the modification and perfection of concrete laws and regulations is 
easy to be broken down. If the economic cycle is booming, the expropriators will also agree 
with the change of the law system. This improvement could be seen as a proclamation to the 
investors that the behavior of the state rulers and inside controllers must be more strictly 
constraint than before. The investors will be better protected, so that some unprofitable projects 
will become attractive. Hence, outside investors will put more money in the financial market. 
The capital needed by the entrepreneurs is easier to be collected and more companies could be 
set up. Consequently, outside investors, entrepreneurs and state rulers all benefit from this 
strategy. 
 
E. Improving investor protection during the development of the financial market 
Result 3.2.1-1 indicates that the intensifying of investor protection increases the sum of 
capital which can be collected from the market, IS, which means the improvement of investor 
protection helps to expand the financial market. The condition that the firm can be set up is 
IS≥ID, hence capital supplied is more than demanded. So the improvement of investor 
protection enhances the possibility that new companies can be set up and new projects can be 
adopted. This in turn encourages the state rulers and controlling shareholders to improve the 
investor protection because they all can benefit from the new firms and projects. Therefore, 
there is a feedback relationship between investor protection and stock market development. 
Pagano and Volpin (2005) presented a political economic model where there is a two-way 
causal relation between investor protection and stock market development. When better 
investor protection is expected, companies can issue more equity, leading to a broad stock 
market. In truth, more equity issuance expands the shareholder base and increases the political 
support for shareholder protection. This feedback loop can generate multiple equilibria, with 
investor protection, stock market size and investor participation being positively correlated 
across equilibria. Using panel data for 47 countries in the period of 1993-2002, they take some 
of the model’s prediction to the data. The positive correlation between investor protection and 
stock market development predicted by the model is broadly consistent with the evidence.  
According to result 2.3.2.4-2, the corporate insider expropriates less when the capital cost 
decreases, and financial globalization is helpful to improve the investor protection also because 
it decreases the capital cost. Stulz (1999) examines the impact of globalization on the cost of 
equity capital and argues that the cost of equity capital decreases because of the globalization 
for two important reasons. Firstly, globalization reduces the discount rate investors charge 
because globalization can decrease risk for the world equity markets as a whole. Secondly, 
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globalization increases the monitoring of management and controlling shareholders because it 
improves firm governance. But empirical evidence in Stulz (1999) shows that the effect of 
globalization on the cost of capital is significant but small and one important reason is the 
existence of home bias. For globalization to reduce the cost of capital, the shareholder base has 
to become truly global. This does not jet take place. As a result, investor protection and 
financial globalization interact themselves and drive the process of development of financial 
market together.  
Improving the investor protection may hurt the benefit of the governors so that they always 
have no interest to make reforms. But when they see the development of the financial market 
they will have more interest to do that for they can benefit from this development. Kaminski 
and Schmuckler (2006) constructed a comprehensive chronology of financial liberalization in 
28 mature and emerging market economies since 1973. They found out that financial 
liberalization is followed by more pronounced boom-bust cycles in the short run, but financial 
liberalization leads to more stable markets in the long run. To explain the contrasting short- and 
long-run effects of financial liberalization they collected information on the quality of 
institutions as well as data on the laws governing the functioning of the financial system. The 
results suggest that institutional reforms do not predate liberalization. Most of the time, 
government reform is implemented within a few years after the partial opening of financial 
markets. As the quality of institutions improves, financial cycles become less pronounced.  
4.4 Summary 
In this section the results in Chapters 2 and 3 are combined to find measures proposed by 
theoretical model to solve the Twin Agency Problems. 
Firstly, what should be done to weaken the Twin Agency Problems is investigated: the 
improvement of legal sense (k) and constraint on state rulers (p) can decrease the expropriation 
by both insider expropriators and state rulers; the strengthening of constraint on insider 
expropriators (q), higher ownership concentration (f), the increase of expected rate of return 
(R), and the lower capital cost (i) can decrease the expropriation by insider expropriators. 
But not all these measures above could be done because the benefit of some existing interest 
groups will be hurt and they will prevent some policies from execution. The following 
measures are much better in the prevention of embarrassment: the improvement of legal sense 
(k), the strengthening of constraint on state rulers (p), the increase of expected rate of return (R) 
and the reduction of capital cost (i).  
According to the above results the following strategies are suggested for the government: 
a) Improving the legal sense through education; 
b) Improving the expected profitability with active economic policies; 
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c) Strengthening the constraint on expropriators through laws and regulations; 
d) Implementing the above three strategies together; 
e) Improving investor protection during the development of financial market. 
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5 Practical Investigations in China 
5.1 General description of financial market in China 
5.1.1 Development of Chinese financial market  
The birthplace of stock market in China is Shanghai and the origin of stock trading can be 
traced back to the 1880s. In 1891, the establishment of Shanghai Share Brokers Association 
was seen as the embryonic form of China’s stock exchange. Later in 1920 and 1921, Shanghai 
Security Goods Exchange and Shanghai Chinese Security Exchange started operation 
respectively. By the 1930s, Shanghai had emerged as the financial center of the Far East, where 
both Chinese and foreign investors could trade stocks, debentures, government bonds and 
futures. In 1946, on the basis of Shanghai Chinese Security Exchange, Shanghai Securities 
Exchange Ltd. came into existence, but ceased operation three years later in 1949, when the 
People’s Republic of  China was founded by Mao Zedong.  
Since 1980, under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory, China’s securities market has 
evolved in tandem with the country’s reform and opened up development of socialist market 
economy. In 1981, treasure bonds were resumed. In 1984, company stocks and corporate bonds 
emerged in Shanghai and a few other cities. On Nov. 26th 1990, Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SHSE) made its debut, which began operation on Dec. 19th 1990.1 Since then on, Shanghai 
Stock Exchange has experienced a fast expansion. The number of listed corporations has 
increased from the initial 8 companies to 864 companies at the end of 2008. The number of 
listed securities has increased from 30 in 1990 to 1,184 at the end of 2008. The number of stock 
issued capital has increased from 261 million shares in 1990 to 1,514,000 million shares at the 
end of 2008 and the stock market value has mounted up from 1,234 million RMB in 1990 to 
9,725,200 million RMB at the end of 2008. Appendix 1 shows the overview of development of 
Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1990 to 2008. 2 
A few days later after Shanghai Stock Exchange was built, another Chinese Stock Exchange 
was created in Shenzhen (a special economic zone in southern China) on Dec. 1st 1990. At the 
end of 1991 there were only 6 listed corporations and 7 listed securities on this exchange, but to 
the end of 2008 there were 740 listed companies and 964 listed securities; from the initial 
357millions shares, the stock issued capital reached 344,186 millions shares at the end of 2008; 
and the stock market value has been increased from 7,976 million RMB in 1991 to 2,411,453 
million RMB at the end of 2008. And since May 2004 the Small and Medium Enterprises 
                                                     
1 See Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book 2006. 
2 All the data about Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1990 to 2007 come from Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book 2001-
2007, the data of 2008 come from Shanghai Stock Exchange Monthly Report of Dec. 2008. 
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Board has been added to Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). Appendix 2 shows the yearly 
market overview of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 1991 to 2008. 1 
The development of these two stock exchanges has brought the advancement of Chinese 
financial market, which has grown continuously2. Figures 2 and 3 show us the trend of the 
increase of number of listed companies and number of listed securities. Especially in 1996 and 
1997 more than 200 new companies came into the market each year. But since 2000, the 
development of SZSE has slowed down, and from then on SHSE has grown much faster than 
SZSE. Although from 2005 to 2008 the new listed companies on SZSE are more than on SHSE, 
the total number of listed companies on SHSE is however much more than on SZSE. Figure 4 
shows that the stock issued capital on SHSE has been much more than that on SZSE since 2001 
and this difference was as a result of the drastic increase on SHSE from 2006 to 2008, while 
the stock issued capital on SZSE grew very slightly in the same years.  
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Figure 2: Number of companies listed in China Mainland (1990-2008) 
 
                                                     
1 All the data about Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 1991 to 2007 come from Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book 1998-
2007, and the data of 2008 come from Shenzhen Stock Exchange Monthly Report of Dec. 2008. 
2 The data of total China is the sum of Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
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Figure 3: Number of securities listed in China Mainland (1990-2008) 
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Figure 4: Total stock issued capital in China Mainland (1990-2008) 
 
Contrary to the stable increasing trend of these indices mentioned above, figure 5 shows a 
more fluctuant movement of stock market value on both of these stock exchanges. We see the 
first boom of financial market in China in 2000, but followed by a five years’ decline. Another 
much bigger spring began in 2006 and was much strengthened in 2007, which was partly 
caused by the great deal of issues but was driven much more by a bubble, because the market 
value at the end of 2008 fell to 37% of the market value at the end of 2007. 
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Figure 5: Stock market value in China Mainland (1990-2008) 
 
Dividing the market value by the number of listed companies the average market value of 
these firms listed on stock exchanges is obtained (shown in figure 6). Although the lines wave 
acutely we can say that the average market value of these companies has been growing. In 2007, 
the average value experienced a sharp rise because of the bubble but dropped sharply in 2008. 
And since 2001, the average market value of the firms listed on SHSE has been greater than 
those on SZSE, which might be one of the reasons why Small and Medium Enterprises Board 
was created in SZSE in 2004.  
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Figure 6: Average market value of companies listed in China Mainland (1990-2008) 
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Although the stock market has expanded greatly in the last years, the development of non-
stock securities is not so optimistic. Figure 7 shows the lag of the development of non-stock 
securities. In 2005 the growth of non-stock securities experienced the fastest period, but in the 
last three years it slowed down again. 
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Figure 7: Stock and non-stock securities listed in China Mainland (1999-2008) 
 
All of the detailed data of these figures (figure 2 to 7) are shown in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2: Overview of Financial Market in China (1990-2008) 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of Listed Companies  
Listed in Shanghai 8 8 29 106 171 188 293 383 438 484 
Listed in Shenzhen 0 6 24 77 120 135 237 362 413 463 
Total Listed in China Mainland 8 14 53 183 291 323 530 745 851 947 
Number of Listed Securities  
Listed in Shanghai 30 46 87 190 259 258 368 467 526 576 
Listed in Shenzhen 7 39 105 212 192 299 429 483 540 
Total Listed China Mainland 30 53 126 295 471 450 667 896 1,009 1,116 
Number of Listed Stocks  
Listed in Shanghai 525 
Listed in Shenzhen 6 33 95 142 161 270 399 454 504 
Total Listed in China Mainland 1,029 
Number of Listed Non-stock Securities  
Listed in Shanghai 51 
Listed in Shenzhen 1 6 10 70 31 29 30 29 36 
Total Listed in China Mainland 87 
Total Stock Issued Capital (RMB Mil.)  
Listed in Shanghai  261 272 4,694 23,554 41,888 56,066 74,986 97,537 128,035 158,015 
Listed in Shenzhen 0 357 2,657 12,206 22,059 26,739 43,954 79,586 106,501 132,870 
Total Listed in China Mainland 261 629 7,351 35,760 63,947 82,805 118,940 177,123 234,536 290,885 
Stock Market Value (RMB Mil.)  
Listed in Shanghai 1,234 2,943 55,840 220,620 260,013 252,566 547,781 921,806 1,062,590 1,458,047 
Listed in Shenzhen 0 7,976 48,975 133,532 109,049 94,862 436,457 831,117 887,973 1,189,070 
Total Listed in China Mainland 1,234 10,919 104,815 354,152 369,062 347,428 984,238 1,752,923 1,950,563 2,647,117 
Average market value of Companies (RMB Mil.)  
Listed in Shanghai 154 368 1,926 2,081 1,521 1,343 1,870 2,407 2,426 3,012 
Listed in Shenzhen 1,329 2,041 1,734 909 703 1,842 2,296 2,150 2,568 
Total Listed in China Mainland 154 780 1,978 1,935 1,268 1,076 1,857 2,353 2,292 2,795 
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Table 2: Overview of Financial Market in China (1990-2008)-continued 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of Listed Companies   
Listed in Shanghai 572 646 715 780 837 834 842 860 864 
Listed in Shenzhen 514 508 508 505 536 544 579 670 740 
Total Listed in China Mainland 1,086 1,154 1,223 1,285 1,373 1,378 1,421 1,530 1,604 
Number of Listed Securities   
Listed in Shanghai 657 744 826 914 996 1,069 1,126 1,125 1,184 
Listed in Shenzhen 596 598 615 627 673 708 768 868 964 
Total Listed China Mainland 1,253 1,342 1,441 1,541 1,669 1,777 1,894 1,993 2,148 
Number of Listed Stocks   
Listed in Shanghai 614 690 759 824 881 878 886 904 908 
Listed in Shenzhen 557 550 551 548 578 586 621 712 782 
Total Listed in China Mainland 1,171 1,240 1,310 1,372 1,459 1,464 1,507 1,616 1,690 
Number of Listed Non-stock Securities   
Listed in Shanghai 43 54 67 90 115 191 240 221 276 
Listed in Shenzhen 39 48 64 79 95 122 147 156 182 
Total Listed in China Mainland 82 102 131 169 210 313 387 377 458 
Total Stock Issued Capital (RMB Mil.)   
Listed in Shanghai  203,242 316,444 372,784 417,039 470,055 502,305 1,027,954 1,417,310 1,541,000 
Listed in Shenzhen 158,097 167,391 173,515 182,754 200,447 213,365 237,583 278,172 344,186 
Total Listed in China Mainland 361,339 483,835 546,299 599,793 670,502 715,670 1,265,537 1,695,482 1,885,186 
Stock Market Value (RMB Mil.)   
Listed in Shanghai 2,693,086 2,759,056 2,536,372 2,980,492 2,601,434 2,309,613 7,161,238 26,983,887 9,725,200 
Listed in Shenzhen 2,116,008 1,593,164 1,296,541 1,265,279 1,104,123 933,415 1,779,152 5,730,202 2,411,453 
Total Listed in China Mainland 4,809,094 4,352,220 3,832,913 4,245,771 3,705,557 3,243,028 8,940,390 32,714,089 12,136,653 
Average market value of Companies (RMB Mil.)   
Listed in Shanghai 4,708 4,271 3,547 3,821 3,108 2,769 8,505 31,377 11,256 
Listed in Shenzhen 4,117 3,136 2,552 2,506 2,060 1,716 3,073 8,553 3,259 
Total Listed in China Mainland 4,428 3,771 3,134 3,304 2,699 2,353 6,292 21,382 7,566 
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5.1.2 Comparison of Chinese stock markets to other main stock markets  
In section 5.1 the development of financial market in China since the creation of the Chinese 
stock exchanges are described and in this subsection a competition of the Chinese stock 
exchanges to main stock exchanges in other countries is done to see the position of Chinese 
financial market in the world financial markets. All the data about foreign financial markets 
have been collected by Shanghai Stock Exchange and they are cited from Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Fact Book (2001 to 2007). 
Figure 8 shows the number of listed companies on 17 main stock exchanges of the world in 
2007. There were 3,951 listed companies on Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), which stood at 
the first place of these 17 stock exchanges and Shanghai was on the 13th position with only 860 
listed companies, a little better than Shenzhen, which was on the 16th position with 670 listed 
firms.  
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Figure 8: Number of companies listed on main stock exchanges (2007) 
 
Although TSX had the most listed companies, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) reached 
the first position according to market value in 2007, which is shown in figure 9. And the 
market value on NYSE was more than 4 times that of Shanghai, which was on the 6th, and 
nearly as much as 20 times that of Shenzhen, which was on the 13th place.1 
                                                     
1 The market value of Chinese market has been exchanged into US$ with the exchange rate published by the People’s 
Bank of China at the end of each year, namely 8.2766, 8.2769, 8.2766, 8.2765, 8.0702, 7.8087 and 7.3046 for 2001 to 
2007. 
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Figure 9: Market value of main stock exchanges (2007) 
 
As done in last subsection, dividing the market value by the number of listed companies, 
gives the average market value of the companies listed on these stock exchanges. Shown by 
figure 10 shows that NYSE also held the first place with an average market value of 6,813.6 
million US$, which was more than 1.5 times that of Shanghai (4,295.5 million US$) and more 
than 5.8 times that of Shenzhen (1,170.8 million US$). It seems that the companies listed on 
SHSE are relative bigger than those listed on other exchanges except NYSE. This phenomenon 
is caused by the boom in 2006 and 2007, which is argued as bubble on the Chinese stock 
market, because the companies could not have grown up so suddenly. And the data of 2008 in 
table 2 shows that the average value of the companies listed on SHSE has greatly shrunk to 
11,256 Mil RMB (1646.9 Mil US$1) at the end of 2008. 
 
                                                     
1 The average market value of 2008 in table 4 is changed from RMB to US$ with the exchange rate of 6.8346 on 
31. Dec. 2008.  
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Figure 10: Average market value of companies listed on main stock exchanges (2007) 
 
All the detailed data of these figures (figures 8 to 10) are found in tables 3 to 5 at the end of 
this subsection. 
These figures show that the financial market in China is still undeveloped although it has 
experienced 17 years of development. Not only more companies should be attracted to come 
into the market, but also the listed companies should be encouraged or helped to expand 
through the financial market. 
The history of SHSE might be not so long as that of other stock exchanges and in the future 
it will catch up with the other exchanges. But it is not the truth. Figures 11 to 13 display the 
yearly overview since 2001 of the five important global stock exchanges and both of the 
Chinese mainland stock exchanges, SHSE and SZSE. The five global exchanges are New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ), London Stock Exchange 
(LSE), Euronext, and Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). These have held the first five places since 
2001, according to market capitalization. These figures indicate that the distance between 
Chinese stock markets and other main stock markets has not shrunk obviously in the last years 
except the bubble in 2007, but widened in some aspects, especially compared to NYSE. 
Figure 11 reveals the number of listed companies on these stock exchanges. London has 
attracted more newly listed companies than other exchanges since 2004 and had the highest 
number of listed companies by the end of 2007. Both the Chinese stock exchanges SHSE and 
SZSE perform mediocre. 
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Figure 11: Number of listed companies on main stock exchanges (2001-2007) 
 
Figure 12 indicates that the market value of Chinese stock market almost did not increase 
from 2001 to 2005, while other markets increased since 2003. NYSE particularly ran to the top 
of all these markets. But China can be delighted because Shanghai market began to run since 
2006 and Shenzhen expanded a bit in 2007. But whether this growth is healthy and continuous 
is questioned by some economists (Lang, 2007). Actually, at the end of 2008 the stock market 
value on SHSE has shrunken to 36% of the value at the end of 2007 (see table 2). 
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Figure 12: Market capitalization of main stock exchanges (2001-2007) 
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Figure 13 displays the trend of the average market value of listed companies. It can be seen 
that the average value of listed companies on all of these five important exchanges has 
increased since the end of 2002 and NYSE also exploded and has increased a lot. On the 
contrary, the average market value of companies listed in China experienced a decrease from 
2001 to 2005, and has increased only since the end of 2005. The sharp rise in 2007 is the result 
of bubble in stock market and is followed by a drop in 2008 (see table 2). 
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Figure 13: Average market value of listed companies on main stock exchanges (2001-2007) 
 
All the detailed data of these figures (figures 11 to 13) are displayed in tables 3 to 5 at the 
end of this subsection.  
Market Capitalization/GDP is another index used to describe the level of development of 
financial market in one country and figure 14 reveals this index in USA and China. Market 
Capitalization of USA is the sum of market value on NYSE and NASDAQ, and the sum of 
market value on Shanghai and Shenzhen is used for the Market Capitalization of China.1 GDP 
of Hong Kong is not included in the GDP of China. This figure proves again that the financial 
market in USA is much more developed than China. Except for the year of 2007, when there 
was a bubble in Chinese financial market, the value of Market Capitalization/GDP of China is 
much lower than that of USA. The detailed data of this figure is shown in table 6 at the end of 
this subsection. 
 
                                                     
1 The GDP of China from 2001 to 2007 used here is cited from China Statistic Yearbook 2007. The GDP of China in 
2008 is cited from the homepage of National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/jdfx/t20090122_402534140.htm. The GDP of USA is cited from the homepage of Bureau of 
Economic Analysis of U.S. Department of Commercial. The data of USA in 2008 was not available by the end of this 
study.  
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Figure 14: China vs. USA, Market capitalization / GDP (2001-2008) 
 
Table 3: Number of listed companies on main stock exchanges (2001-2007) 
Stock Exchange 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
NYSE 2,400 2,366 2,308 2,393 2,270 2,281 2,297 
NASDAQ 4,128 3,649 3,294 3,229 3,164 3,133 3,069 
TSX 1,316 1,304 3,616 3,630 3,758 3,842 3,951 
LSE 2,891 2,824 2,692 2,837 3,091 3,256 3,307 
Euronext 1,345 1,492 1,392 1,333 1,259 1,210 1,155 
Deutsche Borse 984 934 866 819 764 760 866 
ASX 1,410 1,421 1,471 1,582 1,714 1,829 1,998 
TSE 2,141 2,153 2,206 2,306 2,351 2,416 2,414 
SGX 386 385 551 632 686 708 762 
KRX 688 682 684 683 1,619 1,689 1,757 
Bursa Malaysia 807 857 901 959 1,019 1,025 986 
NSE of India 1,034 1,156 1,330 
SET Thailand 382 398 418 463 691 518 523 
HKEx 867 978 1,037 1,096 1,135 1,173 1,241 
TSEC Taiwan 586 640 674 702 696 518 703 
Shanghai 646 715 780 837 834 842 860 
Shenzhen 508 508 505 536 544 579 670 
 
Table 4: Market capitalization of main stock exchanges (2001-2007) (US$ Mil.) 
Stock Exchange 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
NYSE 11,026,518 9,015,167 11,328,953 12,707,578 13,310,592 15,421,168 15,650,833 
NASDAQ 2,896,856 1,994,494 2,844,193 3,532,912 3,603,985 3,865,004 4,013,650 
TSX 615,266 573,403 910,231 1,177,518 1,482,185 1,700,708 2,186,550 
LSE 2,149,501 1,785,199 2,425,822 2,815,928 3,058,182 3,794,310 3,851,706 
Euronext 1,843,529 1,538,654 2,076,410 2,441,261 2,706,804 3,708,150 4,222,680 
Deutsche Borse 1,071,749 686,014 1,079,026 1,194,517 1,221,106 1,637,610 2,105,198 
ASX 375,131 380,087 585,530 776,403 804,015 1,095,858 1,298,315 
TSE 2,264,528 2,069,299 2,953,098 3,557,674 4,572,901 4,614,069 4,330,922 
SGX 115,689 99,807 148,503 217,495 257,340 384,286 539,177 
KRX 194,470 215,894 298,248 398,559 718,011 834,404 1,122,606 
Bursa Malaysia 118,981 125,778 168,376 181,624 180,518 235,581 325,290 
NSE of India  515,973 774,116 1,660,097 
SET Thailand 35,943 45,504 119,017 115,390 123,885 140,161 197,129 
HKEx 506,073 463,055 714,597 861,463 1,054,999 1,714,953 2,654,416 
TSEC Taiwan 292,621 261,211 379,023 443,059 476,018 594,659 663,716 
Shanghai 333,356 306,440 360,111 314,316 286,190 917,085 3,694,095 
Shenzhen 192,490 156,646 152,874 133,405 115,662 227,842 784,465 
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Table 5: Average market value of companies listed on main stock exchanges (2001-2007) (US$ Mil.) 
Stock Exchange 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
NYSE 4,594 3,810 4,909 5,310 5,864 6,761 6,814 
NASDAQ 702 547 863 1,094 1,139 1,234 1,308 
TSX 468 440 252 324 394 443 553 
LSE 744 632 901 993 989 1.165 1.165 
Euronext 1,371 1,031 1,492 1,831 2,150 3,065 3,656 
Deutsche Borse 1,089 734 1,246 1,459 1,598 2,155 2,431 
ASX 266 267 398 491 469 599 650 
TSE 1,058 961 1,339 1,543 1,945 1,910 1,794 
SGX 300 259 270 344 375 543 708 
Korea Exchange 283 317 436 584 443 494 639 
Bursa Malaysia 147 147 187 189 177 230 330 
NSE of India     499 670 1,248 
Thailand 94 114 285 249 179 271 377 
HKEx 584 473 689 786 930 1.462 2,139 
Taiwan 499 408 562 631 684 1.148 944 
Shanghai 516 429 462 376 343 1.089 4,295 
Shenzhen 379 308 303 249 213 394 1,171 
 
Table 6: China vs. USA, Market capitalization/GDP (2001-2008) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
USA         
GDP (US$ Bil.) 10,128 10,470 10,961 11,686 12,434 13,195 13,841  
Market Cap. (US$ Bil.) 13,923 11,010 14,173 16,240 16,915 19,286 19,664  
Market Cap. /GDP (%) 137.47% 105.16% 129.31% 138.98% 136.04% 146.17% 142.07%  
China                 
GDP (RMB Bil.) 10,966 12,033 13,582 15,988 18,322 21,192 25,731 30,067 
Market Cap. (RMB Bil) 4,352 3,833 4,246 3,706 3,243 8,940 32,714 12,137 
Market Cap./GDP 39.69% 31.85% 31.26% 23.18% 17.70% 42.19% 127.14% 40.37% 
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5.2 Situation of ownership concentration in China 
5.2.1 Construction of data 
Much of literature on the role and function of the modern firm is based on the assumption of 
widely dispersed ownership. This notion originally derived from Berle and Means (1932) and 
has been propagated by Baumol (1959), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Grossman and Hart 
(1980).  
In recent years, several studies have begun to question the empirical validity of this image. 
Some studies (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Morck et 
al., 1988) show that even among the largest American firms, there is a modest concentration of 
ownership. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) have found in the United States several hundred 
public traded firms with majority (greater than 51 percent) shareholders. Holderness et al. 
(1999) have found, moreover, that management ownership in the United States today is higher 
than it was when Berle and Means wrote their study. 
Studies on other rich countries reveal more significant concentration of ownership in 
Germany (Edwards and Fischer, 1994; Franks and Mayer, 1994; Gorton and Schmidt, 1996), 
Japan (Prowse, 1992; Berglof and Perotti, 1994), Italy (Barca, 1995), and seven OECD 
countries (European Corporate Governance Network, 1997). 
In developing countries economies, ownership is also heavily concentrated (La Porta et al., 
1998 and 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). La Porta et al. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1999) is the first study that investigates the issue of ultimate control, i.e., they 
trace the chain of ownership to find who has the most voting rights. The findings suggest that 
ownership and control can be separated to the benefit of the large shareholders. Claessens et al. 
(2000) improve on their methodology and apply it to East Asia. They examine the separation of 
ownership and control in 2,980 publicly traded companies in nine East Asian countries (Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Phlippines, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand). 
In all these literature there is a lack of China Mainland, so the purpose of this section is to 
investigate the situation of ownership concentration in China Mainland to fill up this gap. 
The analysis in the following section is based on newly reported data from annual reports 
2007 of all the listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 
all Chinese companies listed on NYSE. The annual report 2007 of all firms are downloaded 
from the homepages of SHSE, SZSE and NYSE, because all publicly traded companies must 
submit their audited annual reports to SEC and disclose them on the homepage of the 
exchanges.  
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All of the annual reports provide the names and share percentage of all immediate owners 
who hold more than 5% of the listed company’s stock. In many cases, the principle 
shareholders of the firms are themselves corporate entities. Most of the listed companies report 
the major shareholders in these entities, then the major shareholders in the major shareholders, 
and so on, until the ultimate owner of the listed companies. A few of the listed companies do 
not have reported their ultimate controllers and owners, but only the immediate ownership 
structure and these firms are kicked out of the samples.  
Net capital at the end of 2007 is reported by all the listed companies and some of the 
companies’ net capitals at the end of 2007 are minus and we also eliminate such companies 
from the samples because the correlation between the ownership concentration and ROE will 
be examined later and ROE of these corporations makes no sense. 
 In the study samples there are 820 companies listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange, 631 
companies listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 40 firms listed on NYSE. Most of these 
firms are listed only on one stock exchange (SHSE, SZSE or NYSE), but some of them are 
double listed, that means listed on both SHSE and NYSE or SZSE and NYSE, therefore, there 
are all together 1,481 corporations in the sample. 
The cash-flow rights and control rights of the companies are analyzed by studying all shares 
controlled or owned by the ultimate controller, who controls the most voting right or owned the 
most cash-flow right in the firm. In most cases, the principal shareholders are themselves 
corporate entities. This study goes on to identify their owners, the owners of their owners, till 
the ultimate controller of the firm, who may be the state, a person or members of a family.  
The definition of ownership relies on cash-flow rights, not on voting rights. The definition of 
control relies on voting rights and the controllers generally use pyramiding schemes or/and 
cross-holdings as a means to separate cash-flow rights and voting rights. This distinction can 
contribute to enormous differences. This is explained with the example of Zhejiang Yankon 
Group Co. Ltd (Yankon), a company listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange and controlled by a 
family, the ownership structure of which is displayed in the following figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Ownership structure of Zhejiang Yankon Group Co. Ltd 
 
This figure shows that the biggest immediate shareholder of Yankon is company B, which is 
controlled by Mr. Chen and his children, so family Chen is the ultimate owner and controller of 
Yankon. The voting right controlled by family Chen is not only the share owned by company B, 
but also the entire share directly or indirectly controlled by all the members of Family Chen, 
namely (2.43%+3.92%+(5.44%+30.45)+6.88%)=49.12%. Because all Chinese companies are 
one-share-one-vote, family Chen controlled nearly half of the voting rights of Yankon. But the 
ownership of family Chen in Yankon is not so much, only: 
(2.43%+((100%*5.44%+30.45%)*90%+10%)*3.92%+(100%*5.44%+30.45%)*36.91%+6.
88%)=22.21%.  
So family Chen owns 22.21% of the cash flow right in Yankan but controls 49.12% of the 
voting right of Yankon. The difference between cash flow right and control right is nearly 27%. 
Voting right and ownership of all companies in study sample are calculated in the same way. 
Theory suggests that both cash-flow and voting rights are important. Crucially, the 
incentives to expropriate vary with cash-flow rights (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). And 
according to the results in Chapter 2, the insiders expropriate less when they invest more in the 
firm, which means they have more cash-flow benefit. Hence, the following sections investigate 
the concentration of cash-flow rights. 
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5.2.2 Proportion of ownership concentrated companies in China 
In this section, how many companies are ownership concentrated in China are examined. 
Similar to La Porta et al. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1999) and 
Claessens et al. (2000) this study defines concentration with both 20% and 10% cutoff. This 
means that a firm is defined as widely held if the ultimate owner of this firm has less than 20% 
(or 10%) cash-flow right. A company is owned by the state means that the ultimate owner is a 
department of the state, which directly or/and indirectly holds at least 20% (or 10%) cash-flow 
rights in this company. And companies held by family are companies with ultimate owner, who 
is a person or a family and directly or/and indirectly holds at least 20% (10%) cash-flow rights 
in this company.  
The cutoff 10% is used because it provides a significant threshold of votes; and most 
countries mandate disclosure of 10%. In China, the detailed information of all owners who hold 
more than 10% stock in the listed company must be disclosed in the annual report, which 
means the owners with more than 10% ownership play an important role in the company. For 
the use of 20% cutoff, it is documented by La Porta et al. that the control right of East Asian 
corporations can be achieved with much less than an absolute majority ownership, because the 
probability of being a single controlling shareholder through holding only 20% of the stock is 
very high (above 80% across the four east Asian countries, namely Hong Kong, Japan, 
Singapore and South Korea). According to the result of Claessens et al., the concentration of 
cash flow rights in East Asia is 15.7%; the concentration of voting rights in East Asia is 
19.77% (Claessens et al., 2000, pp.100). So when the ownership concentration of a company is 
over 20%, it can be called ownership concentrated. Therefore, this study follows the 10% 
cutoff and 20% cutoff used by other authors to classify the companies.  
All the companies in the study samples have provided their ownership structure and the 
name of ultimate owner in their annual report so that the proportion of ownership concentrated 
companies for each industry can be calculated as: 
Percentage of companies held by state in certain industry = the number of state holding 
companies in certain industry/the number of all companies in certain industry 
Percentage of companies held by family in certain industry = the number of family holding 
companies in certain industry/the number of all companies in certain industry 
Percentage of companies widely held in certain industry = the number of widely held 
companies in certain industry/the number of all companies in certain industry 
Percentage of companies held by state in total sample = the number of state holding 
companies in total samples/the number of all companies in total samples 
Percentage of companies held by family in total samples = the number of family holding 
companies in total samples/the number of all companies in total samples 
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Percentage of companies widely held in total samples = the number of widely held 
companies in total samples/the number of all companies in total samples 
The results are shown in tables 7 and 8.  
 
Table 7: Proportion of ownership concentrated companies in China (20% Cutoff) 
Industry   
 Number of 
Firms 
Held by 
State 
Held by 
Family 
Widely 
Held 
Agriculture 34 52.94% 26.47% 20.59% 
Mining 32 81.25% 0.00% 18.75% 
Manufactures 857 50.29% 21.59% 28.12% 
 Food and drink 61 52.46% 22.95% 24.59% 
 Textile, Clothes and Leather 68 38.24% 23.53% 38.24% 
 Wood and Furniture 3 0.00% 66.67% 33.33% 
 Paper Making and Print 29 37.93% 27.59% 34.48% 
 Petroleum, Chemistry and Plastic 156 55.13% 19.87% 25.00% 
 Electron 69 42.03% 27.54% 30.43% 
 Metal and Nonmetal Material 137 59.12% 14.60% 26.28% 
 
Machine, Equipment and 
Instrument 228 56.58% 19.74% 23.68% 
 Medicine and Biology 94 37.23% 24.47% 38.30% 
 Other manufactures 12 16.67% 58.33% 25.00% 
Electric power, gas and water 63 77.78% 1.59% 20.63% 
Construction 34 55.88% 20.59% 23.53% 
Communication, transport and storage 63 80.95% 4.76% 14.29% 
Information technology 94 37.23% 30.85% 31.91% 
Wholesale and retail 88 44.32% 11.36% 44.32% 
Finance and insurance 25 64.00% 0.00% 36.00% 
Real estate 64 46.88% 34.38% 18.75% 
Social service 48 66.67% 12.50% 20.83% 
Media and culture 9 88.89% 11.11% 0.00% 
Miscellaneous 70 28.57% 15.71% 55.71% 
Maximum of all industries   88.89% 34.38% 55.71% 
Minimum of all industries  28.57% 0.00% 0.00% 
Total / Weighted Average 1,481 52.26% 19.18% 28.56% 
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Table 8: Proportion of ownership concentrated companies in China (10% Cutoff) 
Industry 
Number of 
Firms 
Held by 
State 
Held by 
Family 
Widely 
Held 
Agriculture 34 58.82% 32.35% 8.82% 
Mining 32 84.38% 6.25% 9.38% 
Manufactures 857 58.81% 31.97% 9.22% 
 Food and drink 61 57.38% 29.51% 13.11% 
 Textile, Clothes and Leather 68 45.59% 39.71% 14.71% 
 Wood and Furniture 3 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
 Paper Making and Print 29 48.28% 44.83% 6.90% 
 
Petroleum, Chemistry and 
Plastic 156 65.38% 28.85% 5.77% 
 Electron 69 50.72% 40.58% 8.70% 
 Metal and Nonmetal Material 137 70.80% 21.17% 8.03% 
 
Machine, Equipment and 
Instrument 228 61.84% 30.26% 7.89% 
 Medicine and Biology 94 48.94% 37.23% 13.83% 
 Other manufactures 12 25.00% 58.33% 16.67% 
Electric power, gas and water 63 90.48% 1.59% 7.94% 
Construction 34 61.76% 26.47% 11.76% 
Communication, transport and storage 63 88.89% 4.76% 6.35% 
Information technology 94 47.87% 39.36% 12.77% 
Wholesale and retail 88 63.64% 21.59% 14.77% 
Finance and insurance 25 80.00% 8.00% 12.00% 
Real estate 64 53.13% 39.06% 7.81% 
Social service 48 77.08% 16.67% 6.25% 
Media and culture 9 88.89% 11.11% 0.00% 
Miscellaneous 70 41.43% 32.86% 25.71% 
Maximum of all industries  90.48% 39.36% 25.71% 
Minimum of all industries  41.43% 1.59% 0.00% 
Total / Weighted Average 1,481 61.72% 28.02% 10.26% 
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The tables above show us that more than half of the publicly traded companies in China are 
state companies, especially the industries of mining, electric power, gas and water, 
communication, transport and storage, and media and culture are mostly owned by the state. 
More than 75% of the companies in these industries are primarily invested by the government 
(20% cutoff), because these industries are more important and controlled by the state. But the 
industry of miscellaneous is less owned by the state, only 28.57% (20% cutoff). 
About 20% of listed companies are primarily invested by families (20% cutoff). Information 
technology and real estate are the industries mostly favored by families. More than 30% of 
companies in both of these industries are concentrated owned by families (20% cutoff). 
Agriculture, manufactures and Construction are also industries favored by wealthy families and 
more than 20% of companies in these industries are owned by families (20% cutoff). But in the 
industries of mining and finance and insurance, there is no company owned by family (20% 
cutoff).  
So all together 71.44% of the companies are ownership concentrated (20% cutoff), primarily 
owned either by state or by families. This ratio is much higher when the 10% cutoff standard is 
used, namely 89.74%. 
The proportion of widely held firms is much less than the ownership concentrated, only 
28.56% (20% cutoff) and this ratio decreases to 10.26%, if the 10% cutoff standard is taken. 
The industry of Miscellaneous has the highest widely held ratio and 25.71% of companies in 
this group have no concentrated owner (10% cutoff), and this ratio increases to 55.71% with 
20% cutoff. But in the industry of media and culture there is no company widely held (both 
10% and 20% cutoff). 
According to the results in La Porta et al. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1999), at the 20% threshold, for the samples of large firms, 30% of the firms in the world are 
family-controlled, 18% are state-controlled, and 52% are widely held. At the 10% threshold, 
for the samples of large firms, 35% of the firms in the world are family-controlled, 20% are 
state-controlled, and 45% are widely held. At the 20% threshold, for the samples of medium-
sized firms, 45% of the firms in the world are family-controlled, 15% are state-controlled, and 
40% are widely held. At the 10% threshold, for the samples of medium-sized firms, 53% of the 
firms in the world are family-controlled, 16% are state-controlled, and 31% are widely held.  
Faccio and Lang (2002) analyze the ultimate ownership and control of 5,232 corporations in 
13 Western European countries. At the 20% threshold, 36.93% of the samples are widely held 
and 44.29% are family controlled. Widely held firms are more important in the UK (63.08%) 
and Ireland (62.325%), family controlled firms in continental Europe. Financial and large firms 
are more likely widely held, while non-financial and small firms are more likely family 
controlled. In continental European, the state controls more than 10% of the listed firms in 
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Austria, Finland, Italy and Norway, which is more important than other countries in Western 
European. At the 10% threshold, the proportion of widely held firms falls to 13.72% and family 
control increases to 55.87%. 
So compared to other countries, more firms in China are controlled by the state and the 
ownership-dispersed companies are much less than in other countries. This indicates that 
ownership concentration in China is really serious. Remembering the theory of Twin Agency 
Problems in former chapters, these empirical results also denote the severe Twin Agency 
Problems in China.  
To examine the difference of ownership concentration on different stock exchanges the 
proportion of ownership concentrated firms on SHSE, SZSE and NYSE can respectively be 
calculated, which are shown in table 9: 
 
Table 9: Comparison of proportion of ownership concentrated companies between different stock 
exchanges 
  Stock exchange
Number of 
firms Held by state Held by family Widely held 
 SHSE 820 58.66% 12.68% 28.66% 
20% cutoff SZSE 631 45.64% 25.36% 29.00% 
 NYSE 40 35.00% 47.50% 17.50% 
  SHSE 820 67.68% 20.00% 12.32% 
10% cutoff SZSE 631 55.15% 33.91% 10.94% 
 NYSE 40 37.50% 55.00% 7.50% 
 
This table shows that companies on SHSE are more state-owned but less family-owned, 
compared to the other two stock exchanges. Companies on NYSE are more family-owned but 
less state-owned and widely held companies on NYSE are at the least, compared to the other 
stock exchanges. The detailed information of SHSE and SZSE are shown in tables 10 to13. 
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Table 10: Proportion of ownership concentrated companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange (20% 
Cutoff) 
Industry 
Number of 
firms 
Held by 
state 
Held by 
family 
Widely 
held 
Agriculture 21 57.14% 23.81% 19.05%
Mining 21 85.71% 0.00% 14.29%
Manufactures 434 57.83% 12.90% 29.26%
 Food and drink 36 61.11% 11.11% 27.78%
 Textile, Clothes and Leather 36 36.11% 19.44% 44.44%
 Wood and Furniture 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
 Paper Making and Print 17 64.71% 11.76% 23.53%
 Petroleum, Chemistry and Plastic 74 56.76% 14.86% 28.38%
 Electron 26 42.31% 11.54% 46.15%
 Metal and Nonmetal Material 72 65.28% 8.33% 26.39%
 Machine, Equipment and Instrument 119 68.91% 10.08% 21.01%
 Medicine and Biology 52 44.23% 17.31% 38.46%
Electric power, gas and water 42 85.71% 0.00% 14.29%
Construction 23 60.87% 13.04% 26.09%
Communication, transport and storage 45 86.67% 2.22% 11.11%
Information technology 51 43.14% 17.65% 39.22%
Wholesale and retail 58 48.28% 13.79% 37.93%
Finance and insurance 19 63.16% 0.00% 36.84%
Real estate 38 50.00% 39.47% 10.53%
Social service 19 68.42% 0.00% 31.58%
Media and culture 6 83.33% 16.67% 0.00%
Miscellaneous 43 27.91% 13.95% 58.14%
Maximum   86.67% 39.47% 58.14%
Minimum  27.91% 0.00% 0.00%
Total / Weighted Average 820 58.66% 12.68% 28.66%
 
 91
Table 11: Proportion of ownership concentrated companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange (10% 
Cutoff) 
Industry 
Number of 
firms 
Held by 
state 
Held by 
family 
Widely 
held 
Agriculture 21 66.67% 28.57% 4.76%
Mining 21 85.71% 0.00% 14.29%
Manufactures 434 65.44% 21.66% 12.90%
 Food and drink 36 69.44% 16.67% 13.89%
 Textile, Clothes and Leather 36 44.44% 41.67% 13.89%
 Wood and Furniture 2 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
 Paper Making and Print 17 76.47% 23.53% 0.00%
 Petroleum, Chemistry and Plastic 74 70.27% 25.68% 4.05%
 Electron 26 57.69% 34.62% 7.69%
 Metal and Nonmetal Material 72 76.39% 13.89% 9.72%
 
Machine, Equipment and 
Instrument 119 68.91% 10.08% 21.01%
 Medicine and Biology 52 50.00% 32.69% 17.31%
Electric power, gas and water 42 95.24% 0.00% 4.76%
Construction 23 69.57% 17.39% 13.04%
Communication, transport and storage 45 91.11% 2.22% 6.67%
Information technology 51 54.90% 25.49% 19.61%
Wholesale and retail 58 65.52% 22.41% 12.07%
Finance and insurance 19 78.95% 10.53% 10.53%
Real estate 38 57.89% 39.47% 2.63%
Social service 19 84.21% 5.26% 10.53%
Media and culture 6 83.33% 16.67% 0.00%
Miscellaneous 43 41.86% 32.56% 25.58%
Maximum   95.24% 39.47% 25.58%
Minimum  41.86% 0.00% 0.00%
Total / Weighted Average 820 67.68% 20.00% 12.32%
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Table 12: Proportion of ownership concentrated companies on Shenzhen Stock Exchange (20% 
Cutoff) 
Industry 
Number of 
firms 
Held by 
state 
Held by 
family Widely held
Agriculture 12 50.00% 16.67% 33.33%
Mining 11 72.73% 0.00% 27.27%
Manufactures 405 43.95% 28.89% 27.16%
 Food and drink 25 40.00% 36.00% 24.00%
 Textile, Clothes and Leather 32 37.50% 28.13% 34.38%
 Wood and Furniture 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
 Paper Making and Print 12 0.00% 50.00% 50.00%
 Petroleum, Chemistry and Plastic 79 53.16% 24.05% 22.78%
 Electron 40 45.00% 35.00% 20.00%
 Metal and Nonmetal Material 64 53.13% 20.31% 26.56%
 Machine, Equipment and Instrument 102 46.08% 27.45% 26.47%
 Medicine and Biology 38 34.21% 31.58% 34.21%
 Other manufatures 12 16.67% 58.33% 25.00%
Electric power, gas and water 21 61.90% 4.76% 33.33%
Construction 11 45.45% 36.36% 18.18%
Communication, transport and storage 18 66.67% 11.11% 22.22%
Information technology 36 27.78% 50.00% 22.22%
Wholesale and retail 29 37.93% 3.45% 58.62%
Finance and insurance 6 66.67% 0.00% 33.33%
Real estate 24 45.83% 20.83% 33.33%
Social service 28 67.86% 17.86% 14.29%
Media and culture 3 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Miscellaneous 27 29.63% 18.52% 51.85%
Maximum     100.00% 50.00% 58.62%
Minimum   27.78% 0.00% 0.00%
Total / Weighted Average 631 45.64% 25.36% 29.00%
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Table 13: Proportion of ownership concentrated companies on Shenzhen Stock Exchange (10% 
Cutoff) 
Industry 
Number of 
firms 
Held by 
state 
Held by 
family 
Widely 
held 
Agriculture 12 33.33% 16.67% 50.00%
Mining 11 81.82% 18.18% 0.00%
Manufactures 405 52.84% 38.02% 9.14%
 Food and drink 25 44.00% 44.00% 12.00%
 Textile, Clothes and Leather 32 43.75% 37.50% 18.75%
 Wood and Furniture 1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
 Paper Making and Print 12 8.33% 75.00% 16.67%
 Petroleum, Chemistry and Plastic 79 62.03% 30.38% 7.59%
 Electron 40 50.00% 42.50% 7.50%
 Metal and Nonmetal Material 64 65.63% 28.13% 6.25%
 Machine, Equipment and Instrument 102 52.94% 39.22% 7.84%
 Medicine and Biology 38 52.63% 39.47% 7.89%
 Other manufatures 12 25.00% 58.33% 16.67%
Electric power, gas and water 21 80.95% 4.76% 14.29%
Construction 11 45.45% 45.45% 9.09%
Communication, transport and storage 18 83.33% 11.11% 5.56%
Information technology 36 38.89% 55.56% 5.56%
Wholesale and retail 29 62.07% 17.24% 20.69%
Finance and insurance 6 83.33% 0.00% 16.67%
Real estate 24 50.00% 33.33% 16.67%
Social service 28 75.00% 21.43% 3.57%
Media and culture 3 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Miscellaneous 27 40.74% 33.33% 25.93%
Maximum     100.00% 55.56% 50.00%
Minimum   33.33% 0.00% 0.00%
Total / Weighted Average 631 55.15% 33.91% 10.94%
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5.2.3 Average degree of ownership concentration in China 
In this section, it goes on to calculate the mean, median, 1st quartile and 3rd quartile of the 
ownership held by the ultimate owners for all the firms in the samples in order to see the 
average degree of ownership concentration in China.  
All the annual reports in the samples provide ownership structure of the listed companies and 
the percentage of the ownership held by the ultimate owner is calculated for each company, as 
it has been done to Zhenjiang Yankon Group Co. Ltd shown in figure 15. The percentage of 
ownership owned by the ultimate owner is defined as the degree of ownership concentration for 
each company.  
The indices of ownership concentration in table 14 are calculated as: 
Mean of ownership concentration for certain industry = mean of degrees of ownership 
concentration of all the companies in certain industry  
Mean of ownership concentration for total sample = mean of degrees of ownership 
concentration of all the companies in our samples 
Standard deviation of ownership concentration for certain industry = standard deviation of 
degrees of ownership concentration of all the companies in certain industry  
Standard deviation of ownership concentration for total sample = standard deviation of 
degrees of ownership concentration of all the companies in our samples 
Median of ownership concentration for certain industry = median of degrees of ownership 
concentration of all the companies in certain industry  
Median of ownership concentration for total sample = median of degrees of ownership 
concentration of all the companies in our samples 
1st quartile of ownership concentration for certain industry = 1st quartile of degrees of 
ownership concentration of all the companies in certain industry  
1st quartile of ownership concentration for total sample = 1st quartile of degrees of ownership 
concentration of all the companies in our samples 
3rd quartile of ownership concentration for certain industry = 3rd quartile of degrees of 
ownership concentration of all the companies in certain industry  
3rd quartile of ownership concentration for total sample = 3rd quartile of degrees of 
ownership concentration of all the companies in our samples 
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Table 14: Average ownership concentration in China 
Industry 
Number 
of firms Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
1st  
Quartile 
3rd  
Quartile 
Agriculture 34 33.52 15.63 32.15 25.46 46.56
Mining 32 43.79 21.40 49.69 28.25 58.84
Manufactures 857 31.55 16.98 28.98 18.90 43.38
 Food and drink 61 32.50 18.33 32.25 20.74 43.00
 Textile, Clothes and Leather 68 27.46 15.21 24.73 17.39 38.49
 Wood and Furniture 3 23.18 3.95 23.34 20.80 25.64
 Paper Making and Print 29 28.90 17.13 24.02 15.70 35.41
 
Petroleum, Chemistry and 
Plastic 156 33.06 16.69 31.93 19.97 44.52
 Electron 69 30.88 15.95 30.24 17.72 44.41
 Metal and Nonmetal Material 137 34.20 19.18 30.01 19.49 48.76
 
Machine, Equipment and 
Instrument 228 32.08 16.06 30.17 20.72 43.18
 Medicine and Biology 94 27.23 15.39 23.72 14.90 39.50
 Other manufatures 12 36.42 20.16 37.06 20.99 49.87
Electric power, gas and water 63 36.46 16.45 34.32 25.59 47.52
Construction 34 33.82 16.18 35.57 22.43 43.78
Communication, transport and 
storage 63 39.19 16.39 41.00 27.77 50.98
Information technology 94 31.21 18.78 28.42 17.93 44.17
Wholesale and retail 88 26.37 16.13 23.59 15.19 34.07
Finance and insurance 25 32.94 23.16 25.47 12.99 45.46
Real estate 64 36.48 17.89 34.72 21.90 47.47
Social service 48 34.97 17.23 34.82 22.49 49.14
Media and culture 9 40.61 16.13 36.80 25.58 48.42
Miscellaneous 70 21.39 15.99 17.84 10.03 27.77
Maximum 43.79 23.16 49.69 28.25 58.84
Minimum 21.39 15.63 17.84 10.03 27.77
Total / Weighted Average 1,481 32.04 17.62 29.97 18.64 44.78
 
 96
Table 14 above indicates that the average ownership concentration of all these firms is 32.04 
(mean value). The industry of mining has the highest ownership concentration with a mean 
value of 43.79 and a median value of 49.69. Miscellaneous is the most ownership-dispersed 
industry with the lowest mean value of 21.39 and median value of 17.84, although it will still 
be seen as concentrated. 
Claessens et al. (2000) investigated the cash-flow concentration for 9 countries in East Asia 
except China and the result is cited in table 15: 
 
Table 15: Cash-flow concentration in East Asia1 
Country 
Number of 
firms Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 1st  Quartile 3rd  Quartile 
Hongkong 330 24.30 11.43 18.67 17.43 29.68
Indonesia 178 25.61 12.54 24.00 16.00 34.00
Japan 1,117 6.90 8.51 4.00 2.00 10.00
Korea 211 13.96 9.36 10.10 8.29 18.57
Malaysia 238 23.89 11.68 19.68 14.00 30.00
Philippines 99 21.34 11.52 19.22 10.00 28.64
Singapore 211 20.19 10.82 20.00 13.27 29.66
Taiwan 92 15.98 8.76 14.42 10.00 19.27
Thailand 135 32.84 13.51 30.00 20.00 40.00
       
East Aisa 2,611 15.70 13.44 12.00 5.06 22.00
 
So compared to these East Asian countries, the average cash-flow concentration in China, 
shown in table 14 as 32.04%, is much higher than the average level of these 9 countries. And 
this result indicates again that the Twin Agency Problems in China are very serious. 
The comparison of different stock exchanges is shown in table 16: 
 
Table 16: Comparison of average ownership concentration between different stock exchanges 
Stock 
exchange 
Number of 
firms Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 1st  Quartile 3rd  Quartile 
SHSE 820 32.16 17.39 30.49 18.88 44.86
SZSE 631 31.55 17.68 28.98 18.12 44.38
NYSE 40 41.91 21.37 40.79 26.33 56.59
 
It is seen that the situation on SHSE is almost the same as SZSE, but companies on NYSE 
are more concentrated, with a mean value of 41.91, while this ratio on SHSE and SZSE is 
about 32. In section 5.3, this difference is discussed in detail. 
The following table 17 and table 18 show the detailed information about SHSE and SZSE. 
 
                                                     
1 This table is cited from Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. Lang, 2000, the separation of ownership and control in East 
Asian corporations, Journal of Financial Economics 58, pp. 100.  
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Table 17: Average ownership concentration on Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
Industry 
Number 
of firms Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
1st  
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Agriculture 21 34.50 14.68 32.30 26.15 43.27
Mining 21 49.13 21.31 52.86 39.73 60.48
Manufactures 434 31.13 16.46 28.65 18.98 42.21
 Food and drink 36 30.91 17.10 31.03 17.87 40.75
 Textile, Clothes and Leather 36 24.97 12.85 22.13 17.46 31.32
 Wood and Furniture 2 25.64 2.30 25.64 26.79 26.22
 Paper Making and Print 17 31.83 18.20 25.76 20.03 41.90
 
Petroleum, Chemistry and 
Plastic 74 31.53 14.62 31.04 19.58 41.98
 Electron 26 25.22 12.27 21.75 16.75 31.76
 Metal and Nonmetal Material 72 34.30 18.94 32.47 19.60 45.19
 
Machine, Equipment and 
Instrument 119 34.09 16.48 34.39 22.54 46.56
 Medicine and Biology 52 26.61 15.39 23.58 15.57 38.17
Electric power, gas and water 42 36.82 15.01 33.64 28.57 47.17
Construction 23 32.57 15.76 35.35 19.69 43.18
Communication, transport and 
storage 45 41.20 16.04 45.03 31.27 51.98
Information technology 51 27.02 16.43 23.70 12.53 40.10
Wholesale and retail 58 28.52 16.49 26.29 16.50 34.86
Finance and insurance 19 32.39 23.80 22.65 15.14 56.48
Real estate 38 38.05 15.21 36.59 23.83 46.54
Social service 19 34.52 18.62 34.98 17.89 50.44
Media and culture 6 47.47 15.33 46.71 38.85 54.98
Miscellaneous 43 21.33 16.21 17.85 9.58 25.10
Maximum 49.13 23.80 52.86 39.73 60.48
Minimum 21.33 14.68 17.85 9.58 25.10
Sample average 820 32.16 17.39 30.49 18.88 44.86
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Table 18: Average ownership concentration on Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Industry 
Number 
of firms Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
1st  
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Agriculture 12 31.39 17.52 31.53 17.70 47.71
Mining 11 33.58 17.51 29.43 20.63 49.54
Manufactures 405 31.66 17.31 28.58 18.71 44.27
 Food and drink 25 33.55 20.16 33.20 20.74 43.38
 
Textile, Clothes and 
Leather 32 29.28 16.56 28.28 17.02 42.01
 Wood and Furniture 1 18.27 0.00 18.27 18.27 18.27
 Paper Making and Print 12 24.74 14.50 20.44 13.84 34.48
 
Petroleum, Chemistry and 
Plastic 79 33.71 18.10 33.18 20.30 45.71
 Electron 40 35.57 16.59 37.97 23.48 48.44
 
Metal and Nonmetal 
Material 64 33.54 19.12 26.18 19.30 50.36
 
Machine, Equipment and 
Instrument 102 29.46 14.85 27.45 19.56 38.94
 Medicine and Biology 38 27.88 15.17 24.29 14.74 39.58
 Other manufatures 12 36.42 20.16 37.06 20.99 49.87
Electric power, gas and water 21 35.74 18.98 36.24 19.43 47.81
Construction 11 36.44 16.73 36.35 29.20 50.90
Communication, transport and 
storage 18 34.18 16.18 32.83 24.56 41.54
Information technology 36 34.39 18.30 29.53 21.15 44.80
Wholesale and retail 29 22.18 14.80 17.41 13.67 33.75
Finance and insurance 6 34.71 20.88 40.33 17.77 43.74
Real estate 24 34.01 21.80 31.60 14.32 50.39
Social service 28 35.84 16.08 35.93 23.09 48.85
Media and culture 3 26.90 5.31 25.58 23.37 29.77
Miscellaneous 27 21.56 15.56 17.83 10.34 40.73
Maximum 36.44 21.80 40.33 29.20 50.90
Minimum 21.56 5.31 17.41 10.34 29.77
Sample average  631 31.55 17.68 28.98 18.12 44.38
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5.2.4 Most ownership-concentrated companies in China 
Table 19 displays the 20 most ownership concentrated companies in the sample, 15 
companies of which are owned by state and the other 5 companies are owned by families, 
which might indicate that the companies owned by state are more ownership concentrated than 
those owned by families. This conclusion will be further testified in section 5.3.2. 
Among these 20 firms, there is only one company, which is listed only abroad, and the other 
19 companies are listed in China Mainland or listed both in China Mainland and abroad. The 
samples listed on NYSE are much less than on Shanghai and Shenzhen.  According to this 
table it could not be concluded that the ownership concentration of companies listed on NYSE 
is higher or lower than those listed in Mainland, but table 16 has indicated that the average 
ownership concentration on NYSE is more than on SHSE and SZSE. In section 5.3 this topic 
will be discussed in detail. 
The industry of metal and nonmetal material sits on the first place in this table with the most 
companies, 5 of all the 20 companies belonging to this industry, although the mean value of 
ownership concentration of this industry is 34.2%, only a little more than the mean value of 
total sample, 32.04% (see table 14). But it is shown that all the 5 companies from this industry 
are steel companies and invested by the government. If steel companies are separated from the 
industry of metal and nonmetal material, a much higher degree of ownership concentration 
might be calculated for this steel group and the average degree of ownership concentration of 
metal and nonmetal group will be much lower. 
It can also be noticed that the assets of these state holding companies are more than those 
held by families. The relationship between capital scale and ownership concentration will be 
discussed in section 5.3.4. 
 
 
 
Table 19: Top 20 most ownership concentrated companies in China 
Industry Corporate name Listed on 
Listed 
code 
Cash-flow 
concentration 
(%) 
Ultimate 
Owner 
Gross asset 
(th. RMB) 
Net asset  
(th. RMB) 
Mining PetroChina Company Limited 
Shanghai, New York, 
Hong Kong 601857 86.29 Government 994,092,000 677,367,000 
Mining China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation 
Shanghai, New York, 
Hong Kong, London 600028 75.84 Government 718,572,000 300,949,000 
Information technology China Mobile Limited New York CHL 74.29 Government 563,493,000 373,751,000 
Mining China Shenhua Energy Company Limited 
Shanghai, Hong 
Kong 601088 73.86 Government 238,821,000 128,250,000 
Metal and nonmetal material Baoshan Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Shanghai 600019 73.97 Government 188,336,000 88,504,000 
Machine, equipment and 
instrument SAIC Motor Corporation Limited Shanghai 600104 83.83 Government 101,815,488 37,384,768 
Comunication, transport and 
storage Daqin Railway Co. Ltd Shanghai 601006 72.94 Government 51,107,589 37,533,997 
Metal and nonmetal material Bengang Steel Plates Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000761 82.12 Government 29,356,299 16,740,763 
Metal and nonmetal material Laiwu Steel Corporation Shanghai 600102 74.65 Government 17,398,335 6,234,583 
Metal and nonmetal material Liuzhou Iron & Steel Co. Ltd Shanghai 601003 84.00 Government 13,765,168 5,021,882 
Metal and nonmetal material Fujian Sansteel MinGuang Co. Ltd Shenzhen 002110 73.87 Government 6,442,611 2,691,871 
Real estate Chongqing Yukaifa Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000514 82.45 Government 2,662,903 1,853,099 
Real estate Jiangxi Zhongjiang Real Estate Co. Ltd Shanghai 600053 72.37 Government 2,099,791 566,988 
Media and culture Liaoning Publishing & Media Company Limited Shanghai 601999 73.14 Government 1,866,208 1,258,272 
Miscellaneous Hainan Overseas Chinese Investment Co. Ltd Shanghai 600759 77.89 Mr. Chen 1,475,012 1,406,415 
Electric power, gas and water Henan Yuneng Holdings Co. Ltd Shenzhen 001896 78.14 Government 1,236,128 801,647 
Food and drink Zhengzhou Sanquan Foods Co. Ltd Shenzhen 002216 86.95 Family Chen 1,065,008 294,389 
Electron Shenzhen Sea Star Technology Co. Ltd Shenzhen 002137 73.22 Family Qiao 900,562 514,286 
Petroleum, chemistry and 
plastic Jiangsu Hongda New Material Co. Ltd. Shenzhen 002211 81.60 Family Zhu 851,716 300,005 
Petroleum, chemistry and 
plastic Shenzhen Noposion Agrochemicals Co. Ltd Shenzhen 002215 77.34 Family Lu 357,723 181,940 
100 
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5.2.5 Most ownership-dispersed companies in China 
In all the 1,481 samples there are 19 companies without the ultimate owner, who is a 
department of the state or a family and holds more than 2% cash-flow right in the company. 
These firms are referred to as the most ownership dispersed companies in the samples. Detailed 
information of these companies is shown in table 20. 
All these firms are relatively smaller than the most concentrated ones shown in table 19, 
except Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd., which indicates that smaller 
companies are more dispersed.  
It is also shown that 8 of these 19 most dispersed companies are related to people’s daily life, 
for example, four companies from the industry of food and drink, three companies from Social 
Service, and one from Wholesale and Retail, which might indicate that these industries are less 
controlled by the government and the agency problems in these industries are not so serious as 
the other industries.  
Another point is that none of these 19 companies is listed on NYSE, and only one is listed 
both in China mainland (SHSE) and abroad (Hong Kong), the other 18 companies are all listed 
only in China mainland (11 on SHSE and 7 on SZSE). As mentioned in the last section, the 
difference of ownership concentration between companies listed abroad and those listed only in 
China mainland will be discussed later in section 5.3. 
 
 
 
Table 20: 19 most ownership dispersed companies in China 
Industry Corporate name Listed on Listed code 
Gross asset  
(th. RMB) 
Net asset  
(th. RMB) 
Finance and insurance Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd 
Shanghai and  Hong 
Kong 601318 651,104,000 107,234,000 
Social service Dazhong Transportation (Group) Co. Ltd Shanghai 600611 9,972,172 4,044,984 
Miscellaneous Shanghai DaZhong Public Utilities (Group) Co. Ltd Shanghai 600635 8,184,489 2,350,233 
Miscellaneous Guangdong Meiyan Hydropower Co. Ltd. Shanghai 600868 8,095,800 2,215,821 
Petroleum, chemistry and plastic Zhuhai Zhongfu Enterprise Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000659 5,111,758 1,856,159 
Metal and nonmetal material Inner Mongloia Xishui Strong year Co. Ltd  Shanghai 600291 4,894,561 3,830,491 
Information technology Insigam Technology Co. Ltd Shanghai 600797 4,213,712 1,411,257 
Food and drink 
Henan Shuanghui Investment & Development Co. 
Ltd Shenzhen 000895 4,024,117 2,177,648 
Food and drink Yantai Changyu Pioneer Wine Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000869 3,251,224 2,229,020 
Social service Shanghai QiangSheng Holding Co. Ltd Shanghai 600662 3,046,048 1,408,395 
Food and drink V V Food & Beverage Co. Ltd Shanghai 600300 2,978,478 1,497,882 
Petroleum, chemistry and plastic Baotou Tomorrow Technology Co. Ltd Shanghai 600091 2,531,217 1,851,019 
Food and drink Sichuan Swellfun Co. Ltd Shanghai 600779 2,263,962 1,302,831 
Machine, equipment and 
instrument Sundiro Holdings Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000571 1,565,759 1,001,380 
Metal and nonmetal material Xinjiang jionworid Co. Ltd Shanghai 600888 1,469,723 617,691 
Electron Tianshui Huatian Technology Co. Ltd. Shenzhen 002185 1,186,020 788,999 
Wholesale and retail Sanlian Commercial Co. Ltd Shanghai 600898 952,973 339,048 
Miscellaneous Hainan Haide Industry Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000567 287,845 129,413 
Social service 
Hainan Dadonghai Tourism Centre (Holdings) Co. 
Ltd Shenzhen 000613 135,406 73,693 
* All these firms have no ultimate owner, who is a department of the state or a family and holds more than 2% cash flow right in the firm.  
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5.3 Is listing abroad a good way for Chinese companies to become more 
ownership-dispersed? 
5.3.1 Comparison of ownership concentration between Chinese 
corporations listed in mainland and those listed abroad  
In this section it is examined whether there is any difference of ownership concentration 
between the companies listed in mainland and those listed abroad. According to the results 
obtained from the model in Chapters 2 and 3, listing abroad is a solution to the Twin Agency 
Problems. The firms listed abroad must observe stricter laws and regulations demanded by the 
foreign countries so that the minority investors burden less moral risk, the enterpriser can co-
invest less in the firm, and the ownership concentration might be lower in these abroad listed 
companies. 
But the empirical evidence in this study is contrary to the expectation. Table 9 shows that the 
ratio of widely held companies on NYSE is lower than that on SHSE and SZSE. Table 16 
shows that the average ownership concentration on NYSE is higher than that on SHSE and 
SZSE. This evidence indicates that listing abroad is not useful for Chinese firms to become 
more ownership-dispersed.  
To make this empirical conclusion more convincible, this section makes a more detailed 
analysis. All the firms in the sample are classified into two groups, namely listed abroad and 
listed only in China Mainland. Most of the firms in the sample are listed only in China 
Mainland (SHSE or SZSE, no company is found to be listed on both of SHSE and SZSE), and 
these firms are classified into the group of listed only in Mainland. Some of the companies are 
listed only on NYSE, and others are listed both in Mainland and abroad (New York, Hong 
Kong, London and so on), all of which are ranged into the group of listed abroad. Then the 
average ownership concentrations of these two groups are calculated respectively, which is 
shown in panel A of table 21 and Panel B displays the proportion of ownership concentrated 
companies of each group. 
It is shown that the average ownership concentration of the firms listed abroad is 42.95, 
which is much more than those listed only in China Mainland, 31.37. The proportion of widely 
held companies of listed abroad group is 15.12% (20% cutoff) and this proportion decreases to 
4.65% if it is calculated with 10% cutoff standard. Both of these two ratios are much less than 
the group of listed only in Mainland, which is 29.46% (20% cutoff) and 10.61% (10% cutoff) 
respectively.  
Table 21: Comparison of ownership concentration between companies listed abroad and in China 
Mainland 
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Panel A: Average degree of cash-flow concentration 
 Number of 
firms Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 1
st Quartile 3rd Quartile 
All firms listed 
abroad 86 42.95 19.7 42.71 28.13 55.45 
All firms listed 
only inland 1,395 31.37 17.26 29.13 18.31 43.86 
Total 1,481 32.04 17.62 29.97 18.64 44.78 
 
Panel B: Proportion of ownership concentrated companies 
 Number of 
firms Held by state Held by family Widely held 
All firms listed 
abroad 86 62.79% 22.09% 15.12%
All firms listed 
only inland 1,395 51.54% 19.00% 29.46%
20% cutoff 
Total 1,481 52.26% 19.18% 28.56%
All firms listed 
abroad 86 68.60% 26.74% 4.65%
All firms listed 
only inland 1,395 61.29% 28.10% 10.61%
10% cutoff 
Total 1,481 61.72% 28.02% 10.26%
 
It seems that Chinese companies listed abroad are more concentrated than those listed only 
in China Mainland, which is contrary to the expectation. This study tries to explain this 
phenomenon with the following reasons: 
(a) Higher proportion of state holding companies; 
(b) Short ages of listed abroad; 
(c) Greater capital scale. 
At first, it is considered that the ownership concentration of companies listed abroad is 
higher because the proportion of state owning company in the group listed abroad is higher 
than the group listed only in mainland. Table 21 shows that 62.79% of the companies listed 
abroad are owned by the state (20% cutoff) and this ratio is increased to 68.6% with the 10% 
cutoff standard. For the group of listed only in mainland this ratio is much lower, 51.54% and 
61.29% respectively. If the ownership concentration of state holding companies is higher than 
family holding ones, the average ownership concentration of companies listed abroad could be 
increased by these state holding companies.  
Then the second consideration is that it might take a long time for the Chinese companies to 
use the function of foreign financial market to become ownership-dispersed, because it has 
been noticed that most of the companies listed on NYSE have been listed on it only for a short 
time. 18 of these 40 companies listed on NYSE were first listed on NYSE in 2007 and only 12 
companies have been listed on NYSE for more than 5 years. These newly listed abroad 
companies have not had enough time to become dispersed and the companies listed abroad 
longer might have lower ration of ownership concentration. 
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It is also noticed that companies listed on NYSE are relative more than those listed only in 
mainland, since the demand of NYSE for capital scale is greater than that of SHSE and SZSE. 
If the ownership concentration is positively related to capital scale, the higher concentration 
degree of companies listed abroad could be explained by their greater capital scale.  
The following sections are going to examine the difference of ownership concentration 
between companies owned by state and by family, the relationship between ownership 
concentration and the age of listed abroad, and the relationship between ownership 
concentration and capital scale, in order to testify these three hypotheses above.  
5.3.2 Influence of state holding companies on the ownership concentration 
of companies listed abroad  
In last section it has been noticed that the proportion of state-owned companies in the group 
listed abroad is higher than the group listed only in mainland. And this section is to examine 
the difference of ownership concentration between companies owned by the state and those 
owned by family to testify whether the higher ownership concentration of companies listed 
abroad is caused by this higher proportion of the state-owned companies. 
The ownership concentrated companies in the sample are further classified into four groups: 
owned by the state and listed abroad, owned by the state and listed only in mainland, owned by 
family and listed abroad, and owned by family and listed in mainland. The ownership 
concentration of all these four groups is calculated respectively, which is shown in table 22.  
The result indicates that the ownership concentration of companies owned by state is surely 
higher than those owned by family. With the 20% cutoff standard, the mean value of total state 
holding companies is 41.08, while this value of the total family holding companies is 37.22. 
With the 10% cutoff standard the difference is even greater, 37.19 vs. 30.29. And this 
distinction of ownership concentration between state holding and family holding companies is 
much more obvious for companies listed abroad. The mean value of state holding and listed 
abroad companies is 51.29, while that of family holding and listed abroad ones is only 39.94 
(20% cutoff), and under the 10% cutoff standard this value is 48.3 vs. 35.63.  
It is known from the result 2.3.2.1-1 and 2.3.2.1-2 that the more the enterprisers must co-
invest and the companies are more concentrated, the less the expropriators take away from the 
companies. The poorer the minority shareholders are protected, the more the effect of a higher 
ownership concentration on reducing the fraction of profit diverted by corporate insiders. So 
the higher concentration of state owned companies might be caused by the more serious 
expropriation of minority shareholders committed by state rulers and corporate insiders. And 
minority investors on foreign financial market have less trust in the state holding companies 
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than inland investors. The difference between state holding companies and family holding 
companies is higher for the companies listed abroad.  
In future, state holding companies must be transformed and the investment from the 
government into the company will decrease continuously. However, to whom should these 
companies belong, a few rich families or more minority investors? This is a key to the 
development of the Chinese financial market, and an important factor in the development of the 
economic and the social. 
The result also indicates that the companies listed abroad are authentically more 
concentrated than those listed only in mainland, even if state owning companies and family 
owning ones are investigated. Under 20% cutoff standard, the mean value for the state holding 
and listed abroad companies is 51.29, much higher than those state holding and listed mainland, 
which is 40.31. This value of family holding and listed abroad companies is 39.94, a little more 
than those family holding and listed in mainland, which is 37.22. With 10% cutoff standard, the 
mean value for state holding and listed abroad companies is 48.3, while the value of state 
holding and listed only in mainland companies is 36.42. The value of family holding and listed 
abroad companies is 35.63 and 29.98 for those family holding and listed only in mainland; the 
difference is higher than that under 20% cutoff standard. 
Therefore, it can be concluded assuredly that the higher ownership concentration of 
companies listed abroad than those listed only in mainland is not caused by the higher 
proportion of state holding companies in the group of listed abroad.  
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Table 22: Difference of ownership concentration between companies controlled by state and by 
family 
 Number of firms Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
1st 
Quartile
3rd 
Quartile
All Firms listed 
abroad 54 51.29 15.89 52.21 38.87 66.00
All Firms listed only 
in China Mainland 719 40.31 13.58 38.67 28.67 50.12
State 
holding 
Total 773 41.08 14.03 39.22 29.36 50.67
All Firms listed 
abroad 19 39.94 39.94 39.94 39.94 39.94
All Firms listed only 
in China Mainland 265 37.02 14.00 34.20 25.08 44.84
20% 
cutoff 
Family 
holding 
Total 284 37.22 13.99 34.30 25.22 45.01
All Firms listed 
abroad 59 48.30 18.13 50.02 34.10 64.71
All Firms listed only 
in China Mainland 855 36.42 15.37 34.99 23.98 47.83
State 
holding 
Total 914 37.19 15.83 35.79 24.39 48.85
All Firms listed 
abroad 23 35.63 15.56 34.20 23.30 44.35
All Firms listed only 
in China Mainland 392 29.98 15.45 25.28 18.05 39.89
10% 
cutoff 
Family 
holding 
Total 415 30.29 15.51 26.04 18.13 40.38
 
5.3.3 Effect of the listing-abroad-age on ownership concentration of 
companies listed abroad 
It has been noticed that most of the companies listed on NYSE have been listed on it only for 
a short time and it is considered that it might take a long time for those companies to use the 
function of foreign financial market to become ownership-dispersed. So this section is to 
investigate whether the companies newly listed on NYSE are more concentrated than those 
listed for longer time.  
Table 23 shows the ownership concentration of the companies listed on NYSE in different 
year. It is seen that the average ownership concentration of firms listed for longer time is not 
lower than those newly listed and the correlation between mean value and listed age of the 
companies listed during 1993 to 2007 is 0.30831, which means the companies listed later is less 
concentrated than those listed earlier. 
It is also noticed that from 1993 to 2004 all the firms listed on NYSE are state holding 
companies and most of these companies are highly ownership concentrated. From 2005 to 2007 
all the firms listed on NYSE are family held or widely held and the concentration of these firms 
is relative less. So the time is divided into two phases: 1993 to 2004 and 2005 to 2007 and a 
result different to that above is obtained. The correlation between the mean value of ownership 
                                                     
1 These data are collected at the beginning of 2008 so the two companies listed in 2008 cannot represent the character of 
all the firms listed in 2008 on NYSE and is eliminated here. 
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concentration and listed age during 1993 to 2004 is -0.0450, which means that companies listed 
later is more concentrated but not obviously. It is shown that the company listed in 2004 is 
much more dispersed than all the companies listed before. The correlation during 2005 to 2007 
is 0.0580, which means the companies listed earlier is more concentrated than those listed later 
but not obviously.  
These results have testified that the companies listed on NYSE have not become less 
concentrated since they have been listed on NYSE, but those listed later are less concentrated. 
 
Table 23: Effect of listing-abroad- age on ownership concentration of companies listed on NYSE 
Listed 
in 
Number 
of firms 
Held by 
state 
Held by 
family 
Widely 
held Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
1st  
Quartile 
3rd  
Quartile 
1993 1 1 0 0 55.56  
1994 1 1 0 0 32.70  
1996 1 1 0 0 41.00  
1997 3 3 0 0 61.42 9.87 59.67 54.99 66.98
1998 1 1 0 0 52.86  
2000 3 3 0 0 77.77 6.32 75.84 73.51 81.07
2001 2 2 0 0 51.49 12.93 51.49 45.02 57.95
2002 1 1 0 0 70.89  
2003 1 1 0 0 68.37  
2004 1 1 0 0 10.94  
2005 1 0 1 0 34.20  
2006 4 0 3 1 22.83 12.56 19.40 14.31 27.92
2007 18 0 16 2 33.46 16.80 35.65 21.62 44.67
Total 38 15 20 3 41.60 21.35 40.79 24.68 54.89
*The correlation between mean and listed age (from 1993 to 2004) is -0.0450; the correlation between 
mean and listed age (from 2005 to 2007) is 0.0580; the correlation between mean and listed age (from 
1993 to 2007) is 0.3083. 
 
5.3.4 Influence of great capital scale on ownership concentration of 
companies listed abroad 
5.3.4.1 Difference of ownership concentration between top 50 and bottom 50 companies 
This section is to check whether the bigger firms are more concentrated and whether this 
factor has caused the higher ownership concentration of companies listed abroad. 
The market price of the companies on stock exchanges changes frequently and violently, so 
the scale of the companies is judged with their gross asset, which is audited by the independent 
auditor and reported in the annual report.  
At first, this study analyzes the ownership concentration of the top 50 companies and the 
bottom 50 companies. It is found that the average ownership concentration of the top 50 
companies is 47.4, which is much higher than that of the bottom 50, which is only 23.15. But 
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the correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset of all the 1,481 companies is 
0.1075, and the correlation between ownership concentration and net asset is 0.1991, which 
indicates that the ownership concentration is very weakly positively related to company’s scale. 
Then the correlation for the top 50 and bottom 50 is calculated respectively, and each of 
them is further divided into 5 groups, namely top 1-10, bottom 1-10, top 11-20, bottom 11-20 
and so on. It is found that in the top 50 corporations there is no specific relationship between 
ownership concentration and gross asset, for the correlation between gross asset and ownership 
concentration is 0.1708. The ownership concentration seems more related to net asset with a 
correlation value of 0.4555. This difference might be caused by the financial companies, 
because financial companies always have higher debt ratio and there are 18 financial 
companies in the top 50. In the next section, the difference between financial and non-financial 
companies is discussed. In the bottom 50 companies there is also no clear relationship between 
ownership concentration and capital scale. The correlation between ownership concentration 
and gross asset is 0.1814 and the correlation between ownership concentration and net asset is 
0.2355. The comparison of ownership concentration of top 50 and bottom 50 companies is 
shown in tables 24 and 25 respectively. These data indicates again that ownership 
concentration is weakly related to capital scale. 
The difference of ownership concentration between top 50 and bottom 50 companies can be 
explained with the agency problem. When the agency problem is serious in one country, that 
means the expropriators can rob more from the firm, then the concentration of the firm must be 
higher and the controlling shareholder himself must co-invest more in the company. But the 
families or private persons do not have so much money as the state so that the largest 
companies in China are mostly held by the government. As is shown in table 24, 46 of the top 
50 companies are state held companies and no company is held by family. In section 5.3.2, it 
obtains that companies held by the state are more concentrated because the agency problem is 
worse in these companies, so these giant companies are more concentrated than smaller ones. 
For the bottom 50 companies, it is seen that 27 companies are owned by families because they 
have enough money to set up these firms and the agency problem is better solved in these firms, 
so that the average concentration of these firms are much lower.  
This relationship between ownership concentration and capital scale could be explained in 
another way: in a country without developed financial market the capital sum that can be 
collected from the public is limited. Hence, the more money the project needs the higher 
proportion the entrepreneur himself has to invest in the firm, which leads to higher ownership 
concentration of the bigger companies. But the data shows that the relationship between 
ownership concentration and capital scale is only weakly. 
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So the top 50 companies are much more concentrated than bottom 50 partly because of their 
capital scale, but the more important reason is the character of the owner, for these firms are 
mostly held by the state and state held companies are more ownership concentrated. 
 
 
Table 24: Comparison of ownership concentration between top 50 companies 
  
State 
holding 
Family 
holding 
Widely 
held 
Listed 
abroad Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 1st Quartile
3rd 
Quartile 
Average gross 
asset (th RMB) 
Average net asset 
(th RMB) 
Top 1-10 9 0 1 8 50.33 27.37 67.73 22.37 70.04 2,942,690,476 266,099,604 
Top 11-20 8 0 2 5 40.23 29.72 35.47 12.90 73.12 503,943,985 128,553,871 
Top 21-30 10 0 0 6 54.99 17.81 55.94 37.33 69.49 152,606,099 65,119,151 
Top 31-40 9 0 1 6 36.94 22.11 44.43 13.42 55.43 83,711,187 26,615,247 
Top 41-50 10 0 0 3 54.49 16.19 58.87 50.24 64.71 57,810,902 23,317,935 
Total top 50 46 0 4 28 47.40 24.40 53.50 26.20 24.40 748,152,530 101,941,162 
Total 1,481  914 415 152 86 32.04 17.62 29.97 18.64 44.78 28,889,505 4,983,027 
*These companies are ranked descending according to gross asset. 
*The correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset for all top 50 companies is 0.1708; the correlation between ownership concentration and net asset 
for all top 50 companies is 0.4555; The correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset for all these 1,481 companies is 0.1075; the correlation between 
ownership concentration and net asset for all these 1,481 companies is 0.1991. 
 
Table 25: Comparison of ownership concentration between bottom 50 companies 
 
State 
held 
Family 
held 
Widely 
Held 
Listed 
abroad Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 1st Quartile
3rd 
Quartile 
Average gross 
asset (th RMB) 
Average net 
asset  
(th RMB) 
Bottom 1-10 3 3 4 0 17.41 12.09 16.19 7.20 25.96 102,956 25,775 
Bottom 11-20 3 7 0 0 23.60 13.00 18.74 15.91 22.77 179,282 95,480 
Bottom 21-30 2 4 4 0 18.69 18.39 13.36 7.84 17.96 220,250 116,977 
Bottom 31-40 3 5 2 0 22.70 14.62 20.16 13.29 37.42 269,682 160,643 
Bottom 41-50 1 8 1 0 33.36 17.74 40.95 17.11 47.81 302,068 156,329 
Total bottom 50 12 27 11 0 23.15 16.36 18.36 12.45 34.24 214,847 111,041 
Total 1,481 914 415 152 86 32.04 17.62 29.97 18.64 44.78 28,889,505 4,983,027 
*These companies are ranked descending according to gross asset. 
* The correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset for all these 50 companies is 0.1814; the correlation between ownership concentration and net 
asset for all these 50 companies is 0.2355; the correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset for all these 1,481 companies is 0.1075; the correlation 
between ownership concentration and net asset for all these 1,481 companies is 0.1991. 
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In the total sample, there are 25 financial companies and 18 of them are ranked in top 50 
companies. The biggest 6 companies are all financial companies and 9 financial companies are 
ranked in top 10. Financial companies always have higher debt ratio and this factor might cause 
the correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset to be high different to the 
correlation between ownership concentration and net asset. So next, financial companies are 
separated from non-financial companies and they are analyzed, respectively. 
Table 26 displays the ownership concentration of all 25 financial companies. The top 10 
companies are more concentrated than other 15 companies and the ownership concentration of 
these corporations seems to be moderately related to capital scale. The correlation between 
concentration and gross asset is 0.5441 and the correlation between concentration and net asset 
is 0.5963. 20 of these 25 companies are held by the state and 9 of the top 10 companies are 
owned by the government. There are only two financial companies held by family and both of 
them are relatively smaller than those held by the state. They are ranked at the 22nd and 25th 
positions. Detailed information of all these 25 public traded financial companies is shown in 
appendix 3. 
In the total sample there are 1456 non-financial companies and table 27 shows the ownership 
concentrations of the top 50 non-financial companies. Similar to the financial companies, all 
the top 10 companies are held by the state and more concentrated than others. The ownership 
concentration of these corporations also seems to be moderately related to capital scale. The 
correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset is 0.4301 and the correlation 
between concentration and net asset is 0.4322, a little less than the financial firms. The table 
also shows that 48 of the top 50 companies are held by the state and none is held by family. 
Detailed information of these top 50 non-financial companies is shown in appendix 4. 
This phenomenon can also be explained with the same reason mentioned above. The capital 
supply from public is limited in a country without advanced financial market and most of the 
capital demanded by these giant companies can only be supplied by the state, which leads to 
the extremely high ownership concentration of the top 10 financial institutions and top 50 non-
financial companies. The higher the capital scale, the more the state must invest in the 
company, which causes the moderately positive relationship between capital scale and 
ownership concentration. The capital demand of the two family holding financial companies is 
relatively smaller and most of their capital can be collected from the minority shareholders so 
that the controlling shareholders own relative smaller share in the companies, as is shown by 
appendix 3 the ownership concentration of these two companies is 12.3 and 18.4 respectively, 
much lower than the state held ones. In the top 50 non-financial companies there is no 
company held by the family, because all these corporations are too big to be controlled by 
single family or person. 
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Comparing table 26 to 27, it is seen that the ownership of financial institutions are less 
concentrated than non-financial companies. It is well known that the financial institutions are 
always controlled by much stricter laws and regulations than other industries and this makes 
the financial institutions more transparent and less expropriated so that the minority 
shareholders will invest more in these institutions and the controlling shareholders do not need 
to hold higher ownership. 
 
Table 26: Comparison of ownership concentration between financial corporations 
  
State 
held 
Family 
held 
Widely 
held 
Listed 
abroad Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Average gross asset 
(th RMB) 
Average net asset 
(th RMB) 
1-10 9 0 1 7 43.74 25.81 47.95 20.37 68.27 2,928,414,803 202,252,612 
11-20 8 0 2 1 24.98 20.10 19.23 10.50 38.99 264,218,688 29,818,114 
21-25 3 2 0 0 27.28 12.21 22.65 18.43 38,69 4,588,460 1,202,678 
Total 25 20 2 3 8 32.94 23.16 25.47 12.99 45.46 1,277,971,088 93,068,826 
*These companies are ranked descending according to gross asset. 
* The correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset for all these 25 companies is 0.5441; the correlation between ownership concentration and net 
asset for all these 25 companies is 0.5963. 
 
Table 27: Comparison of ownership concentration between top 50 non-financial companies 
  
State 
held 
Family 
held 
Widely 
held 
Listed 
abroad Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
1st  
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Average gross 
asset (th RMB) 
Average net asset 
(th RMB) 
Top 1-10 10 0 0 8 69.71 9.99 72.52 66.03 74.21 380,025,519 213,462,730 
Top 11-20 9 0 1 7 43.31 21.96 44.43 32.96 53.09 100,644,645 39,313,366 
Top 21-30 10 0 0 5 55.43 13.72 58.18 53.85 63.52 61,680,385 20,731,126 
Top 31-40 9 0 1 3 39.02 21.45 40.91 19.29 50.58 41,554,766 16,337,310 
Top 41-50 10 0 0 5 44.77 20.25 42.27 32.61 59.69 31,159,629 14,913,478 
Total top 50 48 0 2 28 50.45 21.21 53.50 35.08 66.71 123,012,989 60,951,602 
Total 1,456  894 413 149 78 32.03 17.51 30.00 18.70 44.74 7,442,363 3,470,565 
*These companies are ranked descending according to gross asset. 
* The correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset for all top 50 non-financial companies is 0.4301; the correlation between ownership concentration 
and net asset for all top 50 non-financial companies is 0.4322; the correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset for all 1,456 non-financial companies 
is 0.2053; the correlation between ownership concentration and net asset for all 1,456 non-financial companies is 0.1991. 
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5.3.4.2 Comparison of ownership concentration between companies listed abroad and 
inland with the same capital scale 
In the last section it is shown that the ownership concentration is moderately related to the 
capital scale, both for the financial and non-financial companies. This section is to examine 
whether the higher ownership concentration of companies listed abroad is caused by their 
capital scale, for the companies listed abroad are relative more than those listed only in 
mainland. Because financial and non-financial companies have different degree of ownership 
concentration, all of the companies are separated into four groups: financial companies listed 
abroad, financial companies listed only inland, non-financial companies listed abroad and non-
financial companies listed only inland. And then the financial and non-financial groups are 
compared respectively. 
Table 28 shows the comparison of ownership concentration between financial institutions 
listed abroad and those listed mainland. The capital scale is divided into three levels: over 
1,000,000,000 thousand RMB, 1,000,000,000 to 600,000,000 thousand RMB and under 
600,000,000 thousand RMB. All the companies in the first level are listed abroad and none of 
the financial companies listed only in mainland has a gross capital over 1,000,000,000. All the 
companies in the third level are listed only in mainland because the gross asset of all companies 
listed abroad is more than 600,000,000. So, only the second level can be used to compare. In 
this level, there are only 2 companies listed abroad and 3 companies listed only in mainland. 
Although the average concentration of these two companies listed abroad is higher than the 
average value of the ones listed inland, it is not convincible to conclude that financial 
corporations listed abroad is more concentrated than those listed inland because the sample in 
this level is too small. 
Table 29 is the comparison of ownership concentration between non-financial companies 
listed abroad and those listed in mainland. As what was done for the financial companies, the 
non-financial companies are also divided into 6 levels according to their gross asset: over 
200,000,000 thousand RMB, 200,000,000 to 35,000,000 thousand RMB, 35,000,000 to 
10,000,000 thousand RMB, 10,000,000 to 3,000,000 thousand RMB, 3,000,000 to 900,000 
thousand RMB, and under 900,000 thousand RMB. In the first level there are only firms listed 
abroad and in the last level only firms listed inland, so the other four levels are used to compare. 
In the second level (200,000,000 to 35,000,000) and the fourth level (10,000,000 to 3,000,000) 
companies listed abroad are much more concentrated than those listed inland; and in the other 
low levels (35,000,000 to 10,000,000 and 3,000,000 to 900,000), companies listed abroad are a 
little less concentrated than those listed inland. So the result indicates that non-financial 
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companies listed abroad are not obviously less concentrated than those listed inland even if the 
capital scale is considered.  
After this carefully comparison of ownership concentration between companies listed abroad 
and inland for each capital scale level it can be concluded assuredly that the higher ownership 
concentration of companies listed abroad is not caused by their greater capital scale. 
 
Table 28: Comparison of ownership concentration between financial companies listed in mainland and listed abroad 
Level of gross asset (th 
RMB) 
Listed 
abroad / 
inland 
Number 
of firms
Held by 
state 
Held by 
family 
Widely 
Held Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Average gross 
asset  
(th RMB) 
Average net 
asset  
(th RMB) 
Over 1,000,000,000 Abroad 6 6 0 0 52.39 23.78 67.73 32.14 32.14 4,283,905,333 289,155,333 
Abroad 2 1 0 1 34.27 34.10 34.27 17.22 51.32 772,854,000 138,723,500 1,000,000,000 to 
600,000,000 Inland 3 2 0 1 18.24 9.31 20.40 13.15 24.40 895,370,675 39,127,040 
Under 600,000,000 Inland 14 11 2 1 27.57 17.12 24.06 12.48 41.14 143,858,942 14,068,609 
Total  25 20 2 3 32.94 23.16 25.47 12.99 45.46 1,277,971,088 93,068,826 
 
Table 29: Comparison of ownership concentration between non-financial companies listed in mainland and listed abroad 
Level of gross asset  
(th RMB) 
Listed 
abroad / 
inland 
Number 
of Firms
Held by 
State 
Held by 
Family 
Widely 
Held Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
Average gross 
asset  
(th RMB) 
Average net 
asset  
(th RMB) 
Over 200,000,000 Abroad 6 6 0 0 73.25 8.24 74.08 71.63 75.45 523,032,453 293,361,245 
Abroad 17 17 0 0 52.04 14.17 53.57 47.89 64.41 87,048,225 39,788,014 200,000,000 to 
35,000,000 Inland 17 15 0 2 44.15 24.76 48.97 18.71 63.82 71,825,800 27,169,506 
Abroad 18 17 1 0 39.47 13.12 41.57 34.26 49.71 22,618,473 13,185,432 35,000,000 to 
10,000,000 Inland 91 79 6 6 42.02 18.24 43.54 30.28 54.97 16,150,485 5,973,754 
Abroad 18 7 10 1 41.77 17.67 46.73 30.04 50.50 5,857,273 3,211,475 10,000,000 to 3,000,000
Inland 331 238 57 36 31.78 16.76 30.91 19.57 44.88 5,271,137 2,113,036 
Abroad 19 5 12 2 27.59 12.12 25.08 20.44 37.05 2,100,544 1,515,842 3,000,000 to 900,000 
Inland 596 370 164 62 30.52 16.82 27.46 18.12 41.76 1,734,473 807,173 
Under 900,000 Inland 343 140 163 40 29.26 16.49 27.22 16.75 40.52 572,497 310,936 
Abroad 517 384 86 47 42.44 18.59 42.27 29.86 54.41 66,288,312 35,391,141 Total 
Inland 1,378 842 390 146 31.44 17.26 29.31 18.42 43.97 4,111,460 1,663,740 
* The correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset for all 78 non-financial companies listed abroad is 0.5356; the correlation between ownership 
concentration and net asset for all 78 non-financial companies listed abroad is 0.5120. 
* The correlation between ownership concentration and gross asset for all 1,378 non-financial companies listed in mainland is 0.1600; the correlation between 
ownership concentration and net asset for all 1,378 non-financial companies listed in mainland is 0.1839. 
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5.3.5 Conclusion 
In the sections above, this study compares the ownership concentration between companies 
listed abroad and listed only inland and analyzes the difference carefully, from aspects of the 
character of ultimate owner (state or family), listed abroad age and capital scale. All these 
results do not sustain the opinion that listing abroad is a good way to solve the Twin Agency 
Problems and makes the companies more ownership dispersed. After all these examinations, it 
should be concluded that listing abroad is not a good way for Chinese company to get more 
ownership-dispersed, although the companies in USA are much more dispersed than in China.  
In Chapter 4, this study has suggested to solve the Twin Agency Problems through education, 
active economic policies and stricter laws and regulations. The purpose of listing abroad is to 
use the laws and regulations in foreign countries, but the effect has not been seen according to 
the evidence in China. It should be considered whether the laws and regulations on foreign 
financial market have any impact on the companies operated in China mainland and how much 
impact they can have. Because the companies, the controlling shareholders and state rulers all 
live in inland and are more regulated and controlled by the laws and regulations of the country 
they stay in, but not the country they only report to. So what is more important is where the 
company is operated, not where it is listed.  
In this section the following conclusions have been made: 
(a) The state holding companies are more concentrated than family holding ones; 
(b) The companies listed longer on NYSE are not less concentrated than those newly listed; 
(c) Ownership concentration is moderately positively related to capital scale. 
(d) The companies listed abroad are not less concentrated than those listed only inland. 
5.4 Relationship between profitability and ownership concentration  
5.4.1 Relationship between ROE and ownership concentration for 
companies in different industries 
From section 5.2, it is known that most of the Chinese companies are ownership 
concentrated, which is the best choice in the situation with serious Twin Agency Problems. It is 
also shown that some companies are ownership-dispersed although they live in the same 
circumstance. How are the dispersed companies operated? Are they more or less effective than 
those concentrated? In Chapter 2.3 it is indicated that the company is less expropriated if the 
entrepreneur has higher cash flow ownership in the company, and the company is better 
operated. But is this true in reality? In this section, the relationship between profitability and 
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ownership concentration is investigated to testify whether the companies with higher 
ownership concentration have higher profitability than those ownership-dispersed. 
The return of equity (ROE) is used here as an index of profitability. All the listed companies 
must disclose their ROE of the last three years in the annual report and all the financial data in 
the report have been audited by independent and professional accountant. Although the 
auditors cannot guarantee that these data are totally true and correct, the annual report is the 
most reliable source where these financial data can be obtained.  
Cash flow is also an index of performance of the company and is more difficult to be 
adjusted than ROE, but cash flow dose not equal the fortune owned by the shareholders in the 
company. The use of cash flow is controlled by the top managers, but the distribution of profit 
benefits all the owners so the owners care more about the profit on the condition that the cash 
flow will not break off. Generally, the managers will try to keep the cash flow at a reasonable 
level. How much is reasonable depends on the company’s financial policy which is different 
among the companies. Contrarily, no company dislikes too much profit and all companies will 
pursue as much profit as they can. So, ROE is used here as the index of performance of the 
companies.  
Because the profitability is very different between industries, the ROE of all the industries 
are calculated respectively. All the original data come from annual reports of 2007 of all the 
companies in the sample. Net profit is the profit or loss of financial year 2007 (1st Jan. to 31st 
Dec. 2007) and net asset is the balance on 31st Dec. 2007. The average ROE is calculated as: 
ROE of whole industry = Sum of net profit of all companies in certain industry/Sum of net 
asset of all companies in certain industry 
ROE of companies held by the state in certain industry = Sum of net profit of all companies 
held by the state in certain industry/Sum of net asset of all companies held by the state in 
certain industry 
ROE of companies held by family in certain industry = Sum of net profit of all companies 
held by family in certain industry/Sum of net asset of all companies held by family in certain 
industry 
ROE of companies widely held in certain industry = Sum of net profit of all companies 
widely held in certain industry/Sum of net asset of all companies widely held in certain 
industry 
ROE of all companies in the sample = Sum of net profit of all companies in the sample/Sum 
of net asset of all companies in the sample 
ROE of all companies held by the state in the sample = Sum of net profit of all companies 
held by the state in the sample/Sum of net asset of all companies held by the state in the sample 
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ROE of all companies held by family in the sample = Sum of net profit of all companies held 
by family in the sample/Sum of net asset of all companies held by family in the sample 
ROE of all companies held widely held in the sample = Sum of net profit of all companies 
widely held in the sample/Sum of net asset of all companies widely held in the sample  
As is shown in tables 30 and 31, the average ROE of all the companies in the sample is 
14.94%, but it is very different among the industries. The industry of mining is the most 
profitable industry with an average ROE of 18.73%, the other more profitable industries are 
petroleum, chemistry and plastic, communication, transport and storage, information 
technology, finance and insurance, and other manufactures, the ROE of which are all over 
15%. The industry of electron has the worst performance, with the ROE of 4.9%. The other 
less profitable industries are construction, and media and culture, both of which have a ROE 
under 8%. 
Tables 30 and 31 also show the comparison of ROE between state holding companies, 
family holding companies and widely held companies for each industry. Both tables indicate 
that in most industries the ROE of companies ownership concentrated (state holding or family 
holding) is higher than those dispersed (widely held), which is consistent to the theoretical 
result that ownership concentrated companies are better operated than dispersed because the 
agency problems in ownership concentrated companies are not so serious as in the dispersed 
ones. It is also found that in some industries it is the contrary. Both tables reveal that the ROE 
of widely held companies exceeds the average ROE of the industry in the following five 
industries: agriculture, mining, textile, clothes and leather, wholesale and retail, and social 
service. Particularly the industries of textile, clothes and leather, and wholesale and retail are 
more convictive, because all these industries have relatively more widely held companies and 
each of the other three industries has only three dispersed companies (10% cutoff). For the 
industry of textile, clothes and leather, the ROE of widely held companies are higher than both 
state held and family held. This means that these dispersed companies are really well managed 
by the professional managers who do not hold high cash flow right in the company and the 
agency problems are better solved by the corporate governance. For the industry of wholesale 
and retail, although the ROE of widely held companies are higher than those state holding ones 
but lower than family holding ones. This means that companies held by family are most 
effective because ownership in these firms is more concentrated by the controlling shareholder, 
who is generally the top manager of the company, and thus their incentive to steal from the 
firm is reduced. For the state holding companies, although the ownership is also concentrated, 
the top manager himself has no cash flow right in the company so the higher ownership 
concentration does not reduce his incentive to expropriate the company.  
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The tables also show the correlation between ROE and ownership concentration for each 
industry and this correlation is very different among these industries. For most industries the 
ROE is almost not related or very weakly related to ownership concentration (the absolute 
value of correlation is less than 0.2). For the industries of food and drink and communication, 
transport and storage, the ROE is weakly positively related to ownership concentration (the 
value of correlation is between 0.2 and 0.4). For the industries of wood and furniture and paper 
making and print, they are moderate positive related (the value is between 0.4 and 0.6). For the 
industries of other manufacture and social service it is even weakly negatively related (the 
value is between -0.2 and -0.4).  
So the comparison of ROE between concentrated and dispersed companies indicates that 
there is some relativity between profitability and ownership concentration but the correlation 
value does not display this relativity obviously. The reason might be that the relativity between 
these two factors among the state holding companies is different from the family holding 
companies; this relativity of companies listed abroad is different from those listed inland. Both 
of these two hypotheses are discussed in the following two sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 30: Comparison of ROE between companies ownership-concentrated and -dispersed (20% cutoff) 
Industry Number of firm 
Held by 
state 
Held by 
family Widely held
ROE of 
Industry 
ROE of 
companies 
held by state 
ROE of 
companies 
held by 
family 
ROE of 
companies 
widely held 
Agriculture 34 18 9 7 8.43% 8.58% 7.11% 9.62% 
Mining 32 26 0 6 18.73% 18.69% No 21.54% 
Manufacture 857 431 185 241     
 Food and drink 61 32 14 15 12.49% 13.64% 9.88% 9.88% 
 Textile, clothes and leather 68 26 16 26 8.38% 5.42% 6.29% 10.14% 
 wood and furniture· 3 0 2 1 10.42% No 10.49% 9.69% 
 paper making and print 29 11 8 10 11.77% 12.77% 14.30% 9.98% 
 Petroleum, chemistry and plastic 156 86 31 39 15.11% 15.60% 12.88% 12.86% 
 Electron 69 29 19 21 4.90% 5.36% 12.12% 3.13% 
 Metal and nonmetal 137 81 20 36 14.81% 15.07% 15.89% 12.14% 
 Machine, equipment and instrument 228 129 45 54 13.53% 13.00% 17.05% 12.08% 
 Medicine and biology 94 35 23 36 11.08% 8.85% 14.40% 10.85% 
 Other manufatures 12 2 7 3 15.91% 7.84% 11.76% 45.30% 
Electric power, gas and water 63 49 1 13 9.98% 10.10% 12.01% 7.02% 
Construction 34 19 7 8 7.05% 6.90% 11.16% 4.93% 
Comunication, transport and storage 63 51 3 9 15.67% 15.89% 5.25% 7.77% 
Information technology 94 35 29 30 15.90% 16.43% 12.28% 6.68% 
Wholesale and retail 88 39 10 39 13.83% 10.71% 20.14% 15.38% 
Finance and insurance 25 16 0 9 15.32% 15.25% No 15.83% 
Real estate 64 30 22 12 11.57% 9.26% 13.99% 14.27% 
Social service 48 32 6 10 10.07% 10.13% 7.23% 11.09% 
Media and culture 9 8 1 0 7.70% 7.70% 7.45% No 
Miscellaneous 70 20 11 39 9.15% 8.59% 13.12% 8.57% 
Total / Weighted Average 1,481 774 284 423 14.94% 15.29% 13.77% 12.69% 
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Table 31: Comparison of ROE between companies ownership-concentrated and -dispersed (10% Cutoff) 
 
Industry Number 
of firm 
Held by 
state 
Held by 
family 
Widely 
held 
ROE of 
industry 
ROE of 
companies 
held by state
ROE of 
companies 
held by 
family 
ROE of 
companies 
widely held 
Corr. Between 
ownership 
concentration 
and ROE 
Agriculture 34 20 11 3 8.43% 7.84% 7.20% 15.82% -0.0054 
Mining 32 27 2 3 18.73% 18.68% 4.66% 23.09% -0.0310 
Manufacture 857 504 274 79   
 Food and drink 61 35 18 8 12.49% 13.40% 9.46% 11.02% 0.2031 
 Textile, clothes and leather 68 31 27 10 8.38% 7.31% 8.33% 9.34% 0.0375 
 Wood and furniture 3 0 3 0 10.42% No 10.42% No 0.5542 
 Paper making and print 29 14 13 2 11.77% 10.48% 13.23% 13.69% 0.4381 
 Petroleum, chemistry and plastic 156 102 45 9 15.11% 15.68% 12.60% 5.80% 0.0437 
 Electron 69 35 28 6 4.90% 3.37% 10.56% 8.09% -0.0549 
 Metal and nonmetal 137 97 29 11 14.81% 14.89% 15.89% 5.78% -0.0962 
 Machine, equipment and instrument 228 141 69 18 13.53% 13.27% 15.33% 9.02% 0.0455 
 Medicine and biology 94 46 35 13 11.08% 8.87% 12.71% 15.00% 0.1342 
 Other manufatures 12 3 7 2 15.91% 23.90% 11.76% 6.86% -0.3287 
Electric power, gas and water 63 57 1 5 9.98% 9.96% 12.01% 9.65% -0.1234 
Construction 34 21 9 4 7.05% 6.89% 9.71% 6.50% 0.0476 
Comunication, transport and storage 63 56 3 4 15.67% 15.77% 5.25% 8.17% 0.3360 
Information technology 94 45 37 12 15.90% 16.22% 12.62% -1.78% -0.0931 
Wholesale and retail 88 56 19 13 13.83% 12.70% 16.32% 14.96% 0.0507 
Finance and insurance 25 20 2 3 15.32% 15.41% 28.40% 14.12% 0.0721 
Real estate 64 34 25 5 11.57% 11.06% 13.80% 10.93% 0.1604 
Social service 48 37 8 3 10.07% 9.85% 7.73% 14.80% -0.2303 
Media and culture 9 8 1 0 7.70% 7.70% 7.45% No 0.0843 
Miscellaneous 70 29 23 18 9.15% 9.82% 12.44% 6.06% -0.0798 
Total / Average Weighted 1,481 914 415 152 14.94% 15.20% 13.03% 12.40%   
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5.4.2 Relationship between profitability and ownership concentration for 
state holding companies and non-state holding companies 
In section 5.3, it is known that the ownership concentration of state holding companies is not 
the same as the family holding companies and the profitability of these two kinds of firms is 
also different. Hence, the relativity between profitability and ownership concentration could be 
very different between companies held by government and held by family. In this section, the 
samples are divided into state holding, family holding and widely held, and the relativity 
between ownership concentration and profitability is investigated for these three groups 
respectively. 
Tables 30 and 31 display that the ROE of all the industries are very different from each other, 
therefore to make the corporations from different industries comparable this study defines a 
relative profitability, named CR, which is obtained through dividing the ROE of a firm by the 
ROE of the industry. The higher the CR of a firm, the more profitable the firm. Instead of ROE, 
CR is another index of profitability of the firm. The CR of the state holding companies, the 
family holding ones and the widely held ones is compared, and the correlation between 
ownership concentration and CR is calculated for each group.  
The indices in tables 32 to 34 are calculated as: 
Mean of CR of state holding companies = Mean of CR of all the state holding companies in 
the sample 
Mean of CR of family holding companies = Mean of CR of all the family holding companies 
in the sample 
Mean of CR of widely held companies = Mean of CR of all the widely held companies in the 
sample 
Mean of CR of non-state holding companies = Mean of CR of all the non-state holding 
companies in the sample 
Mean of CR of total companies = Mean of CR of all companies in the sample 
Other indices are calculated in the same way. 
 
 125
Table 32: Comparison of CR between companies ownership-concentrated and -dispersed (20% 
Cutoff) 
 
Number 
of firms 
Mean of 
CR 
Standard 
deviation 
of CR 
Median 
of CR 
1st 
Quartile 
of CR 
3rd 
Quartile 
of CR 
Corr. Between 
ownership 
concentration 
and CR 
State holding 773 0.96 6.56 0.69 0.34 1.11 0.0079 
Family holding 284 2.44 21.45 0.91 0.56 1.49 0.0404 
Widely held 425 0.92 9.32 0.66 0.22 1.20 0.0098 
Non-state holding 709 1.53 15.40 0.79 0.34 1.35 0.0590 
Total  1,481 1.23 11.66 0.73 0.34 1.19 0.0220 
*CR=ROE of the firm / ROE of the industry 
 
Table 33: Comparison of CR between companies ownership-concentrated and -dispersed (10% 
Cutoff) 
 
Number 
of firms 
Mean 
of CR
Standard 
deviation 
of CR 
Median 
of CR 
1st 
Quartile 
of CR 
3rd 
Quartile 
of CR 
Corr. Between 
ownership 
concentration 
and CR 
State holding 914 0.99 6.21 0.67 0.33 1.10 -0.0017 
Family holding 415 2.03 17.87 0.87 0.45 1.43 0.0506 
Widely held 152 0.48 14.77 0.71 0.20 1.33 -0.0416 
Non-state holding 567 1.61 17.11 0.84 0.39 1.40 0.0586 
Total  1,481 1.23 11.66 0.73 0.34 1.19 0.0220 
*CR=ROE of the firm / ROE of the industry 
 
Table 34: Comparison of CR between companies with different ownership concentration  
Concentration of 
cash flow right 
Ultimate 
owner 
Number 
of firms
Mean 
of CR
Standard 
deviation 
of CR 
Median 
of CR 
1st 
Quartile 
of CR 
3rd 
Quartile 
of CR 
Corr. 
Between 
ownership 
concentration 
and CR 
State 
holding 773 0.96 6.56 0.69 0.34 1.11 0.0079Over 20% Family 
holding 284 2.44 21.45 0.91 0.56 1.49 0.0404
State 
holding 142 1.18 3.79 0.61 0.20 0.98 -0.009920% to 10% Family 
holding 130 1.16 3.52 0.71 0.25 1.19 -0.1047
Under 10% 
Widely 
held 152 0.48 14.77 0.71 0.20 1.33 -0.0416
*CR=ROE of the firm / ROE of the industry 
 
Both tables 32 and 33 indicate that the family holding companies are the most effective, and 
the widely held companies have the lowest CR, which is consistent to the result of Twin 
Agency Problems. The more the firm is ownership concentrated, the less the corporate insiders 
expropriate from the firm and the higher the firms value. The insiders of family holding 
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companies have higher proportion in the firms, so they have less incentive to expropriate the 
firm but more incentive to protest against the expropriation by the state rulers. Although the 
state holding companies have higher ownership concentration, the managers always have no 
direct cash flow right in the companies and are appointed by the government. When they have 
more chances to be lifted in the government, they are more encouraged to expropriate less from 
the corporations and manage the corporations well; otherwise they will use the companies to 
satisfy their own needs. The older managers of the state holding companies will expropriate as 
much as they can before they retire and do not care about the bankruptcy of the company for 
they have not invested any cent in it. The Twin Agency Problems in the widely held company 
are most serious because the insiders have only a little ownership in the company and they do 
not care much about the value of the firm. They also have no political career to care about, 
therefore they are more tempted to steal from the company. 
Tables 32 and 33 also indicate that the ROE of state holding companies is less related to their 
ownership concentration than the non-state holding ones. The correlation between ownership 
concentration and CR for state holding companies is 0.0079 (table 32), which is much lower 
than no-state holding ones, 0.0590 (table 32). It also does not indicate an obvious relationship 
between ownership concentration and CR. The mean value of CR of state holding companies in 
table 32 is 0.96 (20% cutoff) and in table 33 is 0.99 (10% cutoff), which means state holding 
companies with an ownership concentration over 20% are not more profitable than those with 
an ownership concentration between 10% and 20%. This is not the same for the family holding 
companies. The mean value of CR of family holding companies in table 32 is 2.44 (20% cutoff) 
and decreases to 2.03 (10% cutoff ) in table 33, which means the family holding companies 
with an ownership concentration over 20% are more profitable than those with an ownership 
concentration between 10% and 20%. It can be explained by the Twin Agency Problems: the 
managers of state holding companies do not have any share in the companies and their benefit 
and behavior are independent on the cash flow right the state holds in the company. The 
insiders of family holding companies have co-invested in the firms and they care more about 
the performance of firms when they have more shares in them.  
To show this result clearer the ownership concentration is classified into three levels: over 
20%, 20%-10% and under 10%, and the CR of each level for both state holding and family 
holding companies is examined, which is revealed in table 34. As mentioned above the mean 
value of CR of family holding companies decreases with the descending of the ownership 
concentration, from 2.44 to 1.16, for the owners have incentives to expropriate the companies 
when they have fewer shares in the company. And the mean value of CR of the companies 
widely held is only 0.48, which declares again that dispersed ownership is not effective. 
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When the ownership concentration decreases from over 20% to 20%-10%, the mean value of 
CR of state holding companies increases from 0.96 to 1.18, and in the group of 20%-10% the 
state holding and family holding companies have the similar CR, 1.18 and 1.16 respectively. 
When the ownership of the state in the company decreases from over 20% to 20%-10%, the 
ownership held by private families or persons increases, although not as much as the state holds 
(the state is still the biggest shareholder in the company). It is enough to make the private 
investors to care more about the firms and have seats in the board of directors. These less 
concentrated and state holding companies could be more effective than those companies wholly 
controlled by a group of officials who do not have even one percent ownership in the company. 
According to the median value, 1st and 3rd quartiles, the state holding companies with a 
concentration over 20% are a little better than those with a concentration between 20% and 
10%. 
Another interesting discovery is that the standard deviation of the group of 20%-10% is at 
the least, which means that there is not much distinction of profitability between all the 
companies in this group. The reason may be that the decisions of these firms are made more by 
a group of top managers, instead of by one or two dictators, which is common in the family 
companies, so these firms are more controlled by an institution than by several important 
persons. This reason also explains why the mean value of CR of state holding companies in this 
group is nearly the same as those held by families. Both of these two kinds of companies are 
controlled by a group of top managers. It is contrary to the companies held by the family with 
over 20% concentration, which have the highest mean value of CR, but also have the highest 
standard deviation because most of these firms are controlled by several family members and 
sometimes only the father of the family. Of course, these dictators will try their best to run the 
firm, but the risk of making wrong decision is also higher. So, the performance of these 
corporations depends on the ability and emotion of the ultimate owners and is more unstable. 
5.4.3 Relationship between profitability and ownership concentration for 
companies listed abroad and listed inland 
In section 5.3, it has been proved that listing abroad is helpless for the Chinese companies to 
get more dispersed and this section is to investigate the profitability of the companies listed 
abroad. As was done in section 5.3, all the samples are classified into two groups, listed abroad 
and listed only in inland. Because of the difference between state holding and family holding 
companies, the samples of each group are further divided into state holding, family holding and 
widely held. Then the CR of each group is analyzed, which is shown in tables 35 and 36. 
According to the mean value of CR, the companies listed abroad are not as profitable as 
those listed inland. The mean value of all the 86 companies listed abroad is 0.96, which is less 
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than the value of all 1395 companies listed inland, which is 1.25. And this distinction is greater 
for companies held by family. The mean value of CR of companies held by family and listed 
abroad is 1.33 and that for those listed inland is 2.52 (20% cutoff). The mean value of CR of 
companies held by family and listed abroad is 1.06 and this value of those listed inland is 2.09 
(10% cutoff). It seems that listing abroad does not make the companies more effective. The 
only except is the companies widely held. The mean value of CR of companies widely held and 
listed abroad is 1.41 (10%), greater than those widely held and listed inland, and even greater 
than the concentrated companies listed abroad (10% cutoff). There are only 4 widely held and 
listed abroad companies, much less than the samples widely held and listed inland, so this 
comparison is not so convictive. 
Looking at medians of the CR, the result is different. The median of CR of all 86 companies 
listed abroad is 0.90, which is greater than the median of all 1396 companies listed inland, 
which is 0.72. The median value of CR of companies held by family and listed abroad is 1.19 
(20% cutoff), which means that 50% companies in this group have an ROE higher than the 
average level of the industry they belong to. But the median value of CR of the companies held 
by family and listed inland is only 0.9 (20% cutoff), which means that 50% of them have an 
ROE less than the average ROE of the industry they belong to. These data indicate that there 
are more good firms in the group listed abroad, although their average CR is not as good as 
those of the firms in the group listed inland. This is similar with the result of Doidge et al. 
(2004), who found that firms cross-listed in the US have higher rate of return than those listed 
in homeland and can be explained with the Twin Agency Problems. The firms listed abroad are 
less expropriated by inside expropriators and state rulers because of the stricter laws and 
regulations enforced by foreign exchanges.  
Another point worth mentioning is the distinction of standard deviation between companies 
listed abroad and those listed inland. The deviation of all 86 companies listed abroad is only 
1.08, much less than 12.01, the value of all 1396 companies listed inland. Even for the family 
holding companies, which have the highest deviation in tables 32 and 33, the deviation of those 
listed abroad is only 0.83 under the 20% cutoff standard (see table 35) and 1.41 under the 10% 
cutoff standard (see table 36). So the companies listed abroad are more reliable as a whole and 
the investors have less risk when they choose companies to invest in because the difference 
between the companies are not so high. And this characteristic might well reflect the advantage 
of foreign stock market; bad companies are strictly forbidden to step into the market.  
Tables 35 and 36 also show that the profitability of companies listed abroad is more related 
to ownership concentration than those listed inland. The correlation between ownership 
concentration and CR for all the companies listed abroad is 0.1014, which is higher than this 
correlation for all the companies listed inland, 0.0234 (see table 35). This value of firms held 
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by family and listed abroad is 0.2728 (10% cutoff) and for the family holding and listed inland 
companies it is only 0.0521 (10% cutoff). According to the theory of agency problems, the 
insiders care more about their share in the firm when the financial market is more advanced, 
because the value of the company can be better publicly priced and more sensitive to their 
performance. So, if the companies step into a foreign market, the owners pay more attention to 
the share value they hold in the company than the private benefit they can divert from the 
company and the more ownership they have in the company, the more they care about the 
corporate market value. On the contrary, if the firm value cannot be fair priced and the value of 
the stocks held by the insiders is not related to their performance, they will not care so much 
about the profitability shown on the annual report but care more about their own private benefit 
from the company. 
Next, the ownership is classified into three levels: over 20%, 20%-10% and under 10%, and 
the CR of each level is analyzed for both companies listed abroad and listed inland, as is 
displayed in table 37. 
Similar to the result obtained in the last subsection, the mean value of CR of state holding 
companies increases when the concentration decreases from over 20% to 20%-10%, and it is 
suitable to both companies listed inland and abroad, because the state holding companies in the 
group of 20%-10% are more effective than those in the group of over 20%. 
An unexpected datum is the negative mean value of CR of the four family holding listed 
abroad companies in the group of 20%-10%. It is found that the ROE of these four companies 
is -60.77%, 21.68%, 22.22% and 8.67% respectively. If the extremely bad one is kicked out of 
the sample, the mean value of CR of the other three companies is 1.18, which is more 
reasonable. And it is seen again that the mean value of CR of family holding companies 
decreases when the ownership concentration decreases from over 20% to 20%-10%. 
A very interesting discovery is that the companies listed abroad with an ownership 
concentration under 10% are really well operated and their mean value of CR is 1.41, which is 
higher than other listed abroad groups and much higher than the listed inland companies with 
the same concentration, which is only 0.45. But as mentioned before, the sample is this group is 
too small, only 4 companies are listed abroad and widely held, so that this result is not 
convincible. The next section focuses on the well managed and ownership dispersed companies 
and characteristic of these companies will be examined to get some empirical results. 
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Table 35: Comparison of CR between companies listed abroad and listed inland (20% Cutoff) 
 
Number 
of firms
Mean 
of CR
Standard 
deviation 
of CR 
Median 
of CR 
1st 
Quartile 
of CR 
3rd 
Quartile 
of CR 
Corr. 
Between 
ownership 
concentration 
and CR 
State 
holding 54 0.88 0.93 0.80 0.60 1.06 0.1971 
Family 
holding 19 1.33 0.83 1.19 0.82 1.45 0.1568 
Widely 
held 13 0.72 1.69 0.92 0.55 1.46 -0.3450 
Non-
state 
holding 32 1.01 1.30 1.06 0.51 1.47 0.1682 
Listed abroad 
Total 86 0.96 1.08 0.90 0.61 1.32 0.1014 
State 
holding 719 0.96 6.79 0.67 0.32 1.11 0.0068 
Family 
holding 265 2.52 22.21 0.90 0.52 1.50 0.0422 
Widely 
held 411 0.93 9.47 0.64 0.21 1.18 0.0119 
Non-
state 
holding 676 1.55 15.76 0.78 0.33 1.34 0.0608 
Listed inland 
Total 1,395 1.25 12.01 0.72 0.33 1.19 0.0234 
Total 1,481 1.23 11.66 0.73 0.34 1.19 0.0220 
*CR=ROE of the firm / ROE of the industry 
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Table 36: Comparison of CR between companies listed abroad and listed inland (10% Cutoff) 
 
Number 
of firms
Mean 
of CR
Standard 
deviation 
of CR 
Median 
of CR 
1st 
Quartile 
of CR 
3rd 
Quartile 
of CR 
Corr. Between 
ownership 
concentration 
and CR 
State holding 59 0.89 0.92 0.79 0.60 1.06 0.1516 
Family holding 23 1.06 1.41 1.19 0.71 1.45 0.2728 
Widely held 4 1.41 0.81 1.07 0.87 1.61 0.3139 
Non-state 
holding 27 1.11 1.35 1.19 0.72 1.45 0.1637 
Listed 
abroad 
Total 86 0.96 1.08 0.90 0.61 1.32 0.1014 
State holding 855 1.25 12.01 0.72 0.33 1.19 -0.0027 
Family holding 392 2.09 18.38 0.85 0.45 1.43 0.0521 
Widely held 148 0.45 14.97 0.70 0.20 1.33 -0.0433 
Non-state 
holding 540 1.64 17.53 0.82 0.35 1.40 0.0603 
Listed 
inland 
Total 1,395 1.25 12.01 0.72 0.33 1.19 0.0234 
Total 1,481 1.23 11.66 0.73 0.34 1.19 0.0220 
*CR=ROE of the firm / ROE of the industry 
 
Table 37: Comparison of CR between companies listed abroad and listed inland with different 
ownership concentration 
  
Cash 
flow 
right Owner 
Number 
of firms
Mean 
of 
CR 
Standard 
deviation 
of CR 
Median 
of CR 
1st 
Quartile 
of CR 
3rd 
Quartile 
of CR 
Corr. 
Between 
ownership 
concentration 
and CR 
State 
holding 54 0.88 0.93 0.80 0.60 1.06 0.1971 Over 
20% Family 
holding 19 1.33 0.83 1.19 0.82 1.45 0.1568 
State 
holding 5 0.94 0.87 0.65 0.39 1.46 0.2012 20% to 
10% Family 
holding 4 -0.24 2.49 0.97 -0.71 1.45 -0.6840 
Listed 
abroad 
Under 
10% 
Widely 
held 4 1.41 0.81 1.07 0.87 1.61 0.3139 
State 
holding 719 0.96 6.79 0.67 0.32 1.11 0.0068 Over 
20% Family 
holding 265 2.52 22.21 0.90 0.52 1.50 0.0422 
State 
holding 136 1.20 3.86 0.60 0.20 0.97 -0.0130 20% to 
10% Family 
holding 127 1.19 3.53 0.70 0.23 1.16 -0.1089 
Listed 
inland  
Under 
10% 
Widely 
held 148 0.45 14.97 0.70 0.20 1.33 -0.0433 
*CR=ROE of the firm / ROE of the industry 
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5.5 Measures taken by the ownership-dispersed corporations to solve the 
agency problems 
5.5.1 Effective ownership structure 
5.5.1.1 Ownership structures taken by the ownership-dispersed companies 
Through the analyses above, it is known that a few public traded companies are ownership 
dispersed and some of them have good performance according to the annual report of 2007. So 
the purpose of this capital is to make a detailed analysis of the ownership structure of these 
companies to see how these companies disperse their ownership and which structure is more 
effective. 
There are altogether 152 dispersed companies in the samples and the detailed information of 
these 152 companies is shown in appendix 5. It is found that the ownership structure of these 
companies can be classified into 4 types: direct dispersed structure, indirect dispersed structure, 
pyramid structure and foundation structure. And the following 4 examples explain these 
structures more clearly. 
a) Direct dispersed 
As indicated by the definition, direct dispersed means that the shares of the listed company is 
directly dispersed to different owners, nobody of which holds more than 10% share in the 
company. These owners may be persons or entities and they do not belong to the same ultimate 
owner.  
The following figure 16 shows the ownership structure of Shanghai Broadband Technology 
Co. Ltd (SBT), a company in the industry of information technology and listed on SHSE. The 
biggest immediate shareholder of SBT is company A, which holds 8.52% share (less than 10%) 
and is indirectly controlled by Mr. Yan Xiaoqun. He holds none of the shares of other 
shareholders of SBT. So the shares of SBT are directly dispersed to Mr. Yan and other owners. 
Because Mr. Yan holds 80% shares of company B, B holds 94% shares of company A, and A 
holds 8.52% shares of SBT, so the voting rights held by Mr. Yan in SBT is 8.52%, the least of 
the chain. The cash flow right held by Mr. Yan in SBT is 6.41%, the product of all the percent 
along the chain: 80%*94%*8.52%=6.41%. Mr. Yan holds the most voting right in SBT.  
The characteristics of direct dispersed companies are: none of the immediate shareholders 
holds more than 10% shares in the listed company; and both of the voting right and the cash 
flow right held by the biggest ultimate owner in the listed company are less than 10%. 
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Figure 16: Ownership structure of Shanghai Broadband Technology Co. Ltd. 
 
b) Indirect dispersed 
This means that the ownership of the listed company is concentrated by an immediate 
controlling shareholder, who is an entity and holds more than 10% share of the company, but 
the voting right of this controlling shareholder is dispersed to many persons and nobody holds 
more than 10% share in the controlling shareholder.  
This type can be divided into two subclasses: employee holding or non-employee holding. 
The former means that most of the owners of the controlling shareholder are managers or 
employees of the listed company. The ultimate owners can be hundreds of or even more than 
1000 of persons. The latter means, most of the ultimate owners are not managers or employees 
of the listed company, but only one or two of them have places in the group of top managers of 
the listed company, sometimes none of them enters into the board of directors. In all the 
samples, there are altogether 16 indirectly dispersed companies, 14 of which are employee 
holding and only 2 are held by non-employees.  
Figure 17 displays the ownership structure of Jilin AoDong Medicine Industry Group Co. 
Ltd (AoDong), a typical employee holding medical company and listed on SZSE. The biggest 
immediate shareholder of AoDong is company A, which holds 25.57% (more than 10%) shares 
in AoDong, so the ownership of AoDong is not directly dispersed. But the ultimate 
shareholders of AoDong are 1029 employees of AoDong and none of them holds more than 
3% (less than 10%) share in company A, so the ownership of AoDong is indirectly dispersed 
through company A and the cash flow right held by each ultimate owner in AoDong is less 
than 1%. In this situation, both the voting right and cash flow right of each ultimate owner is 
Shanghai Broadband Technology 
Company C 
Company A 
Other persons or companies 
with an ownership under 5% 
respectively 
Mr. Yan Xiaoqun 
8.32% 
8.52% 83.16% 
Company B 
80%
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very small, and both of them are defined in this study as 1%, otherwise the value of voting 
right/cash right will be too high and distort the separation of voting right from cash flow right 
(V/C) of this kind of companies1. 
The characteristics of indirect dispersed companies are: the biggest immediate shareholder 
holds more than 10% share in the listed company; but the voting right of the biggest immediate 
shareholder is dispersed to many persons; and both of the voting right and the cash flow right 
held by the biggest ultimate owner in the listed company are less than 10%. 
 
 
Figure 17: Ownership structure of Jilin AoDong Medicine Industry Group Co. Ltd. 
 
c) Pyramid 
Pyramid structure is popularly used by the enterprisers to reduce their investment in the 
company, but still sustain their control of it. 114 ownership-dispersed companies in the sample 
use the pyramid structure. In the pyramid structure, the ultimate owner controls the company of 
each floor of the pyramid, but his cash flow right in the listed company is less than 10% 
because cash flow right decreases with the lengthening of the pyramid chain. 
Figure 18 shows an example of pyramid structure of Tianjin Tasly Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd 
(Tasly), a medical company and listed on SHSE. The controlling shareholder of Tasly is 
company A, which holds 50.02% (more than 10%) shares of Tasly, and company A is 
controlled by company B with 60% (more than 10%) ownership, which is controlled by 
                                                     
1 In the following section the index of V/C, Voting rights/Cash flow right, is used to value the separation of voting right 
and cash flow right and to analyse the effect of this separation on the profitability of the company. 
Jilin AoDong Medicine Industry Group Co. Ltd 
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Mr. Xiu 
1029 employees of AoDong 
Labour Union of AoDong 
Authorizing 
Authorizing 
32.46%
25.57%
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company C with 51% (more than 10%) ownership, which is controlled by Mr. Yan Xijun with 
50% (more than 10%) ownership. So, the voting right of Tasly is not dispersed and Mr. Yan 
Xijun is the ultimate controller, who controls 50% (more than 10%) voting rights in Tasly, the 
least of the chain. The cash flow right is dispersed through a chain of companies, and Mr. 
Yan’s cash flow right in Tasly is only 7.65% (less than 10%), which is the product along the 
chain. If the pyramid is higher, his cash flow right can be even less without the loss of control 
over Tasly. 
The characteristics of pyramid structure is: the biggest immediate shareholder holds more 
than 10% share in the listed company; the ultimate owner controls the listed company through 
a chain of companies and the voting right of all the controlling companies on the chain is not 
dispersed; the voting right held by the biggest ultimate owner in the listed company is more 
than 10%, but the cash flow right held by him in the listed company is less than 10%. 
 
 
Figure 18: Ownership structure of Tianjin Tasly Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 
d) Foundation  
Many of the listed companies are co-invested by foundations, but most foundations have 
only a little share in each company and only 4 firms in the sample are controlled by a 
foundation, which means the foundation or financial institution is the biggest shareholder of the 
listed company and has more than 10% share in the company. But virtually the ownership of 
this company is dispersed, because the foundation is only the agent of thousands of investors. 
Figure 19 is the ownership structure of Zhuhai Zhongfu Enterprise Co. Ltd (Zhongfu), which 
is a company in the industry of petroleum, chemistry and plastic, and listed on SZSE. The 
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 136
immediate controlling owner of Zhongfu is Asia Bottles (HK) Company Limited with 29% 
(more than 10%) ownership, which is held by Asia Bottles Company Limited with 100% 
ownership, which is held by Asia Bottles Holdings Limited with 100% ownership, which is 
held by Asia Group Holdings Limited with 100% ownership, which is held by CVC Capital 
Partners Asia Pacific II (83.82% ownership) and CVC Capital Partners Asia Pacific II Parallel 
Fund - A. LP (16.18% ownership), which are ultimately invested by Citigroup Pension funds 
and others. The ultimate owner of Zhongfu is a foundation, Citigroup Pension funds, who 
controls 29% voting right in Zhongfu. But the ownership of Citigroup Pension funds belongs to 
thousands of investors, so the cash flow right of Zhongfu is finally dispersed. 
The characteristics of foundation structure is: the biggest immediate shareholder holds more 
than 10% share in the listed company; the ultimate owner of this controlling shareholder is a 
foundation and controls more than 10% voting rights in the listed company; the ownership of 
this foundation is dispersed to many investors so the cash flow right held by each investor in 
the listed company is less than 10%.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Ownership structure of Zhuhai Zhongfu Enterprise Co. Ltd. 
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5.5.1.2 The effect of different ownership structure on profitability 
In the last section this study has shown the four kinds of ownership structures of the publicly 
traded and ownership-dispersed companies in China. The profitability of the companies with 
different ownership structures is compared to see whether some structure is more effective than 
others.  
All the 152 dispersed companies are classified into 4 groups, according to their ownership 
structure and the average value of CR of each group is calculated.  
The indices in table 38 are calculated as: 
Mean of CR of direct dispersed companies = Mean of CR of 18 companies, which are all 
direct dispersed. 
Mean of CR of indirect dispersed companies = Mean of CR of 16 companies, which are all 
indirect dispersed. 
Mean of CR of pyramid structural companies = Mean of CR of 114 companies, which are all 
pyramid structural. 
Mean of CR of foundation holding companies = Mean of CR of 4 companies, whose 
ultimate owners are all foundation. 
Mean of CR of all dispersed companies = Mean of CR of 152 companies, which are all 
ownership dispersed. 
Other indices are calculated in the same way. 
 
Table 38: Comparison of profitability between different ownership structures of ownership-
dispersed companies in China 
Ownership 
structure 
Number 
of firms 
Mean 
of CR 
Standard 
deviation 
of CR 
Median of CR 1
st Quartile 
of CR 
3rd Quartile 
of CR 
Direct dispersed 18 0.81 0.52 0.74 0.47 1.05 
Indirect dispersed 16 1.24 1.11 1.15 0.28 2.13 
Pyramid  114 0.29 17.05 0.65 0.15 1.33 
Foundation 4 1.23 0.62 1.27 0.99 1.51 
Total 152 0.48 14.77 0.71 0.20 1.33 
CR=ROE of the firm / ROE of the industry. 
 
According to the mean and median of CR, indirect dispersed structure and foundation 
holding structure have the highest profitability, with a mean value over 1.2, which means that 
these companies are better than other dispersed companies and even better than the average 
level of the industry they belong to. It is very interesting and important because it declares that 
ownership dispersion can also be effective as long as the agency problems are well solved. And 
one of the solutions is the ownership structure itself. But foundation structure is used 
infrequently in China and all of the four foundation holding companies are controlled by 
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foreign foundation instead of foundation in China. According to the result of Ferreira and 
Motos (2006), institutional investors reveal a strong preference for large and liquid stocks with 
good governance practices and foreign institutional ownership has real effects as it is positively 
associated with higher firm valuation. The extremely low proportion of foundation holding 
ownership in the sample might reflects the bad governance practices in China. 
The most ineffective structure is the pyramid structure but it is the one used by most 
companies, 75% of companies in the total of 152 samples use this ownership structure to 
decrease the cash flow right of the ultimate owner. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005) argue that 
“the level of investor protection plays a crucial role in the choice of structure. Poor investor 
protection leads to high diversion of cash flows, which makes the pyramidal structure more 
attractive for two reasons. First, diversion increases the family’s private benefits of control, at 
the expense of a reduction in security benefits. Because in a pyramidal structure the family 
shares the security benefits with non-family shareholders, while in the horizontal structure it 
keeps them entirely, high diversion increases the family’s payoff under the pyramidal structure 
relative to the payoff under the horizontal structure (payoff advantage). Second, because 
external investors anticipate diversion and discount the terms at which they are willing to 
provide finance, it is optimal for the controlling shareholders to use internal funds of existing 
firms to set up new firms, before an external finance is raised. Thus, the family’s ability to use 
the entire stock of retained earnings of existing group firms when it chooses the pyramid 
becomes more valuable (financing advantage).” (Almeida and Wolfenzon 2005, page 3). 
Another point worth mentioning is that the standard deviation of companies with indirect 
dispersed structure or foundation holding structure is much lower than pyramid structure. This 
means that the investment in the former two kinds of companies is less risky than in the 
companies with pyramid structure, whose standard deviation of CR is highest. Although the 
standard deviation of companies held by foundation is a little less than indirect dispersed ones, 
it cannot be concluded that foundation holding companies are less risky than indirect dispersed 
one. This is because foundation structure is used only by four companies. The reason why the 
standard deviation of companies with indirect dispersed structure or foundation holding 
structure is much lower than pyramid structure might be that the decisions of the former two 
kinds companies are made by a group of managers. This is not like the companies with a 
pyramid structure, where the important strategies and decisions are made by several family 
members, sometimes only by the head of the family. So that the performance of the pyramid 
companies depends more on the ability and character of individual, which brings more risk.  
All the 152 ownership-dispersed companies are divided into effective and ineffective groups 
and the ownership structures of these two groups are compared. A company is defined as 
effective when the following two conditions are satisfied: its CR is more than 1, according to 
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its ROE in 2007, which means its profitability is better than the average level of the industry it 
belongs to; and it has not lost in last three years, 2005, 2006 and 2007 (Financial data of last 
three years are disclosed in annual report 2007). These two standards are prescribed for the 
reason that some firms have won only a little in 2007, but have a higher CR because they have 
lost much in last years and their ratio of net capital is very low, which makes them have a 
higher ROE. So the performances of the last three years are considered here. According to 
these standards, there are only 42 companies that can be called effective and dispersed 
company. The performance of all other 110 companies is worse than the average level of their 
industry.  
Table 39 displays the comparison of ownership structure between the effective and 
ineffective companies. The percentage of each structure is calculated as: 
Percentage of direct dispersed companies in effective companies = the number of direct 
dispersed and effective companies/the number of all effective companies 
Percentage of indirect dispersed companies in effective companies = the number of indirect 
dispersed and effective companies/the number of all effective companies 
Percentage of pyramid structural companies in effective companies = the number of pyramid 
structural and effective companies/the number of all effective companies 
Percentage of foundation holding companies in effective companies = the number of 
foundation holding and effective companies/the number of all effective companies 
Percentage of direct dispersed companies in ineffective companies = the number of direct 
dispersed and ineffective companies/the number of all ineffective companies 
Percentage of indirect dispersed companies in ineffective companies = the number of 
indirect dispersed and ineffective companies/the number of all ineffective companies 
Percentage of pyramid structural companies in ineffective companies = the number of 
pyramid structural and ineffective companies/the number of all ineffective companies 
Percentage of foundation holding companies in ineffective companies = the number of 
foundation holding and ineffective companies/the number of all ineffective companies 
Percentage of direct dispersed companies in all dispersed companies = the number of all 
direct dispersed companies/the number of all dispersed companies 
Percentage of indirect dispersed companies in all dispersed companies = the number of all 
indirect dispersed companies/the number of all dispersed companies 
Percentage of pyramid structural companies in all dispersed companies = the number of all 
pyramid structural and dispersed companies/the number of all dispersed companies 
Percentage of foundation holding companies in all dispersed companies = the number of 
foundation holding companies/the number of all dispersed companies 
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Similar to the results in table 38 above, indirect dispersed and foundation holding are more 
used by effective companies than ineffective companies. 21.43% of the effective companies 
use indirect dispersed structure and only 6.36% of the ineffective companies use this structure. 
7.14% of the effective companies use foundation structure, which is used by only 0.91% of 
ineffective companies. Actually, foundation structure can also be seen as indirect dispersed 
because the ultimate ownership of this kind of companies is also distributed to thousands of 
persons and they entrust the shares to the manager of the foundation. And the ineffective 
companies have a higher ratio in pyramid structure. 79.09% of the ineffective companies use 
pyramid structure and this ratio of effective companies is 64.29%.  
 
Table 39: Comparison of ownership structure between effective and ineffective companies 
 Number of firms 
Direct 
dispersed 
(%) 
Indirect 
dispersed 
(%) 
Pyramid (%) Foundation (%) 
Effective  42 7.14% 21.43% 64.29% 7.14% 
Ineffective 110 13.64% 6.36% 79.09% 0.91% 
Total 152 11.84% 10.53% 75.00% 2.63% 
 
The reason why indirect dispersed companies are more effective than pyramid structure 
might be: 
a) The danger brought by the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights is less. 
The company with pyramid structure always has a high degree of separation of voting rights 
from cash rights. The top manager of the listed company has absolute or relative control right 
in the firm and he can make decisions to benefit himself but hurt the listed company, and other 
members in the board cannot protest because they do not have enough voting rights. And these 
decisions will not hurt the top manager himself because the capital he really has invested in the 
listed company is not as much as it seems and the private benefit he gets from these 
expropriating decisions are more than his loss in the cash dividend or stock value of the firm. 
So pyramid is a popular ownership structure used by the controlling shareholder to steal money 
from the minority shareholders. 
 It is different for the companies held by employees. The top manager himself has little share 
in the company, which means both his voting rights and cash flow rights in the listed company 
is very little, and his controlling right in the firm is given by the employees. Sometimes the 
employees authorize their share to more than one top manager. So the manager’s behavior is 
limited and he cannot make important decisions only by himself. Moreover, if he has done 
wrong or has stolen from the company he will be replaced by others.  
b) All of the managers and employees have been inspired to do well. 
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In companies held by employees all managers or even all employees have direct or indirect 
share in the listed company, so they all are encouraged by their economic interest, not only to 
be productive in their own job, but also to care more about the performance of the company 
because they are also owners. They will supervise each other and keep their eyes on the top 
managers. Any cent stolen or wasted by the managers from the company is actually taken from 
the pockets of all the employees who have share in the company. In this situation, the 
expropriation by the managers is discovered and punished with much higher possibility, for the 
employees of the listed company act as monitors and benefit all other minority shareholders. 
For the direct dispersed companies, their V/C is also low, but their performance is not as 
good as the employee holding companies, which may be explained as: they have only the first 
advantage mentioned above, namely the top manager has less right to expropriate; but they lack 
of monitors in the company, namely more managers or employees who have share in the 
company. 
In the next subsections these two hypotheses will be analyzed in detail: the effect of 
separation of voting rights from cash rights on the profitability; and the effect of economic 
encouragement to more managers and employees on the profitability. 
5.5.2 Lower separation of voting rights from cash flow rights 
In the last subsection, it has been mentioned that the separation of voting rights from cash 
flow rights will increase the incentive of the managers to expropriate from the company. This 
subsection analyses this separation in detail to testify that the effective companies have less 
separation of voting rights from cash flow rights. Dual-class firms, i.e. corporations with two 
classes of shares that differ in their voting rights, are forbidden by the law in China. So the 
separation of voting rights from ownership in China is caused by the pyramidal ownership 
structure.  
Here, the degree of voting rights concentration is defined as the percentage of voting rights 
controlled by the ultimate owner of the listed company. Cash flow rights concentration is 
defined as the percentage of cash flow rights owned by the ultimate owner. The calculation of 
voting rights and cash rights controlled or owned by ultimate owner is executed in the same 
way as was done to Zhejiang Yankon Group Co. Ltd, which is shown by figure 15 in Chapter 
5.2.1. V/C equals the degree of voting rights concentration divided by the degree of cash flow 
rights concentration. 
 At first, the average concentration of voting rights and cash flow rights are calculated for 
each ownership structure, and then the average degree of the separation, V/C, is calculated, 
which means that the value of voting rights is divided by cash flow rights.  
The indices in table 40 are calculated as: 
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Mean of voting rights concentration of direct dispersed companies = mean of the degree of 
voting rights concentration of 18 companies, which are all direct dispersed. 
Mean of cash flow rights concentration of direct dispersed companies = mean of the degree 
of cash flow rights concentration of 18 companies, which are all direct dispersed. 
Mean of V/C of direct dispersed companies = mean of V/C of 18 companies, which are all 
direct dispersed. 
Other indices are calculated in the same way. 
 
Table 40: Separation of voting rights from cash flow rights for different ownership structures 
 Voting rights concentration 
Cash flow rights 
concentration V/C 
Owner structure Number of firms Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Direct dispersed 18 7.86 8.73 6.55 6.58 1.40 1.00 
Indirect dispersed 16 1.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.81 1.00 
Pyramid  114 21.46 20.88 6.24 6.59 4.03 3.33 
Foundation 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Total 152 16.84 17.76 5.50 5.83 3.35 3.06 
V/C=Voting rights concentration / Cash flow rights concentration 
 
It is shown that the pyramid structure has the highest voting rights concentration and V/C, 
while the indirect dispersed structure and the foundation structure have the lowest voting rights 
concentration and V/C. This indicates that the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights 
might be the reason why pyramid structure is less effective than indirect dispersed structure.  
Claessens et al. (1999) examined the evidence on expropriation of minority shareholders in 
publicly-traded companies in East Asia and found that the concentration of control rights has 
negative effect on firm value and the separation of voting rights from cash-flow rights is 
especially associated with lower market value, which is consistent with Mocrck et al. (1988) 
and Shleifer and Vishny (1997). 
Next, the comparison of this separation between effective and ineffective companies is made, 
which is shown in table 41. 
 
Table 41: Comparison of separation of voting rights from cash flow rights between effective and 
ineffective companies 
 Voting rights concentration 
Cash flow rights 
concentration V/C 
  
Number of 
firms Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Effective  42 14.20 14.39 4.95 4.53 3.03 2.55 
Ineffective 110 18.43 19.83 5.84 6.45 3.58 3.18 
Total 152 16.84 17.76 5.50 5.83 3.35 3.06 
V/C=Voting rights concentration / Cash flow rights concentration 
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It is shown that the ineffective companies have a higher V/C, but not much higher than the 
effective ones. This might indicate that the lower degree of separation of voting rights from 
cash flow rights is only one of the reasons why pyramid structure is less effective than indirect 
dispersed structure and there must be other causes leading the indirect dispersed structure to be 
more effective. Therefore, lower separation of voting rights from cash flow rights is only one 
of the solutions to the agency problems.  
This result reveals the reason why the direct dispersed companies are more effective than 
pyramid structure, although both of them give no ownership to more managers and employees 
and thus have no monitors in the company. 
5.5.3 Ownership encouragement to more top managers and employees 
In subsection 5.5-1, it has been mentioned that companies held by employees are effective 
because all the managers and employees are encouraged by their ownership in the company to 
do well and this subsection investigates the effect of ownership encouragement on the 
company’s profitability.  
There are many measures of economic encouragement, but here this study examines only the 
encouragement brought by ownership. As displayed by the annual report the top managers, 
who are revealed in the report, can hold shares in the listed company through two ways. One 
way is directly holding stocks of the listed company. It is easy to find out how many top 
managers hold stocks in the listed company, for the report must reveal whether and how many 
stocks the top managers hold in the listed company. The other way is indirect holding, which 
means the principle owner of the listed company is an entity and the managers of the listed 
company hold shares of this entity.  
For example, the report of AoDong has revealed 13 top managers, including directors, 
supervisors, CEO and CFO, and 4 persons of them come from companies or institutions outside 
AoDong1, the other 9 persons work in AoDong. As is shown by figure 17, AoDong is an 
employee holding company and all the managers and employees indirectly hold shares in 
AoDong, so the number of top managers who hold shares in the listed company is 9.  
For the non-employee holding companies, it is difficult to judge whether the top managers 
indirectly have shares in the listed company, because some reports do not disclose whether the 
top managers are indirect owners of the listed company. So for these companies, the number of 
managers who indirectly hold shares in the listed company might be undervalued.  
In this research, it is found that in most of the companies there are a group of top managers 
who directly or indirectly hold shares in the company. In some companies only one or two top 
managers are owners, and in the others nearly all the managers have shares in the company. 
                                                     
1 In China all listed companies must hire independent directors to sit in the directorate. 
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Some managers hold only stocks, some only indirectly hold shares and others hold both stocks 
and indirect shares. The number of managers holding stocks is defined as the number of the 
managers, who directly hold stocks of the public traded company. The number of managers 
holding shares is the number of managers who directly hold stocks or indirectly hold shares in 
the listed company; in any case they are owners of the company. 
Table 42 shows the ownership encouragement of different ownership structures. The indices 
are calculated as: 
Percentage of direct dispersed firms whose managers hold stocks = the number of direct 
dispersed firms, where some or all top managers direct hold stocks of the listed company / the 
number of all direct dispersed companies, namely 18. 
Percentage of direct dispersed firms whose managers hold shares = the number of direct 
dispersed firms, where some or all top managers direct hold stocks or indirect hold shares of 
the listed company / the number of all direct dispersed companies, namely 18. 
Mean of number of managers holding stocks of direct dispersed companies = mean of the 
number of the managers holding stocks of the direct dispersed companies where some or all top 
managers hold stocks in the listed company. 
Mean of number of managers holding shares of direct dispersed companies = mean of the 
number of the managers holding shares of the direct dispersed companies where some or all top 
managers hold shares in the listed company. 
Other indices are calculated in the same way. 
 
Table 42: Comparison of ownership encouragement on top managers between different 
ownership structures 
 Percentage of firms Number of managers holding stocks3 
Number of 
managers holding 
shares4 
  
Number of 
firms 
Holding 
stocks1 
Holding 
shares2 Mean Median Mean Median 
Direct dispersed 18 77.78% 77.78% 3.36 2.00 4.86 2.50 
Indirect dispersed 16 62.50% 93.75% 5.70 4.50 6.07 5.00 
Pyramid  114 60.53% 78.95% 3.77 3.00 4.08 3.00 
Foundation 4 75.00% 75.00% 4.67 4.00 5.00 4.00 
Total 152 62.50% 80.26% 3.94 3.00 4.43 3.00 
1. The percentage of the firms where some or all top managers direct hold stocks in the listed company. 
2. The percentage of the firms where some or all top managers direct or indirect hold shares in the listed 
company. 
3. Average number of the managers holding stocks of the companies where some or all top managers 
direct holding stocks in the listed company. 
4. Average number of the managers holding shares of the companies where some or all top managers 
direct or indirect hold shares in the listed company. 
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According to the data, more indirect dispersed companies give ownership to their top 
managers (93.75%) and more managers in the indirect dispersed companies directly or 
indirectly hold shares in the listed company (6.07). It is known that most of the indirect 
dispersed companies are employee holding companies. So it proves the second advantage of 
employee holding structure mentioned in section 5.5-1: all of the managers and employees 
have been encouraged to do well, and all the members of top manager group act as monitors for 
each other, which benefit also other minority shareholders.  
Next, the comparison of ownership encouragement between effective and ineffective 
companies is made. The indices in table 43 are calculated as: 
Percentage of effective firms whose managers hold stocks = the number of effective firms, 
where some or all top managers direct hold stocks of the listed company / the number of all 
effective companies, namely 42. 
Percentage of effective firms whose managers hold shares = the number of effective firms, 
where some or all top managers direct or indirect hold shares of the listed company/the number 
of all effective companies, namely 42. 
Mean of number of managers holding stocks of effective companies = mean of the number 
of the managers holding stocks of the effective companies where some or all top managers hold 
stocks in the listed company. 
Mean of number of managers holding shares of effective companies = mean of the number 
of the managers holding shares of effective companies where some or all top managers hold 
shares in the listed company. 
Other indices are calculated in the same way. 
 
Table 43: Comparison of ownership encouragement on top managers between effective and 
ineffective companies 
 Percentage of firms Number of managers holding stocks3 
Number of managers 
holding shares4 
 Number of firms 
Holding 
stocks1 
Holding 
shares2 Mean Median Mean Median 
Effective  42 69% 93% 5.20 4.00 5.64 5.00 
Ineffective 110 59% 75% 3.32 2.00 3.87 3.00 
Total 152 62.50% 80.26% 3.94 3.00 4.43 3.00 
1 The percentage of the firms where some or all top managers direct hold stocks in the listed company. 
2 The number of the firms, where some or all top managers direct or indirect hold shares in the listed 
company. 
3 Average numbers of the managers holding stocks of the companies, where some or all top managers 
direct hold stocks in the listed company. 
4. Average number of the managers holding shares of the companies, where some or all top managers 
direct or indirect hold shares in the listed company. 
 
It is shown that 93% of the effective companies encouraged their managers with ownership 
and this ratio for the ineffective companies is only 75%. And the effective companies also have 
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more managers holding ownership in the company, averagely more than 5 persons in the top 
manager group, while in the ineffective companies only 3 members of the group who make 
important decisions have stocks or shares of the listed company. So it indicates that ownership 
encouragement is more used by effective dispersed company. Therefore, encouraging more top 
managers with ownership is another solution to the Twin Agency Problems.  
5.6 Suggestions indicated by the empirical data 
Through all the practical analyses above it is known that although the Chinese financial 
market has experienced a fast expansion since 1990 when the Shanghai Stock Exchange was 
re-opened and Shenzhen Stock Exchange was built. Compared to the global stock exchanges 
such as NYSE, Tokyo, LSE and so on, it is still undeveloped. Considering the economic boom 
in China in last the 30 years, the progress of Chinese financial market is much lagged and 
disproportional to the economic scale in the country. How to drive the Chinese financial market 
forward is an important and difficult task for the politicians and economists.  
Remembering the discussion about Twin Agency Problems in the former Chapters (Chapters 
2 to 4), it is known that when the Twin Agency Problems worsen, diffuse ownership is 
inefficient and ownership concentration becomes the best choice. But ownership concentration 
limits a country’s ability to benefit from financial globalization and leads to lower financial 
development, lower firm valuations, smaller firms, and lower economic growth. So in this 
Chapter, the situation of ownership concentration in China is investigated and the effect of 
Twin Agency Problems on corporate finance is examined to find out some empirical solutions 
to the Twin Agency Problems in China. 
On the basis of the annual reports of 1,481 listed Chinese companies, it is found that most 
Chinese listed companies are ownership concentrated and cash flow rights of more than half of 
these companies are concentrated in the state. This badly limits the advance of the Chinese 
financial market, but this is the result of Twin Agency Problems and the best choice of the 
investors. If the Twin Agency Problems are not solved or lightened, the ownership of these 
listed companies cannot be shared by more investors and the Chinese financial market cannot 
grow up to be a global one. 
But under the actual situation, how could the Twin Agency Problems be solved? In the 
research, a few effective but ownership dispersed companies are revealed, which means that the 
Twin Agency Problems are better solved in these companies and ownership dispersal is not 
impossible under the actual situation.  
After a detailed examination of all these samples, it comes to the following suggestions, 
which might be helpful to solve the Twin Agency Problems and make the Chinese financial 
market go further: 
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A. Not relying on foreign financial market, but concentrating on the advancement of legal 
sense, laws and regulations inland. 
In Chapter 4, it is pointed out that to solve the Twin Agency Problems, the legal sense should 
be improved through education and the constraint on insider and outside expropriators should 
be strengthened through stricter laws and regulations. The process of these reforms must take a 
long time and the effect of all these measures can’t emerge immediately. Listing abroad is 
suggested to be a good way to borrow the laws and regulations of the foreign market. But 
according to the result in section 5.3, the Chinese companies listed abroad are not more 
decentralized than those listed only inland. This means that the risk of these firms is still 
concentrated. So we cannot rely on the foreign financial market to meliorate the corporate 
governance of Chinese company, because all the managers of the company and the outside 
expropriators from the government live in China, commit the sin in China and can only be 
constrained and punished by Chinese laws and regulations. So what should be done is to learn 
the experiences of foreign countries and implement them into China, including the 
improvement of both education and law system inland. Only when those expropriators who live 
in China have no chance to steal from or rob the company, can more investors transfer their 
saving from bank to stock exchanges.  
 
B. Strictly examining the companies which apply to be listed on the exchange and prevent 
the bad companies from going into the market. 
Section 5.4-3 shows that the difference of profitability between companies listed abroad is 
much less than the difference between those listed only inland. This means that the companies 
listed abroad are more reliable as a whole and the investors have less risk if they choose their 
favorable companies among these listed abroad companies to invest. This well reflects the 
advantage of foreign stock markets: bad companies are strictly forbidden to step into the 
market. First of all, the gate of stock exchanges should be carefully guarded, so that the bad and 
deceitful companies must not step in. If this is not well done the reputation of the financial 
market cannot be rebuilt and the investors will no longer have faith in these listed companies. 
The entrance standard could not be lowered down to let more companies into the market. 
 
C. Beginning the decentralization of ownership with relative smaller companies. 
In section 5.3.4, it is obtained the relatively smaller companies are less concentrated. This is 
because the actual Chinese financial market is still undeveloped and the sum of the capital that 
can be collected from the stock market is limited. It would be better to begin the process of 
decentralization with these smaller firms and the capital to be financed at each time cannot be 
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too high. Only when the investment in these smaller companies has a good reward and the 
dispersed ownership is shown to be effective. This indicates that if the Twin Agency Problems 
are lightened or solved, the investors will put more money in the market and the ownership of 
the relatively greater companies can be also dispersed. 
 
D. Transforming state holding company into employee holding dispersed company. 
In section 5.5.1, this study has analyzed the effect of ownership structure on profitability and 
has found out that employee holding is an effective ownership structure because all the 
managers and employees have direct or indirect shares in the company. It is a good way to 
transform the state holding companies into widely held companies. 
At the moment, more than half of the listed companies are controlled by the state but in 
future the government will continuously decrease their investment in most of these companies. 
So who should be the new owners of these state holding companies? Should it be a family 
holding company or a widely held one? Because most of these companies are giant companies, 
it is difficult to find a family who has enough capital to buy the control right of the whole 
company. But if they are transferred to widely held ones, what should be done to keep and 
enhance the performance of these companies? Employee holding structure might be a better 
choice. 
At first, the dispersal of ownership to all the managers and employees encourage all of them 
to do well in their job and care more about the performance of the company, for the value of 
their wealth is influenced by the fluctuation of the market price of the company. 
Secondly, nobody has absolute or relative control right in the company for the cash flow 
right is decentralized, and the top manager is entrusted by the employees. So the manager’s 
behavior is limited by the contract between him and the employees, and he cannot make all 
decisions freely. So the top managers of these companies have less right to expropriate other 
shareholders. 
Finally, when all members of the top manager group have shares in the company, they act as 
monitors for each other because any cent stolen or wasted from the company is the same as 
stolen from their own pockets. So if anyone tries to steal or hurt the company, it is easier to be 
discovered, prevented and punished. Consequently, the top managers are more constrained to 
be honest and principled. 
So the shares of the state holding companies can firstly be sold to the managers and 
employees and when higher profitability has been shown more shares can be publicly sold.  
 
E. Eliminating or decreasing the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights. 
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Section 5.5.1 indicates that the pyramid structure is a popular structure used by the widely 
held companies, but this structure results in the separation of voting rights from the cash flow 
rights. This enables the controlling shareholder sustaining his control of the listed company, but 
at the same time reducing his actual investment in it. So the controlling shareholder has right 
and incentive to make decisions, which brings him private benefit but hurts the company. And 
because his ownership in the company is small his expropriation does not hurt himself. 
So in the reform of state holding companies, the pyramid structure should be avoided, but 
direct or indirect dispersed and foundation holding structure should be encouraged. For the 
existing pyramid structural companies the voting rights of the ultimate owners should be 
limited or the ultimate owner should put more money in the company.  
 
F. Encouraging and supervising the managers by giving more managers stocks or shares of 
the company. 
Analysis in section 5.5.3 proves that in the effective dispersed companies more managers 
have stocks or indirect shares of the listed companies. This encourages them to do well and 
care more about the performance and the market price of the company but lessens their 
incentive to divert private benefit from the company. The function of this measure is like the 
employee holding ownership structure. If the ultimate owner wants to improve the company 
governance and to show his righteousness and blamelessness he should let more top managers 
hold shares in the company. 
5.7 Summary  
This Chapter makes a practical investigation of the financial market in China to see the 
actual situation of the financial market and to find some empirical measures to solve the agency 
problems. 
Since 1990, when Shanghai Stock Exchange re-opened and Shenzhen Stock Exchange was 
built, the Chinese financial market has experienced a fast expansion (see figures 2 to 7). But 
compared to other global stock exchanges the development of Chinese financial market is 
lagged and disproportional to the economic prosperity of the country (see figures 8 to 14), so 
developing the financial market in China is a pressing need. 
According to the theoretical model in this study, the development of the financial market is 
badly limited when the ownership of the company is concentrated because of the Twin Agency 
Problems. The ownership concentration of Chinese companies is examined to see how serious 
the Twin Agency Problems are in china. On the basis of annual reports of 2007 of 1481 listed 
Chinese companies, including companies listed mainland and abroad, it is revealed that only a 
little fraction of the listed companies are ownership dispersed (see tables 7 to 9) and the 
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average degree of ownership concentration of the listed companies in China is much higher 
than most of the other countries in east Asia (see tables 14 to 15). This indicates that the agency 
problems are serious in China at the moment and ownership concentration is the best choice for 
most companies. This also embarrasses the dispersal of the risk and the further development of 
the financial market.  
In the process of investigating the difference of ownership concentration between companies 
listed mainland and those listed abroad, the following results are obtained. The state holding 
companies are more concentrated than family holding ones. Ownership concentration is 
moderately positively related to capital scale of the company. The companies listed longer on 
NYSE are not less concentrated than those newly listed; and the companies listed abroad are 
not less concentrated than those listed only inland.  
The higher ownership concentration of state holding companies indicates that the agency 
problems are more serious in these companies controlled by the state. In the future these state 
holding companies must be transformed, and the investment from the state into these 
companies will decrease continuously. To whom should these companies belong, a few rich 
families or a great deal of common minority investors? This is a key of the development of the 
Chinese financial market, even the development of the economy and the society.  
As to the relationship between capital scale and ownership concentration, it is found that the 
ownership concentration of the biggest 50 companies is much greater than that of the smallest 
50 companies, but the ownership concentration is moderately related to the capital scale. The 
capital need of the small companies is much less than that of the giant companies and easy to 
be collected from the controlling family and the public, so they are more held by the family and 
less concentrated. On the contrary, all of the top 50 companies are held by the state, because 
only the state can satisfy their need of capital under the situation of undeveloped financial 
market. Therefore, on an undeveloped financial market, the ownership decentralization should 
begin with the relatively smaller companies. 
Listing abroad is revealed by other articles to be a good way to solve the agency problems, 
but according to the evidence in this Chapter, the Chinese companies listed abroad are not less 
concentrated than those listed only inland. This indicates that listing abroad is not an effective 
way for Chinese companies to solve the agent problems and make the ownership more 
dispersed. The key point should be laid inland, which means something should be done to 
improve the legal sense, laws and regulations in land, because the companies and the 
expropriators all live in China and are regulated by Chinese laws and regulations. 
According to the theory, the ownership concentrated companies should have better 
performance than the dispersed. In the practical research, it is shown that for most industries 
the return of equity (ROE) of ownership concentrated companies is higher than the dispersed 
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ones. There is no obvious relativity between profitability and ownership concentration. The 
profitability of family holding companies is higher than the state holding ones and the ROE of 
state holding companies is less related to their degree of ownership concentration than the non-
state holding companies. The widely held companies have the lowest profitability. But there 
exist a few widely held companies, which also have higher ROE.  
Through the comparison of the profitability between companies listed abroad and those 
listed only inland, it is discovered that although the average profitability (mean value) of 
companies listed abroad is lower than the companies only listed inland, the standard deviation 
of profitability of companies listed abroad is much less than those only listed inland. This 
indicates that companies listed abroad are more reliable as a whole and bad companies have 
been strictly forbidden to step into the foreign stock market. And the profitability of companies 
listed abroad is more related to their ownership concentration degree than the companies listed 
only inland, because the market value of these listed abroad companies are fairly priced and 
their market value is more related to their performance.  
Next, this study concentrates on the widely held companies to see how the Twin Agency 
Problems are solved by these firms. Of all the 1,481 samples there are only 152 ownership 
dispersed companies, whose ownership is decentralized through direct dispersed structure, 
indirect dispersed structure, pyramid structure and foundation structure, and pyramid structure 
is used by most of the widely held companies. But the average profitability of those pyramid 
structured companies is much lower than that of the indirect dispersed companies. Of these 152 
dispersed companies there are only 42 companies, whose ROE is higher than the average level 
of the industry they belong to and indirect dispersed structure is more used by these more 
effective companies.  
In the research, a typical indirect dispersed structure is discovered: employee holding 
company, which means the ultimate controllers of the listed company are all the managers and 
employees of the listed company. This structure is more effective than pyramid structure 
because the danger brought by the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights is 
decreased, and all the managers and employees have been encouraged by their ownership in the 
company to do well and act as monitors for each other.  
The comparison of separation of voting rights from cash flow rights between the effective 
and ineffective dispersed companies shows that the ineffective companies have a higher 
separation than the effective. Hence, eliminating or decreasing this separation can be helpful to 
solve the Twin Agency Problems. 
In the research, it is also revealed that in the effective dispersed companies more members of 
the top manager group are given direct or indirect shares in the company. This encourages 
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more managers to be righteous and honest, and when these top managers supervise each other 
expropriation is difficult to be carried out.  
Through all these practical analyses the following suggestions are proposed to solve the 
Twin Agency Problems and make the Chinese financial market go further: 
a) Not relying on foreign financial market but concentrating on the advancement of legal 
sense, laws and regulations inland; 
b) Strictly examining the companies which apply to be listed on the exchange and prevent 
the bad companies from going into the market; 
c) Beginning the decentralization of ownership with relative smaller companies; 
d) Transforming state holding company into employee holding dispersed company; 
e) Eliminating or decreasing the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights;  
f) Encouraging and supervising the managers by giving more managers stocks or shares of 
the company. 
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6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusion 
Since the end of World War II, the barriers of cross-border trade in financial assets have 
been sharply reduced. Financial markets have increasingly extended beyond national borders. 
Financial globalization is an inherent feature of today’s economies.  
But the positive impact of financial globalization has been surprisingly limited and some 
puzzling evidence has been found recently. Capital flows uphill from “poor” to “rich”, not as 
expected to emerging market; international investors continue to have strong preference for 
domestic financial assets, called home bias; the corporations are generally ownership 
concentrated and only a few firms are widely held. 
To explain these puzzles, Stulz argues that finance is critically affected by Twin Agency 
Problems. Firstly, the controlling shareholders can use their power for their own benefit but at 
the expense of outside investors, which is called “the agency problem of corporate insider 
discretion”. Secondly, the state rulers can use their power to improve their own welfare at the 
expense of all shareholders, which is called “the agency problem of state ruler discretion”. 
When these agency problems worsen, diffuse ownership is inefficient and ownership 
concentration is the best choice. Ownership concentration inversely limits a country’s ability to 
benefit from financial globalization. It causes lower financial development, more consumption 
volatility, stronger correlation between savings and investment, less foreign investment, lower 
firm valuations, smaller firms, and lower economic growth. 
On the basis of Stulz’s theory and remaining the central role of the Twin Agency Problems 
in fostering ownership concentration, this study relaxes some simplified assumptions in Stulz’s 
model and develops a more practical one: one-period model is developed into a multi-period 
one; value model of corporate existing n periods is built; factor k, the quality of basic legal 
environment is added; debt is considered in the model; and the concrete quadratic cost function 
is substituted by an abstract one, which satisfies a series of conditions. 
With the improved multi-period model the expropriators’ decisions on expropriating the 
existing firm is investigated. Both the controlling shareholders and the state rulers will trade 
off their gain and loss in the process of expropriation and choose the optimal fraction diverted 
from the company to maximate their benefit. The optimal fraction chosen by corporate insiders 
is negatively related to the extent of ownership concentration, the quality of protection of 
minority shareholders, the severity of the constraint on state rulers, the level of legal sense and 
the expected rate of return. It is positively related to the fraction diverted by state rulers and the 
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capital cost of the firm. The optimal expropriation fraction chosen by state rulers negatively 
related to the quality of constraint on state rulers and the level of legal sense. 
A corporate value model with the consideration of Twin Agency Problems is also built. As a 
result it can be deduced that the more the corporate insiders and state rulers expropriate, the 
lower the firm value. Analysis on the important factors affecting corporate value reveals that 
the corporate market value increases with higher expected rate of return, higher degree of 
ownership concentration, better protection of minority shareholders, better legal sense and 
stricter constraint on state rulers. Nevertheless, it decreases with higher capital cost.  
The research shows that although the improvement of protection of minority shareholder, 
legal sense and constraint on state rulers can reduce expropriation by controlling shareholders 
and state rulers, corporate insiders’ or state rulers’ benefit from the existing firms will be 
decreased by this improvement, so that these expropriators are reluctant to make such 
betterment. On the contrary, higher expected rate of return and lower capital cost can decrease 
expropriation by the corporate insiders and at the same time increase their benefit from the 
firm, so that active economic policies will be welcome. 
Before the company is established, the corporate insiders will make their financing and 
investment decisions. The controlling shareholders will invest all his initial wealth in the firm 
if starting a firm is profitable. If they do not have enough money to start the firm, they must 
sell part of the future cash flow to outside investors to collect the remaining capital. Their 
willingness to start a firm will be enhanced by higher expected rate of return, lower capital cost 
and the improvement of constraint on state rulers. This willingness is also related to the quality 
of minority shareholder protection and the legal sense, but the direction of the influence 
(positive or negative) is uncertain. The capital supplied by the outside investors will be 
increased by the improvement of protection of minority shareholder, legal sense and constraint 
on state rulers. Hence, the corporate insiders in need of capital have more incentive to improve 
the quality of outside investor protection on firm level (q) and are eager to canvass the state 
rulers to improve the protection of investor on state level (k and p), which has impact on 
outside investors’ investment decision. Before establishing of the corporations, the state rulers 
will trade off their gain and loss from the existing and potential companies and make decisions 
on improving investor protection. If the improvement of the protection of minority shareholder, 
legal sense and the constraint on themselves can encourage the entrepreneurs to start more 
firms and increase their total benefit from the existing and future firms, they will make such 
amelioration.  
Combining the results above, what should be done to reduce the expropriation can be 
obtained. The improvement of legal sense (k) and constraint on state rulers (p) can decrease the 
expropriation by both insider expropriators and state rulers. The strengthening of constraint on 
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insider expropriators (q), higher ownership concentration (f), the increase of expected rate of 
return (R), and the lower capital cost (i) can decrease the expropriation by insider expropriators. 
But not all these measures could be done successfully because the benefit of some 
expropriators will be affected and they will disagree with the improvement. The research 
shows that the following measures will come up against less embarrassment: the improvement 
of legal sense (k), the strengthening of constraint on state rulers (p), the increase of expected 
rate of return (R) and the reduction of capital cost (i).  
Although the Chinese financial market has experienced a fast expansion since 1990, 
compared to other global stock exchanges, the development of Chinese financial market is 
lagged and disproportional to the economic prosperity of the country. So developing the 
financial market in China is very necessary. According to Stulz’ theory, the development of the 
financial market is badly limited when the ownership of the company is concentrated because 
of the Twin Agency Problems. Therefore, this study goes on to make a practical investigation 
of Chinese companies listed on Shanghai, Shenzhen or NYSE to see the actual situation of 
ownership concentration in China and to find some empirical measures to solve the agency 
problems. 
On the basis of annual reports 2007 from 1481 listed companies, it is revealed that only a 
few of the listed companies are ownership dispersed and the average degree of ownership 
concentration of these companies is much higher than most of the other countries in east Asia. 
This indicates that the agency problems are serious in China at the moment and ownership 
concentration is the best choice of most companies.  
The investigation of difference of ownership concentration between companies listed in 
mainland and abroad shows that the Chinese companies listed abroad are not less concentrated 
than those listed inland. Also, the companies listed before on NYSE are not less concentrated 
than those newly listed. This indicates that listing abroad is not an effective way for Chinese 
companies to become less ownership dispersed, although listing abroad is revealed by other 
articles to be a good way to solve agency problems. This study points out that the efforts laid 
inland, which improve the legal sense, laws and regulations inland, are more important than 
listing abroad, because the companies and the expropriators all live in China and are more 
controlled by Chinese laws and regulations.  
The state holding companies are found to be more concentrated than family holding ones 
because state holding companies are very huge and in a country without advanced financial 
market these companies can only be financed by the government. It is also revealed that 
ownership concentration is moderately positively related to capital scale of the company, which 
can be explained as: if the financial market is undeveloped, the sum of the capital supplied by 
 157
the minority shareholders is limited, so that in the companies with greater capital scale the 
shares held by the minority shareholders is lower.  
In the practical research, it is shown that for most industries the ownership concentrated 
companies are more profitable than the dispersed ones, but there is no obvious relativity 
between profitability and ownership concentration. The profitability of family holding 
companies is higher than that of the state holding ones and the profitability of state holding 
companies is less related to their degree of ownership concentration. The widely held 
companies have the lowest profitability, but there exist a few widely held companies, which 
also have good performance. Through the comparison of the profitability between companies 
listed abroad and those listed only inland, it is discovered that, although the average 
profitability of companies listed abroad is lower the standard deviation of profitability of these 
companies is much less than those listed inland. This indicates companies listed abroad are 
more liable as a whole and bad companies are not allowed to step into the foreign stock market. 
And the profitability of companies listed abroad is more related to their ownership 
concentration degree because the market value of these companies are more fairly priced than 
those listed inland and their market value is more related to their performance.  
Of all the 1,481 samples there are only 152 ownership dispersed companies, whose 
ownership is decentralized through direct dispersed structure, indirect dispersed structure, 
pyramid structure or foundation structure. Pyramid structure is most used, but the average 
profitability of these pyramid structured companies is much lower than the indirect dispersed 
ones. Of these 152 dispersed companies only 42 effective companies exist, whose profitability 
is higher than the average of the industry and indirect dispersed structure is more used by these 
effective companies. It is found that most of the indirect dispersed companies are employee-
holding companies, which means the ownership of these companies are decentralized to all 
managers and most of their employees. Employee-holding structure is found to be more 
effective because, the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights of these companies is 
lower; all the managers and employees are encouraged with ownership to do well and they act 
as monitors for each other.  
6.2 Recommendations 
Through all these theoretical and practical researches, the following strategies and 
suggestions are proposed to solve the Twin Agency Problems and make the Chinese financial 
market go further: 
 
a) Improving the legal sense through education 
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The improvement of legal sense increases the cost of theft and decreases the expropriation 
by both inside expropriators and state rulers. Legal sense requires some time and is influenced 
by culture, tradition, history and religion. This strategy should be implemented as a long-term 
policy. Legal sense should be taught from the childhood and in the whole society. The 
Christians are taught to obey the words of God when they go to the church from childhood with 
their parents, which is their original legal sense. But in some countries religion is not common, 
so kindergarten and schools are the important places where legal sense should be taught to the 
future managers and officials.  
 
b) Improving the expected profitability with active economic policies 
Active economic policies include creating more profitable investment opportunities, 
decreasing the rate of interest regulated by the central bank, reducing the rate of taxes, taking 
preferential tax policies and so on. These measures encourage the entrepreneurs to set up more 
new firms or invest more in the company, which give the entrepreneurs more interest to 
improve investor protection and divert less from the company. The state rulers will also grab 
less from one firm, when more firms are expected to be set up, because they know this 
reduction of expropriation can encourage more companies to be built and their total benefit 
from all the firms will increase. Although this strategy will be agreed by all expropriators and 
won’t come up with resistance, it can only be seen as temporal measures and the balance of the 
treasury in one country must be considered.  
 
c) Strengthening the constraint on expropriators through laws and regulations 
Strengthening the constraint means the expropriators are more likely to be caught and the 
punishment is often very severe when they are caught. This increases the cost burdened on the 
expropriators and reduces the fraction diverted by them from the company. This strategy must 
be seen as a long term policy and hence the laws and regulations must be improved and 
modified continuously, since the situation and society changes continuously. Some researches 
find that civil law countries exhibit heavier regulation, less secure property rights, more corrupt 
and less efficient government, and even less political freedom than the common law countries 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 2002; Djankov et al., 2002). Common law countries are more financially developed 
than civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). So, how to develop the financial market 
in a civil law country is an intractable problem for the jurists and economists. 
 
d) Implementing the above three strategies together 
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Strengthening the laws and regulations comes with strong resistance, because it affects the 
benefit of certain persons or existing interest groups, who will canvass the government not to 
do so. But if this strategy is taken together with the other two strategies above, resistance may 
be cut down. When the legal sense is being improved in the whole country, the resistance 
against the modification and perfecting of concrete laws and regulations will be minimized. If 
the economic cycle is in the climbing stage, the expropriators will also agree with the 
betterment of the law system, because this improvement encourages more companies to be set 
up, which benefits the outside investors, entrepreneurs and state rulers.  
 
e) Improving investor protection during the development of financial market 
The improvement of investor protection increases the sum of capital that can be collected 
from the market. This means that the improvement of investor protection is helpful to expand 
the financial market and enhances the possibility for new companies and projects to be created. 
This in turn encourages the state rulers and controlling shareholders to improve the investor 
protection, so that there is a feedback relationship between investor protection and stock market 
development. When better investor protection is expected, companies can issue more equity, 
and this leads to a broad stock market. In truth, more equity issuance expands the shareholder 
base and increases the political support for shareholder protection.  
 
f) Not relying on foreign financial markets but concentrating on the advancement of legal sense, 
laws and regulations inland 
The investigation of Chinese companies shows that listing abroad is not a good way for 
Chinese companies to become ownership dispersed, which indicates that there is no reliance on 
the foreign financial market to improve the corporate governance of Chinese company. This is 
because all the controlling shareholders and state rulers live inland, commit the faults inland 
and can only be constrained and punished by laws and regulations of the country where the 
company is operated. So, what is more important is to get the experiences of foreign countries 
and transplant them inland. This should include the improvement of both legal sense and law 
system inland. Only when those expropriators who live inland have no reason and chance to 
steal from or rob the company, can the ownership of the public traded companies be 
decentralized and distributed to more minority investors. 
 
g) Strictly examine the companies which apply to be listed on the exchanges and prevent the 
bad companies from going into the market 
The evidence of Chinese companies shows that the companies listed abroad are more 
reliable as a whole because the bad companies are not allowed to step into the financial market. 
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The purpose of stock exchange is not to attract more companies but to afford a reliable place of 
financing and investment. So, first of all, the gate of stock exchanges must be carefully 
guarded and the bad and deceitful companies must be obstructed from stepping in. The 
investors will have no faith in these listed companies and the financial market won’t be 
expanded unless the reputation of the financial market can be rebuilt. The entrance standard 
must not be lowered down to let more companies go into the market. 
 
h) Beginning the decentralization of ownership with relative smaller companies 
If the financial market in one country is undeveloped the sum capital that can be financed 
from the stock market is limited. This affects the dispersion of ownership to minority 
shareholders and leads to higher ownership concentration by the controlling shareholders. 
Hence, it will be easier when the process of decentralization is started with the relative smaller 
firms and the capital to be collected at each time can’t be too great. When the investment in 
smaller companies has a high yield and dispersed ownership has been effective, which 
indicates that Twin Agency Problems in these listed companies have been lightened or solved, 
the investors will invest more money in the market and the ownership of relatively greater 
companies can just be dispersed. 
 
i) Transforming the state holding company into employee holding dispersed company 
The higher ownership concentration of state holding companies indicates that the agency 
problems are more serious in the state holding companies. In the future, these state holding 
companies must be transformed, and the investment from the state into these companies will 
decrease continuously. To whom should these companies belong, a few rich families or a great 
deal of common minority shareholders? If transferred to family holding companies, it is 
difficult to find a family who has enough capital to buy the control right of the companies 
because most of these state held companies are very huge. But, if transferred to ownership 
dispersed companies, it is difficult to keep or enhance the performance of these companies 
because most of the widely held companies have poor performance. In the research it is found 
that the dispersed companies held by the employees have a good performance. When the 
ownership is decentralized and transferred to the employees, all of the employees and managers 
will be encouraged by the ownership to do well and they act as monitors to each other, so that 
the top managers have less chance and right to steal from the company. Selling the shares of 
these state holding companies to managers and employees might be a good way to decentralize 
these state holding companies. 
 
j) Eliminating or decreasing the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights 
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The separation of voting rights from cash flow rights gives the ultimate owner more rights 
and reasons to steal from the listed company because he can preserve his control on the listed 
company and at the same time reduce his actual investment in it. So the ultimate controller can 
make decisions to benefit himself, but hurt the company and other investors. Therefore in the 
reform or building of the companies this separation should be avoided.  The direct dispersed 
structure, indirect dispersed structure or foundation holding structure should be the preference 
because these structures have lower separation of voting rights from cash flow right. For the 
existing pyramid structural companies, which have higher separation of voting rights from cash 
flow rights, the voting rights of the ultimate owners should be limited or the ultimate owner 
should put more money in the company.  
 
k) Encouraging and supervising the managers by giving more managers and employees stocks 
or shares of the company 
More managers and employees should hold stocks or indirect shares of the listed companies. 
This encourages them to do well and care more about the performance and the market price of 
the company, but reduces their incentive to divert private benefit from the company. 
Furthermore, if all top managers have ownership in the company they act as monitors for each 
other and everyone has less opportunity to steal from the company. The function of this 
encouragement is similar with the employee-holding ownership structure.  
Appendix  
Appendix 1: Yearly Market Overview of Shanghai Stock Exchange (1990-2008) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of Listed Companies 8 8 29 106 171 188 293 383 438 484 
Number of Listed Securities 30 46 87 190 259 258 368 467 526 576 
 Stocks  525 
 Corporate Bonds  
 Convertible Bonds  
 Treasury Bonds  
 Funds  
 Warrants and Rights   
Stock issued Capital (Mil. Shs) 261 272 4.694 23,554 41,888 56,066 74,986 97,537 128,035 158,015 
Stock Negotiable Capital (Mil. Shs)          49,441 
Stock Market Value (RMB Mil.) 1,234 2,943 55,840 220,620 260,013 252,566 547,781 921,806 1,062,590 1,458,047 
Stock Nego. Market Val (RMB Mil.) 424,969 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
Number of Listed Companies 572 646 715 780 837 834 842 860 864  
Number of Listed Securities 657 744 826 914 996 1,069 1,126 1,125 1,184  
 Stocks  614 690 759 824 881 878 886 904 908  
 Corporate Bonds 11 11 19 27 50 66 73 103  
 Convertible Bonds 1 3 13 19 18 19 12 12  
 Treasury Bonds 19 28 30 44 52 111 113 131  
 Funds 23 25 25 25 25 24 17 16  
  Warrants and Rights       18 6 14  
Stock issued Capital (Mil. Shs) 203,242 316,444 372,784 417,039 470,055 502,305 1,027,954 1,417,310 1,541,000  
Stock Negotiable Capital (Mil. Shs) 64,899 83,753 99,253 115,710 136,658 156,121 225,448 339,930 491,600  
Stock Market Value (RMB Mil.) 2,693,086 2,759,056 2,536,372 2,980,492 2,601,434 2,309,613 7,161,238 26,983,887 9,725,200  
Stock Nego. Market Val (RMB Mil.) 848,133 838,211 74,673 820,114 735,088 2,309,613 1,642,833 6,453,217 3,230,600  
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Appendix 2: Yearly Market Overview of Shenzhen Stock Exchange (1991-2008) 
   1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of Listed Companies 6 24 77 120 135 237 362 413 463 
Number of Listed Securities 7 39 105 212 192 299 429 483 540 
 Stocks  6 33 95 142 161 270 399 454 504 
 Corporate Bonds 1 5 8 6 1 1 2 2 3 
 Convertible Bonds 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 
 Treasury Bonds 0 0 40 13 18 18 16 15 
 Funds 0 0 8 10 10 10 10 16 
  Warrants and Rights  1 1 15 6 0 0 0 0 
Stock issued Capital (Mil. Shs) 357 2,657 12,206 22,059 26,739 43,954 79,586 106,501 132,870 
Stock Negotiable Capital (Mil. Shs) 244 855 3,619 7,757 10,513 15,876 27,506 36,121 45,793 
Other Listed Par (RMB Mil.) 768 2,753 2,808 2,158 5,558 7,558 28,554 
Stock Market Value (RMB Mil.) 7,976 48,975 133,532 109,049 94,862 436,457 831,117 887,973 1,189,070 
Stock Nego. Market Val (RMB Mil.) 3,767 17,064 43,769 38,194 35,122 145,829 269,095 279,815 396,428 
   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of Listed Companies 514 508 508 505 536 544 579 670 740 
Number of Listed Securities 596 598 615 627 673 708 768 868 964 
 Stocks  557 550 551 548 578 586 621 712 782 
 Corporate Bonds 2 1 4 9 13 16 24 26 41 
 Convertible Bonds 3 3 6 10 13 11 7 5 5 
 Treasury Bonds 16 19 25 31 39 53 62 70 85 
 Funds 18 25 29 29 30 39 46 48 48 
  Warrants and Rights 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 7 3 
Stock issued Capital (Mil. Shs) 158,097 167,391 173,515 182,754 200,447 213,365 237,583 278,172 344,186 
Stock Negotiable Capital (Mil. Shs) 58,424 64,335 68,741 74,022 82,281 93,430 117,690 151,122 202,375 
Other Listed Par (RMB Mil.)* 32,860 38,300 54,910 61,850 75,779 79,731 92,899 108,044 128,110 
Stock Market Value (RMB Mil.) 2,116,008 1,593,164 1,296,541 1,265,279 1,104,123 933,415 1,779,152 5,730,202 2,411,453 
Stock Nego. Market Val (RMB Mil.) 760,619 608,106 501,726 497,738 433,776 387,591 857,531 2,853,218 1,290,799 
* Other listed Par includes corporate bonds, convertible bonds, funds and warrants. 
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Appendix 3: Ownership concentration of public traded financial companies in China 
 Ownership concentration  
No. Corporate name Listed on Listed code 
Cash flow 
(%) Owner 
Gross asset 
(th. RMB) 
Net asset 
(th. RMB) 
1 Industry and commercial bank of China Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 601398 70.60 State 8,684,288,000 576,741,000 
2 China Construction Bank Corporation Shanghai, Hong Kong 601939 67.97 State 6,598,177,000 422,281,000 
3 Bank of China Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 601988 67.49 State 5,995,553,000 454,993,000 
4 Bank of Communications Co. Ltd Shanghai, Hong Kong 601328 20.36 State 2,103,626,000 128,797,000 
5 China Merchants Bank Co. Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 600036 17.29 State 1,310,552,000 67,984,000 
6 China Citic Bank Corporation Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 601998 70.61 State 1,011,236,000 84,136,000 
7 China Minsheng Banking Corp., Ltd Shanghai 600016 5.90 Widely held 919,796,410 50,186,175 
8 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co. Ltd  Shanghai 600000 28.41 State 914,980,346 28,297,868 
9 China Life Insurance Company Limited 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
New York 601628 68.37 State 894,604,000 170,213,000 
10 Industry Bank Co. Ltd Shanghai 601166 20.40 State 851,335,270 38,897,077 
11 Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd Shanghai, Hong Kong 601318 0.17 Widely held 651,104,000 107,234,000 
12 Hua Xia Bank Co. Limited Shanghai 600015 25.47 State 592,338,274 13,055,627 
13 Bank of Beijing Co. Ltd Shanghai 601169 10.40 State 354,222,941 26,667,945 
14 Shenzhen Development Bank Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000001 5.57 Widely held 352,539,361 13,006,063 
15 China Pacific Insurance (Group) Co.Ltd. Shanghai 601601 45.46 State 309,010,000 62,807,000 
16 Citic Securities Co. Ltd. Shanghai 600030 30.10 State 189,653,882 46,279,268 
17 Bank of Nanjing Co. Ltd Shanghai 601009 12.99 State 76,063,712 9,942,463 
18 Bank of Ningbo Co. Ltd Shenzhen 002142 10.80 State 75,510,771 8,022,317 
19 Hong Yuan Securities Co. Ltd shenzhen 000562 66.88 State 22,799,755 5,998,519 
20 Guoyuan Securities Companies Limited shenzhen 000728 41.96 State 18,944,188 5,167,938 
21 Northeast Securities Co. Ltd shenzhen 000686 38.69 State 13,410,394 2,138,310 
22 The Pacific Securities Co. Ltd shanghai 601099 12.30 Family Liu 4,933,251 2,025,093 
23 Shanghai AJ Corporation shanghai 600643 22.65 State 2,704,053 1,167,098 
24 Shaanxi International Trust & Investment Corp. Ltd shenzhen 000563 44.34 State 1,389,615 536,059 
25 Anxin Trust & Investment Co. Ltd shanghai 600816 18.43 Family Gao 504,989 146,828 
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Appendix 4: Ownership concentration of top 50 public traded non-financial companies in China 
   Ultimate Owner   
No. Industry Corporate name Listed on 
Listed 
code 
Cash flow 
(%) Owner 
Gross asset 
(th. RMB) 
Net asset 
(th. RMB) 
1 Mining PetroChina Company Limited 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
New York 601857 86.29 State 994,092,000 677,367,000 
2 Mining 
China Petroleum & Chemical 
Corporation 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
New York,  London 600028 75.84 State 718,572,000 300,949,000 
3 Information technology China Mobile Limited NYSE CHL 74.29 State 563,493,000 373,751,000 
4 Information technology China Telecom Corporation Limited NYSE CHA 70.89 State 408,004,000 220,921,000 
5 Mining 
China Shenhua Energy Company 
Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 601088 73.86 State 238,821,000 128,250,000 
6 Construction China Railway Group Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 601390 58.30 State 215,212,719 58,929,469 
7 
Metal and nonmetal 
material Baoshan Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Shanghai 600019 73.97 State 188,336,000 88,504,000 
8 
Petroleum, chemistry and 
plastic CNOOC Limited NYSE CEO 64.41 State 179,793,244 134,314,738 
9 Information technology China Unicom Limited NYSE CHU 71.18 State 149,422,000 97,217,000 
10 Information technology 
China United Telecommunications 
Corporation Limited Shanghai 600050 48.09 State 144,509,225 54,424,091 
11 
Electric power, gas and 
water Huaneng Power International, INC. Shanghai, Hong Kong 600011 32.70 State 122,139,350 46,119,679 
12 
Electric power, gas and 
water 
Datang International Generation Co. 
Ltd Shanghai, Hong Kong 601991 33.74 State 121,515,641 34,007,341 
13 
Comunication, transport 
and storage 
China COSCO Holdings Company 
Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 601919 53.57 State 113,663,440 54,011,157 
14 
Machine, equipment and 
instrument SAIC Motor Corporation Limited Shanghai 600104 83.83 State 101,815,488 37,384,768 
15 Real estate China Vanke Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000002 14.70 State 100,094,468 29,278,648 
16 Wholesale and retail Haitong Securities Company Limited Shanghai 600837 6.75
Widely 
held 95,345,163 36,632,307 
17 
Metal and nonmetal 
material 
Aluminum Corporation of China 
Limited 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
New York 601600 38.56 State 94,338,362 57,924,660 
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A4: Ownership concentration of top 50 public traded non-financial companies in China-continued 
  Ultimate Owner   
No. Industry Corporate name Listed on 
Listed 
code 
Cash flow 
(%) Owner 
Gross asset 
(th. RMB) 
Net asset 
(th. RMB) 
18 
Comunication, transport and 
storage Air China Limited 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
London 601111 51.66 State 88,295,539 31,288,095 
19 Metal and nonmetal material Angang Steel Co. Ltd Shenzhen, Hong Kong 000898 67.28 State 86,786,000 54,255,000 
20 
Comunication, transport and 
storage 
China Southern Airlines Company 
Limited 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
New York 600029 50.30 State 82,453,000 12,232,000 
21 Metal and nonmetal material 
Maanshan Iron & Steel Company 
Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 600808 56.68 State 71,083,141 23,008,971 
22 
Comunication, transport and 
storage 
China Eastern Airlines Corporation 
Limited 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
New York 600115 59.67 State 67,141,714 3,568,007 
23 Electric power, gas and water 
Huadian Power International 
Corporation Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 600027 49.18 State 65,753,194 18,209,755 
24 Metal and nonmetal material 
Wuhan Iron and Steel Company 
Limited. Shanghai 600005 63.82 State 64,946,819 25,772,747 
25 Electric power, gas and water China Yangtze Power Co. ltd. Shanghai 600900 62.60 State 64,314.083 41,253,231 
26 Electric power, gas and water GD Power Development Co. Ltd Shanghai 600795 53.42 State 59,605,767 13,418,864 
27 Mining China Coal Energy Company Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 601898 65.00 State 57,959,436 34,235,428 
28 Metal and nonmetal material 
Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel Co. 
Ltd Shenzhen 000825 70.53 State 57,661,233 16,906,747 
29 
Comunication, transport and 
storage 
Shanghai International Port (Group) 
Co. Ltd Shanghai, Hong Kong 600018 55.13 State 55,542,872 28,201,722 
30 Electron SVA Electron Co. Ltd. Shanghai 600602 18.32 State 52,795,587 2.735,783 
31 
Comunication, transport and 
storage Daqin Railway Co. Ltd Shanghai 601006 72.94 State 51,107,589 37,533,997 
32 Metal and nonmetal material 
Hunan Valin Steel Tube & Wire Co. 
Ltd Shenzhen 000932 33.92 State 48,422,439 14,911,080 
33 
Comunication, transport and 
storage 
China Shipping Container Lines 
Company Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 601866 47.89 State 48,381,402 32,657,980 
34 Real estate Poly Real Estate Group Co. Ltd Shanghai 600048 48.97 State 40,894,664 11,925,244 
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A4: Ownership concentration of top 50 public traded non-financial companies in China-continued 
    Ultimate Owner   
No. Industry Corporate name Listed on 
Listed 
code 
Cash 
flow 
(%) Owner 
Gross asset
(th. RMB) 
Net asset 
(th. RMB) 
35 Metal and nonmetal material 
China International Marine Containers 
(Group) Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000039 18.71 State 40,391,920 15,913,757 
36 
Comunication, transport and 
storage Hainan Airlines Company Limited Shanghai 600221 21.01 State 39,839,946 8,435,434 
37 Information technology ZTE Corporation Shenzhen, Hong Kong 000063 17.89 State 39,173,100 12,137,200 
38 Machine, equipment and instrument Dongfang Electric Corporation Limited Shanghai, Hong Kong 600875 69.87 State 36,378,397 3,007,507 
39 Metal and nonmetal material Tangshan Iron and Steel Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000709 51.11 State 35,613,832 11,116,126 
40 Textile, clothes and leather Youngor Group Co. Ltd Shanghai 600177 7.93 
Widely 
held 35,344,370 15,734,774 
41 Electron 
Semiconductor Manufacturing 
International Corporation New York SMI 10.94 State 34,324,557 21,961,264 
42 Metal and nonmetal material 
Inner Mongolia BaoTou Steel Union Co. 
Ltd. Shanghai 600010 39.41 State 33,626,462 14,074,686 
43 Wholesale and retail Minmetals Development Co. Ltd Shanghai 600058 63.22 State 33,253,570 4,273,480 
44 Metal and nonmetal material Anhui Conch Cement Co. Ltd Shanghai, Hong Kong 600585 20.51 State 31,040,609 11,079,605 
45 Petroleum, chemistry and plastic Shanghai Petrochemical Co. Ltd 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
New York 600688 42.14 State 30,494,334 20,999,444 
46 Machine, equipment and instrument China CSSC Holdings Limited Shanghai 600150 61.06 State 30,477,268 9,359,136 
47 Metal and nonmetal material Jiangxi Copper Co. Ltd 
Shanghai, Hong Kong, 
London, New York 600362 42.41 State 30,054,809 18,382,542 
48 Petroleum, chemistry and plastic 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical 
Company Limited New York SHI 55.56 State 29,853,050 20,952,029 
49 Metal and nonmetal material Bengang Steel Plates Co. Ltd Shenzhen 000761 82.12 State 29,356,299 16,740,763 
50 Machine, equipment and instrument 
Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery Co. 
Ltd Shanghai 600320 30.34 State 29,115,331 11,311,835 
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Appendix 5:  Data of 152 ownership-dispersed public traded companies in China 
  
Ownership 
concentration 
(%)  
Number of 
Managers 
No. Industry Corporate name 
listed 
on 
Listed 
code 
Voting 
right 
Cash 
flow V/C 
Gross asset 
(th RMB) 
Net asset 
(th RMB) 
Net profit 
(th RMB) ROE CR 
Ownership 
structure 
Holding 
shares 
Holding 
stocks 
1 
Finance and 
insurance 
China Minsheng 
Banking Corp., 
Ltd. SHSE 600016 5.90 5.90 1.00 919,796,410 50,186,175 6,335,176 12.62% 0.82 
Direct 
dispersed 0 0 
2 
Finance and 
insurance 
Ping An 
Insurance 
(Group) 
Company of 
China, Ltd. 
SHSE 
and 
HKEx 601318 1.00 1.00 1.00 651,104,000 107,234,000 15,086,000 14.07% 0.92 
Direct 
dispersed 19 4 
3 
Finance and 
insurance 
Shenzhen 
Development 
Bank Co. Ltd. SZSE 000001 1.00 1.00 1.00 352,539,361 13,006,063 2,649,903 20.37% 1.33 Foundation 3 3 
4 
Wholesale 
and retail 
Haitong 
Securities 
Company Ltd. SHSE 600837 6.75 6.75 1.00 953,45,163 36,632,307 5,456,721 14.90% 1.08 
Direct 
dispersed 0 0 
5 
Textile, 
clothese and 
leather 
Youngor Group 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600177 2.,05 7.93 3.03 35,344,370 15,734,774 2,475,710 15.73% 1.88 Pyramid 5 5 
6 Real estate 
Gemdale 
Corporation SHSE 600383 8.94 8.94 1.00 25,314,965 8,442,208 964,970 11.43% 0.99 
Direct 
dispersed 0 0 
7 Mining 
Western Mining 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 601168 28.21 8.80 3.21 15,785,921 10,132,856 1,725,844 17.03% 0.91 Pyramid 0 0 
8 
Textile, 
clothese and 
leather 
China Union 
Holdings Ltd. SZSE 000036 20.89 6.52 3.20 13,422,719 1,654,026 -382,142 -23.10% -2.76 Pyramid 0 0 
9 Mining 
Inner Mongolia 
Yitai Coal 
Company Ltd. SHSE 900948 1.00 1.00 1.00 12,027,749 3,632,919 1,539,976 42.39% 2.26 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 9 0 
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Ownership 
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Holding 
shares 
Holding 
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10 
Food and 
drink 
Inner Mongolia 
Yili Industrial 
Group Co. Ltd. SHSE 600887 10.50 6.41 1.64 10,173,901 4,212,888 -20,599 -0.49% -0.04 Pyramid 4 4 
11 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment TBEA Co. Ltd. SHSE 600089 13.10 4.43 2.96 10,030,575 2,466,661 538,564 21.83% 1.61 Pyramid 7 7 
12 Social service 
DaZhong 
Transportation 
(Group) Co. Ltd. SHSE 600611 1.00 1.00 1.00 9,972,172 4,044,984 466,100 11.52% 1.14 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 7 6 
13 Electron 
Konka Group 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000016 8.70 8.70 1.00 9,277,975 3,785,989 209,198 5.53% 1.13 
Direct 
dispersed 2 2 
14 
Textile, 
clothese and 
leather 
Shanghai Haixin 
Group Co. Ltd. SHSE 600851 8.50 8.50 1.00 8,923,380 5,886,989 5,095 0.09% 0.01 
Direct 
dispersed 4 4 
15 Miscellaneous 
Orient Group 
Incorporation SHSE 600811 27.29 8.89 3.07 8,276,008 4,320,475 154,740 3.58% 0.39 Pyramid 3 3 
16 Miscellaneous 
Shanghai 
DaZhong Public 
Utilities (Group) 
Co. Ltd SHSE 600635 1.00 1.00 1.00 8,184,489 2,350,233 250,103 10.64% 1.16 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 13 13 
17 Miscellaneous 
Guangdong 
Meiyan 
Hydropower Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600868 10.39 1.46 7.13 8,095,800 2,215,821 -161,087 -7.27% -0.79 Pyramid 9 9 
18 
Paper making 
and print 
Dare Technology 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000910 40.00 9.45 4.23 7,897,101 1,833,617 215,624 11.76% 1.00 Pyramid 1 0 
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Holding 
shares 
Holding 
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19 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Zhengzhou 
Yutong Bus Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600066 15.00 3.67 4.08 7,895,888 2,658,198 376,964 14.18% 1.05 Pyramid 8 8 
20 
Wholesale and 
retail 
Shanghai 
Yuyuan Tourist 
Mart Co. Ltd. SHSE 600655 17.26 7.78 2.22 7,010,760 3,164,652 760,181 24.02% 1.74 Pyramid 6 4 
21 Mining 
Shanxi Lanhua 
Sci-tech 
Venture Co. Ltd SHSE 600123 33.79 5.86 5.76 6,682,128 2,874,037 576,702 20.07% 1.07 Pyramid 9 9 
22 
Textile, 
clothese and 
leather 
Lu Thai Textile 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000726 14.31 3.01 4.76 5,869,633 2,266,024 459,725 20.29% 2.42 Pyramid 12 12 
23 Miscellaneous 
China Baoan 
Group Co. Ltd. SZSE 000009 11.64 9.95 1.17 5,839,300 1,709,735 230,389 13.48% 1.47 Pyramid 4 4 
24 
Medicine and 
biology 
Jilin AoDong 
Medicine 
Industry Croup 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000623 1.00 1.00 1.00 5,638,500 4,608,095 1,992,260 43.23% 3.90 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 9 4 
25 
Information 
technology 
Founder 
Technology 
Group Corp. SHSE 600601 11.39 7.88 1.44 5,328,326 2,680,741 208,124 7.76% 0.49 Pyramid 0 0 
26 
Electric 
power, gas and 
water 
Shenyang 
Jinshan Energy 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600396 29.80 10.52 2.83 5,255,135 978,340 111,599 11.41% 1.14 Pyramid 6 6 
27 
Petroleum, 
chemistry and 
plastic 
Zhuhai Zhongfu 
Enterprise Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000659 1.00 1.00 1.00 5,111,758 1,856,159 85,960 4.63% 0.31 Foundation 0 0 
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28 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
Xishui Strong Year 
Co. Ltd. Inner 
Mongloia SHSE 600291 14.58 1.57 9.29 4,894,561 3,830,491 31,758 0.83% 0.06 Pyramid 0 0 
29 
Electric 
power, gas 
and water 
Shandong Luneng 
Taishan Cable Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000720 26.07 9.44 2.76 4,756,124 1,193,484
-
126,489
-
10.60%
-
1.06 Pyramid 2 2 
30 
Electric 
power, gas 
and water 
Wuhan Kaidi 
Electric Power Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000939 7.50 1.00 7.50 4,694,555 1,174,270 321,982 27.42% 2.75
Indirect 
dispersed - 
non-
employee 
holding 1 1 
31 Electron 
Jiangsu Changjiang 
Electronics 
Technology Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600584 16.21 8.27 1.96 4,463,516 1,586,219 141,445 8.92% 1.82 Pyramid 1 0 
32 
Machine, 
equipment 
and 
instrucment Trina Solar Ltd. NYSE TSL 9.54 9.54 1.00 4,378,913 2,678,995 260,472 9.72% 0.72
Direct 
dispersed 14 12 
33 Miscellaneous
Shanghai Ace Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600652 9.09 2.73 3.33 4,368,633 873,954 25,557 2.92% 0.32
Direct 
dispersed 2 2 
34 
Information 
technology 
Insigam 
Technology Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600797 17.36 1.95 8.88 4,213,712 1,411,257 152,293 10.79% 0.68 Pyramid 0 0 
35 Miscellaneous
Zhejiang China 
Light & Textile 
Industrial City 
Group Co. Ltd. SHSE 600790 26.11 3.00 8.70 4,184,066 1,141,379 138,945 12.17% 1.33 Pyramid 9 4 
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36 Food and drink 
Henan 
Shuanghui 
Investment & 
Development 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000895 1.00 1.00 1.00 4,024,117 2,177,648 561,881 25.80% 2.07 Foundation 4 4 
37 
Communication, 
transport and 
storage 
Jinzhou Port Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600190 24.33 2.17 11.22 3,934,759 1,392,785 61,331 4.40% 0.28 Pyramid 4 4 
38 
Wholesale and 
retail 
Beijing Hualian 
Hypermarket 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600361 22.78 3.96 5.75 3,832,738 1,646,870 202,083 12.27% 0.89 Pyramid 0 0 
39 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Beihai Yinhe 
Hi-Tech 
Industrial Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000806 15.55 5.02 3.10 3,743,847 1,522,144 11,738 0.77% 0.06 Pyramid 5 5 
40 
Petroleum, 
chemistry and 
plastic 
Ningxia 
Yinglite 
Chemicals Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000635 17.79 3.77 4.72 3,723,785 367,814 97,027 26.38% 1.75 Pyramid 0 0 
41 
Petroleum, 
chemistry and 
plastic 
Inner Mongolia 
Yuan Xing 
Energy 
Company Ltd. SZSE 000683 21.02 4.63 4.54 3,633,720 636,013 114,502 18.00% 1.19 Pyramid 3 3 
42 Construction 
Changjiang & 
Jinggong Steel 
Building 
(Group) Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600496 28.72 5.22 5.50 3,613,339 756,694 99,886 13.20% 1.87 Pyramid 1 0 
43 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Fujin Longking 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600388 21.98 9.56 2.30 3,540,664 1,054,231 124,295 11.79% 0.87 Pyramid 2 1 
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Holding 
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44 Miscellaneous 
Huawen Media 
Investment 
Corporation SZSE 000793 20.31 9.64 2.11 3,454,682 1,961,836 131,033 6.68% 0.73 Pyramid 1 1 
45 Food and drink
Yantai Changyu 
Pioneer Wine Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000869 1.00 1.00 1.00 3,251,224 2,229,020 635,628 28.52% 2.28 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 5 0 
46 
Medicine and 
biology 
Tianjin Tasly 
Pharmaceutical 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600535 50.02 7.65 6.54 3,094,334 1,818,288 177,743 9.78% 0.88 Pyramid 1 0 
47 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Holley 
Pharmaceuticals 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000607 23.52 6.91 3.41 3,058,735 568,916 -199,111 -35.00% -2.59 Pyramid 10 5 
48 Social service 
Shanghai 
QiangSheng 
Holding Co. Ltd. SHSE 600662 1.00 1.00 1.00 3,046,048 1,408,395 213,011 15.12% 1.50 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 8 7 
49 Food and drink
V V Food & 
Beverage Co. Ltd SHSE 600300 1.00 1.00 1.00 2,978,478 1,497,882 85,630 5.72% 0.46 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 2 0 
50 Miscellaneous 
Shenzhen 
Huaqiang 
Industry Co. Ltd. SZSE 000062 38.29 9.93 3.86 2,784,875 1,760,655 116,411 6.61% 0.72 Pyramid 6 5 
51 
Petroleum, 
chemistry and 
plastic 
Sichuan Jinlu 
Group Co. Ltd. SZSE 000510 9.45 5.41 1.75 2,745,108 1,190,537 80,665 6.78% 0.45 
Direct 
dispersed 2 2 
52 
Textile, 
clothese and 
leather 
Ningbo Veken 
Elite Group Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600152 24.28 4.28 5.67 2,692,293 860,030 110,463 12.84% 1.53 Pyramid 6 0 
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53 
Information 
technology 
Daheng New 
Epoch 
Technology, Inc. SHSE 600288 20.00 5.52 3.62 2,560,820 928,560 67,501 7.27% 0.46 Pyramid 0 0 
54 Miscellaneous 
Jonjee Hi-Tech 
Industrial & 
Commercial 
Holding Co. Ltd. SHSE 600872 8.76 8.76 1.00 2,552,781 1,458,411 73,981 5.07% 0.55 
Direct 
dispersed 0 0 
55 
Petroleum, 
chemistry and 
plastic 
Guangdong 
Xinhui Media 
Nylon Co. Ltd. SZSE 000782 20.23 6.64 3.05 2,532,695 1,000,904 37,566 3.75% 0.25 Pyramid 6 3 
56 
Petroleum, 
chemistry and 
plastic 
Baotou 
Tomorrow 
Technology Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600091 10.32 1.67 6.18 2,531,217 1,851,019 10,241 0.55% 0.04 Pyramid 2 2 
57 
Medicine and 
biology 
WuXi Pharma 
Tech Inc. NYSE WX 1.00 1.00 1.00 2,506,120 1,832,691 247,153 13.49% 1.22 Foundation 8 7 
58 Real estate 
Celebrities Real 
Estate 
Development 
Group Co. Ltd. SZSE 000667 18.82 7.53 2.50 2,493,533 1,439,734 295,764 20.54% 1.77 Pyramid 1 0 
59 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Huayi 
Compressor Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000404 29.92 9.16 3.26 2,409,717 419,806 7,897 1.88% 0.14 Pyramid 1 1 
60 
Information 
technology 
Ningbo Bird Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600130 21.23 7.64 2.78 2,379,443 756,788 -593,640 -78.44% -4.93 Pyramid 1 0 
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61 Agriculture 
Haikou 
Agriculture & 
Industry 
(Luoniushan) Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000735 10.31 2.61 3.95 2,347,263 1,409,249 366,218 25.99% 3.08 Pyramid 7 7 
62 
Petroleum, 
chemistry and 
plastic 
Shandong Shengli 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000407 3.18 1.00 3.18 2,315,213 644,024 22,318 3.47% 0.23 
Direct 
dispersed 5 5 
63 Food and drink 
Sichuan Swellfun 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600779 1.00 1.00 1.00 2,263,962 1,302,831 201,240 15,45% 1.24 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 18 17 
64 Real estate 
Dongguan 
Winnerway 
Industrial Zone 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000573 13.98 8.25 1.69 2,230,880 1,473,227 32,572 2.21% 0.19 Pyramid 3 3 
65 Miscellaneous 
Shenzhen 
Hongkai (Group) 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000040 13.17 4.39 3.00 2,227,239 996,359 76,936 7.72% 0.84 Pyramid 5 5 
66 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
Chengdu Dr. Peng 
Technology Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600804 9.99 5.88 1.70 2,223,926 1,516,354 168,316 11.10% 0.75 
Direct 
dispersed 2 1 
67 
Information 
technology 
China Scholars 
Group Co. Ltd. SZSE 000547 19.96 6.57 3.04 2,221,430 1,706,491 18,102 1.06% 0.07 Pyramid 2 1 
68 Real estate 
Shenyang 
Ingenious 
Development Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000511 20,34 6,89 2.95 2,160,723 1,296,664 141,683 10.93% 0.94 Pyramid 2 2 
69 Electron 
Hangzhou Silan 
Microelectronics 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600460 17.40 9.19 1.89 2,135,022 939,810 21,582 2.30% 0.47 Pyramid 11 11 
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70 
Communication, 
transport and 
storage 
Zhejiang Haiyue 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600387 18.53 4.06 4.57 2,058,683 1,032,814 159,917 15.48% 0.99 Pyramid 17 17 
71 Miscellaneous 
JiangSu 
WuZhong 
Industrial Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600200 20.00 4.26 4.70 2,002,212 803,458 -64,327 -8.01% -0.88 Pyramid 6 6 
72 
Electric power, 
gas and water 
Qianjiang Water 
Resources 
Development Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600283 25.55 9.42 2.71 1,973,642 1,017,791 33,551 3.30% 0.33 Pyramid 0 0 
73 Agriculture 
Yuan Longping 
High-Tech 
Agriculture Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000998 22.22 6.84 3.25 1,944,805 1,049,916 49,331 4.70% 0.56 Pyramid 3 2 
74 Electron 
China Digital TV 
Holding Co. Ltd. NYSE STV 25.80 9.98 2.59 1,922,628 1,806,834 246,519 13.64% 2.78 Pyramid 9 6 
75 
Wholesale and 
retail 
Kunming 
Sinobright 
(Group) Co. Ltd. SZSE 000560 35.08 9.86 3.56 1,897,979 86,801 74,930 86.32% 6.24 Pyramid 2 1 
76 Construction 
Keda Group Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600986 19.00 9.69 1.96 1,778,297 576,880 8,022 1.39% 0.20 Pyramid 1 1 
77 
Paper making 
and print 
Jincheng Paper 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000820 27.30 5.15 5.30 1,750,398 401,854 90,363 22.49% 1.91 Pyramid 6 4 
78 Miscellaneous 
China Hi-Tech 
Group Co. Ltd. SHSE 600730 12.50 3.04 4.11 1,679,256 687,832 218,613 31.78% 3.47 Pyramid 0 0 
79 
Medicine and 
biology 
Shanghai Jiaoda 
Onlly Co. Ltd. SHSE 600530 17.73 6.82 2.60 1,675,369 1,005,604 5,110 0.51% 0.05 Pyramid 0 0 
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80 Miscellaneous 
Feilo 
Acoustics Co. 
Ltd. Shanghai SHSE 600651 6.21 6.21 1.00 1,591,590 814,861 53,875 6.61% 0.72 
Direct 
dispersed 2 2 
81 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Guangdong 
Mingzhu 
Group Co. Ltd. SHSE 600382 23.49 5.79 4.05 1,582,105 753,914 90,029 11.94% 0.88 Pyramid 1 1 
82 Miscellaneous 
Wuhan East 
Lake High 
Technology 
Group Co. Ltd. SHSE 600133 7.50 1.00 7.50 1,571,183 808,226 32,165 3.98% 0.43 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
non-
employee 
holding 0 0 
83 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Sundiro 
Holding Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000571 12.16 1.86 6.55 1,565,759 1,001,380 22,511 2.25% 0.17 Pyramid 1 1 
84 
Textile, clothese 
and leather 
Jiangsu 
Sanfangxiang 
Industry Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600370 27.04 7.81 3.46 1,538,094 1,111,101 57,705 5.19% 0.62 Pyramid 7 7 
85 
Medicine and 
biology 
Guangxi 
Beisheng 
Pharmaceutical 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600556 13.84 2.85 4.85 1,492,017 438,488 -319,120 -72.78% -6.57 Pyramid 1 0 
86 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
Xinjiang 
Jionworid Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600888 13.10 1.44 9.10 1,469,723 617,691 120,340 19.48% 1.32 Pyramid 1 0 
87 Miscellaneous 
Shenzhen 
Fountain 
Corporation  SZSE 000005 20.14 6.71 3.00 1,457,024 750,360 77,375 10.31% 1.13 Pyramid 2 0 
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88 
Wholesale and 
retail 
Xian Kaiyuan 
Holding Group 
Company Ltd. SZSE 000516 19.78 2.07 9.57 1,450,059 537,694 79,243 14.74% 1.07 Pyramid 1 1 
89 
Information 
technology 
Beijing Tianqiao 
Beida Jade Bird 
Sci-Tech Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600657 12.79 3.33 3.85 1,437,840 73,200 -76,457 -104.45% -6.57 Pyramid 0 1 
90 Electron 
Guoguang 
Electric Co. Ltd. SZSE 002045 30.58 9.40 3.25 1,404,143 710,114 78,713 11.08% 2.26 Pyramid 8 0 
91 
Food and 
drink 
Shandong Hiking 
International Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600735 19.17 8.10 2.37 1,391,712 155,708 112,770 72.42% 5.80 Pyramid 5 0 
92 
Food and 
drink 
Guangxi Guitang 
(Group) Co. Ltd. SZSE 000833 18.69 3.32 5.63 1,320,464 699,209 61,951 8.86% 0.71 Pyramid 4 4 
93 
Medicine and 
biology 
Inner Mongolia 
Jinyu Group Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600201 14.46 4.45 3.25 1,295,207 697,820 92,925 13.32% 1.20 Pyramid 9 6 
94 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
Sichuan Golden 
Summit (Group) 
Joint-Stock Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600678 18.65 9.51 1.96 1,276,503 416,251 25,705 6.18% 0.42 Pyramid 3 2 
95 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
QingHai 
HuaDing 
Industrial Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600243 50.00 8.39 5.96 1,220,738 483,588 32,911 6.81% 0.50 Pyramid 3 2 
96 
Medicine and 
biology 
Kunming 
Pharmaceutical 
Corp. SHSE 600422 23.29 5.60 4.16 1,190,148 574,509 29,069 5.06% 0.46 Pyramid 0 0 
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97 
Wholesale 
and retail 
Xi'an Minsheng 
Group Co. Ltd. SZSE 000564 1.00 1.00 1.00 1,187,594 591,146 22,771 3.85% 0.28 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 5 5 
98 Electron 
Tianshui Huatian 
Technology Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 002185 1.00 1.00 1.00 1,186,020 788,999 80,899 10.25% 2.09 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 4 0 
99 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
NBTM New 
Materials Group 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600114 27.65 9.22 3.00 1,169,586 600,226 21,375 3.56% 0.24 Pyramid 4 1 
100 
Wholesale 
and retail 
Beijing Hualian 
Development 
Store Co. Ltd. SZSE 000882 25.14 6.90 3.64 1,136,503 587,220 25,586 4.36% 0.32 Pyramid 4 4 
101 
Other 
manufacture 
Zhejiang Weixing 
Industrial 
Development Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 002003 12.72 9.27 1.37 1,088,453 536,420 115,716 21.57% 1.36 Pyramid 5 3 
102 
Petroleum, 
chemistry 
and plastic 
Hebei Weiyuan 
Bio-chemical Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600803 29.74 5.42 5.49 1,077,675 369,160 16,690 4.52% 0.30 Pyramid 0 0 
103 
Medicine 
and biology 
Shanxi Yabao 
Pharmaceutical 
Group Co. Ltd. SHSE 600351 20.07 6.02 3.33 1,074,311 360,257 45,060 12.51% 1.13 Pyramid 0 0 
104 
Machine, 
equipment 
and 
instrucment 
Zhejiang 
Jinggong Science 
& Technology 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 002006 28.72 9.06 3.17 1,053,826 335,233 5,206 1.55% 0.11 Pyramid 5 3 
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Ownership 
concentration (%)    
Number of 
Managers 
No. Industry Corporate name listed on 
Listed 
code 
Voting 
right 
Cash 
flow V/C 
Gross 
asset (th 
RMB) 
Net asset
(th 
RMB) 
Net 
profit (th 
RMB) ROE CR 
Ownership 
structure 
Holding 
shares 
Holding 
stocks 
105 
Electric 
power, gas 
and water 
Shantou Electric 
Power 
Development Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000534 18.68 9.68 1.93 976,721 658,297 144,182 21.90% 2.20 Pyramid 3 2 
106 
Wholesale 
and retail 
Sanlian 
Commercial Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600898 1.00 1.00 1.00 952,973 339,048 -5,655 -1.67% -0.12 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 2 0 
107 
Medicine 
and biology 
Henan Lingrui 
Pharmaceutical 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600285 9.96 9.96 1.00 942,551 559,979 69,497 12.41% 1.12 
Direct 
dispersed 2 2 
108 Real estate 
Hainan Pearl 
River Holdings 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000505 25.31 7.83 3.23 939,167 195,690 -31,200 -15.94% -1.38 Pyramid 1 1 
109 
Information 
technology 
Shandong Inspur 
Software  Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600756 26.50 5.77 4.59 937,415 559,618 18,362 3.28% 0.21 Pyramid 0 0 
110 
Information 
technology 
Hundsun 
Technologies Inc. SHSE 600570 18.84 7.49 2.52 917,122 591,248 126,418 21.38% 1.34 Pyramid 10 10 
111 
Information 
technology 
Shanghai 
Broadband 
Technology Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600608 8.52 6.41 1.33 905,807 105,792 25,472 24.08% 1.51 
Direct 
dispersed 6 6 
112 
Wholesale 
and retail 
The First 
Investment & 
Merchant Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600515 23.59 9.60 2.46 900,224 138,479 135,593 97.92% 7.08 Pyramid 4 3 
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Ownership 
concentration 
(%)  Number of Managers 
No. Industry Corporate name 
listed 
on 
Listed 
code 
Voting 
right 
Cash 
flow V/C 
Gross 
asset (th 
RMB) 
Net asset 
(th RMB)
Net profit 
(th RMB) ROE CR 
Ownership 
structure 
Holding 
shares 
Holding 
stocks 
113 
Medicine and 
biology 
Wuhan Jianmin 
Pharmaceutical 
Groups Corp. Ltd. SHSE 600976 20.87 5.01 4.16 885,696 716,591 8,326 1.16% 0.10 Pyramid 3 1 
114 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
Anhui Chaodong 
Cement Co. Ltd. SHSE 600318 33.06 7.58 4.36 866,927 514,081 22,314 4.34% 0.29 Pyramid 1 0 
115 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
Zhongshan 
Vantage Gas 
Appliance Stock 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 002035 39.00 9.04 4.31 866,497 330,353 14,818 4.49% 0.30 Pyramid 5 1 
116 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Wuzhou Minovo 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600873 16.00 3.27 4.90 836,487 218,799 11,558 5.28% 0.39 Pyramid 7 4 
117 
Information 
technology 
Chang An 
Information 
Industry (Group) 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600706 12.68 3.17 4.00 828,557 29,770 6,497 21.82% 1.37 Pyramid 1 0 
118 
Other 
manufacture 
Xinlong Holding 
(Group) Company 
Ltd. SZSE 000955 20.95 6.49 3.23 808,416 359,534 -54,245 -15.09% -0.95 Pyramid 1 0 
119 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Hubei Hongcheng 
Cereral Machinery 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600566 3.94 1.00 3.94 802,322 497,822 10,876 2.18% 0.16 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 1 1 
120 Construction 
Shenzhen Universe 
(Group) Co. Ltd. SZSE 000023 15.00 4.78 3.14 799,195 294,707 20,166 6.84% 0.97 Pyramid 8 2 
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Ownership 
concentration (%)  
Number of 
Managers 
No. Industry 
Corporate 
name listed on 
Listed 
code 
Voting 
right 
Cash 
flow V/C 
Gross 
asset (th 
RMB) 
Net asset 
(th RMB)
Net profit 
(th RMB) ROE CR 
Ownership 
structure 
Holding 
shares 
Holding 
stocks 
121 Agriculture 
Yunnan 
Jinggu 
Forestry Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600265 24.11 7.23 3.33 796,806 378,564 33,289 8.79% 1.04 Pyramid 1 0 
122 
Wholesale 
and retail 
Baoji 
Department 
Store (Group) 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 000796 1.00 1.00 1.00 782,176 378,737 1,671 0.44% 0.03 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 2 2 
123 
Information 
technology 
Weifang 
Beida Jadebird 
Huaguang 
Technology 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600076 17.62 4.58 3.85 750,825 103,771 -155,105 -149.47% -9.40 Pyramid 2 2 
124 
Machine, 
equipment 
and 
instrucment 
Guizhou 
Changzhen 
Electrical 
Apparatus Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600112 32.27 7.96 4.06 714,866 404,409 32,896 8.13% 0.60 Pyramid 0 0 
125 
Medicine 
and biology 
Chengdu 
Hoist Inc., 
Ltd. SZSE 000790 24.00 6.93 3.46 704,754 388,709 1,846 0.47% 0.04 Pyramid 3 3 
126 Construction
Shanghai 
Lingyun 
Industries 
Development 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 900957 24.26 4.75 5.10 698,320 376,945 2,344 0.62% 0.09 Pyramid 0 0 
127 
Wholesale 
and retail 
Jilin Wuhua 
Group Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600247 8.99 8.99 1.00 675,203 472,427 14,631 3.10% 0.22 
Direct 
dispersed 3 3 
182 
Appendix 5: Information of 152 ownership-dispersed public traded companies in China-Continued 
  
Ownership 
concentration 
(%)  
Number of 
Managers 
No. Industry Corporate name listed on 
Listed 
code 
Votin
g right
Cash 
flow V/C
Gross 
asset (th 
RMB) 
Net asset 
(th RMB) 
Net profit 
(th RMB) ROE CR 
Ownership 
structure 
Holdin
g 
shares 
Holding 
stocks 
128 Miscellaneous 
Hainan 
Huandao 
Industry Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000691 9.97 5.18 1.92 663,567 389,916 24,345 6.24% 0.68 
Direct 
dispersed 1 1 
129 
Communicatio
n, transport and 
storage 
Ningbo Fubang 
Jingye Group 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600768 13.50 1.99 6.78 662,487 212,262 3,933 1.85% 0.12 Pyramid 7 1 
130 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Shanghai 
Hanbell Precise 
Machinery Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 002158 22.80 8.39 2.72 643,257 512,478 53,725 10.48% 0.77 Pyramid 1 0 
131 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Hubei Bothwin 
Investment Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000760 21.20 4.81 4.41 626,056 285,390 62,322 21.84% 1.61 Pyramid 2 1 
132 
Medicine and 
biology 
Shanghai Kehua 
Bio-Engineering 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 002022 8.12 8.12 1.00 612,642 459,213 117,997 25.70% 2.32 
Direct 
dispersed 4 1 
133 
Textile, 
clothese and 
leather 
NingBo YAK 
Technology 
Industrial Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 002036 23.09 4.96 4.65 570,739 336,960 16,579 4.92% 0.59 Pyramid 3 3 
134 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Jiangxi Special 
Electric Motor 
Co. Ltd. SZSE 002176 25.42 7.98 3.18 525,138 335,694 31,468 9.37% 0.69 Pyramid 7 7 
135 
Petroleum, 
chemistry and 
plastic 
Shanghai 
FengHWA Ball 
Pen Co. Ltd. SHSE 600615 21.13 4.31 4.91 521,841 173,049 4,093 2.37% 0.16 Pyramid 0 0 
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Ownership 
concentration 
(%)  
Number of 
Managers 
No. Industry Corporate name 
listed 
on 
Listed 
code 
Votin
g right
Cash 
flow V/C
Gross asset 
(th RMB) 
Net asset 
(th RMB) 
Net profit 
(th RMB) ROE CR 
Ownership 
structure 
Holding 
shares 
Holding 
stocks 
136 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
Jiangsu Tongrun 
Tool Cabinet Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 002150 12.93 7,84 1.65 474,703 397,524 53,195 13.38% 0.90 Pyramid 0 0 
137 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
Chong Qing 
Dong Yuan 
Industry 
Development Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000656 13.14 5.36 2.45 462,345 409,834 19,557 4.77% 0.32 Pyramid 4 0 
138 
Machine, 
equipment and 
instrucment 
Zhejiang Holley 
Technology Co. 
Ltd. SHSE 600097 21.51 5.53 3.89 402,084 179,558 3,644 2.03% 0.15 Pyramid 2 0 
139 
Medicine and 
biology 
Wuhan Guoyao 
Keji Co. Ltd. SHSE 600421 23.85 8.52 2.80 390,980 28,193 -445,113 -1578.81% -142.54 Pyramid 1 0 
140 
Communication, 
transport and 
storage 
Yan Bian Road 
Construction Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000776 1.00 1.00 1.00 385,447 257,360 11,340 4.41% 0.28 
Indirect 
dispersed - 
employee 
holding 5 1 
141 Food and drink 
Tonghua Grape 
Wine Co. Ltd. SHSE 600365 17.53 7.19 2,44 323,262 191,597 -264,189 -137.89% -11.04 Pyramid 1 0 
142 Miscellaneous 
Hainan Haide 
Industry Co. Ltd. SZSE 000567 22.33 4.60 4.85 287,845 129,413 24,809 19.17% 2.10 Pyramid 4 1 
143 
Wholesale and 
retail 
Shenzhen 
Huaxin Co. Ltd. SZSE 000010 23.00 2.66 8.66 285,950 110,872 -28,869 -26.04% -1.88 Pyramid 0 0 
144 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
Hunan Ginde 
Development Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000639 20.91 2.33 8.99 270,325 127,535 3,290 2.58% 0.17 Pyramid 3 3 
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Ownership 
concentration 
(%)  Number of Managers 
No. Industry Corporate name 
listed 
on 
Listed 
code 
Voting 
right 
Cash 
flow V/C 
Gross 
asset (th 
RMB) 
Net asset 
(th RMB) 
Net profit 
(th RMB) ROE CR 
Ownership 
structure 
Holding 
shares 
Holding 
stocks 
145 
Textile, clothese 
and leather 
Shenzhen Victor 
Onward Textile 
Industrial Co. Ltd. SZSE 000018 20.89 6.55 3.19 229,452 169,602 -116,357 -68.61% -8.18 Pyramid 0 0 
146 
Textile, clothese 
and leather 
Sichuan Jinyu 
Automobile City 
(Group) Co. Ltd. SZSE 000803 23.51 8.15 2.89 226,463 103,497 6,086 5.88% 0.70 Pyramid 3 3 
147 
Textile, clothese 
and leather 
Sichuan Joint-Wit 
Medical & 
Pharmaceutical 
Industry Co. Ltd. SZSE 000809 20.00 7.74 2.58 224,980 130,860 5,902 4.51% 0.54 Pyramid 2 1 
148 Miscellaneous 
Hubei Xingfu 
Industry Co. Ltd. SHSE 600743 19.18 7.67 2.50 204,319 6,713 1,881 28.02% 3.06 Pyramid 0 0 
149 
Metal and 
nonmetal 
material 
Dongxin 
Electrical Carbon 
Co. Ltd. SHSE 600691 28.58 9.00 3.17 143,812 2,860 25,558 893.64% 60.35 Pyramid 1 1 
150 
Information 
technology 
Powerise 
Information 
Technology Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000787 11.79 6.01 1.96 141,166 3,207 43,226 1347.86% 84.78 Pyramid 0 0 
151 Social service 
Hainan 
Dadonghai 
Tourism Centre 
(Holdings) Co. 
Ltd. SZSE 000613 10.31 1.00 10.31 135,406 73,693 139,159 188.84% 18.76 Pyramid 1 1 
152 
Wholesale and 
retail 
Along Tibet Co. 
Ltd. PLC SHSE 600773 19.70 6.60 2.99 124,738 11,984 -51,811 -432.33% 
-
31.26 Pyramid 1 0 
185 
Note: 
1. Voting rights concentration: voting rights held by ultimate owner. 
2. Cash flow rights concentration: cash flow rights held by ultimate owner. 
3. V/C = voting rights concentration /cash flow rights concentration. 
4. Gross asset and net asset come from balance on 31. Dec. 2007, net profit is the profit or loss in 2007. 
5. CR= ROE of the firm / ROE of the industry. 
6. Number of managers holding shares: Number of top managers who direct or indirect hold shares in the listed company.  
7. Number of top managers holding stocks: Number of top managers who direct hold stocks of the listed company. 
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